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This dissertation examines the recent introduction of U.S.-style, image-based political 
management techniques into Colombian politics, a phenomenon facilitated by the 
comprehensive market and political reforms of the 1990s. The Colombian elites who 
favored these reforms hoped to dismantle the clientelistic networks of private interests 
that, in their view, perpetuated a corrupt, ineffective, and at times, collusive two-party 
system. They hoped that a multi-party system would provide Colombian voters with real 
political choice. However, despite these efforts, clientelism continues to thrive under the 
new regime. With party/faction loyalty no longer the dominant driver in elections, 
campaigns now hire political managers to guide voters’ choices based on individual 
candidates’ appeal. Ironically, these practices have created “electoral industries,” 
networks of voters organized around political figures as opposed to party platforms. 
These electoral industries have easily adapted to existing clientelistic networks, the very 
networks the reforms were meant to dismantle. Meanwhile, through the language of 
market segmentation, political elites have publicly moralized clientelism’s resilience, 
characterizing it as a persistent, anti-modern behavior that can be objectively correlated 
with lower class voters. Their portrait of clientelism stands in stark contrast to the liberal 
political subjectivity (grounded in individual choice) that they attribute to urban middle 
and upper classes.! According! to! these! ideas,! political! managers! mobilize! specific!
technologies!meant!to!more!effectively!manage!each!kind!of!vote.!While!lower!class!voters! are! managed! through! face=to=face! networks! and! informal! channels! of!communication,! middle! and! upper! class! voters! are! reached! through! broadcast!media!and!web=based!social!media.!By!looking!at!the!institutional!platforms,!expert!knowledge,! political! technologies! and! normative! political! ideas! at! work! in! the!organization!of!these!environments!for!political!participation,!my!work!explores!the!features!of!liberalism!that!allow!clientelism!and!media=based!politics!to!coexist,!and!even! thrive,!under!a!single!system.!Specifically,! I! trace! the!emergence!of!a! form!of!“strategic!citizenship,”!to!borrow!Partha!Chatterjee’s!term,!that!I!argue!is!the!latest!guise!that!the!transactional!dimensions!of!liberalism!has!taken.!!
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Introduction*
 
The Colombian congressional and presidential elections in 2010 were the first 
elections in which web based social media were used for campaigning purposes. The 
introduction of these new technologies in electoral politics revived long-standing debates 
in Colombian public culture about the pragmatics and ideals of politics in a country 
marked by social exclusion and war. During these elections, the different spaces used for 
political campaigning embodied a widespread sense that class radically fractures 
Colombia. Political campaigners, political analysts and the broader public saw the use of 
the new social media spaces and other media as the natural environment of a middle and 
upper class urban vote, commonly known as the voto de opinión [opinion or informed 
vote]. The spaces of face-to-face politics, on the other hand, were mostly associated with 
poor urban and rural populations, known as voto amarrado [tied vote]. The voto de 
opinión is thought to be an informed and free voter who will vote moved by individual 
thoughts and emotions. The voto amarrado, on the contrary, is conceived to be the voter 
moved by economic need, who belongs to close-knit networks of allegiance and seeks 
security through these networks. This conceived split in political subjectivity is rehashed 
election after election, and informs the planning and implementation of campaign 
strategies, as well as the design of the spaces for political participation.  
This dissertation looks at the mechanisms by which political elites have 
reproduced forms of social distinction within politics despite a nominal commitment to 
participatory politics, political inclusion and multiculturalism. I pay special attention to 
how notions of political modernity and pre-modernity, the values associated with political 
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properness and democratic ideals are mapped to match different class environments. 
Political marketing has provided the technical tools for political elites to de-politicize 
class discourses and present them as objective observations on political behavior. I 
particularly look at how the language of market segmentation has been appropriated by 
political elites to reproduce a vertical social order and segmented forms of political 
participation. For this purpose, I take a close look at the political marketing and 
management industry in Colombia during elections, as well as the electoral monitoring 
NGOs standing in opposition and that work everyday to transform Colombia’s 
authoritarian political culture.  
At first glance, this may seem as a familiar story: elites reproducing class 
divisions by juxtaposing discourses of political modernity to refer to their political 
values, and discourses of anti-modernity to scorn “traditional” forms of political 
behavior. But the story that I tell in this dissertation is different. I argue that the 
introduction of political marketing into Colombian politics, and the moralization of 
media-based politics and clientelism as opposed forms of political practice, unveil the 
complex relations between political choice and political interest in market-centered 
democracies.  As it will be explored in chapter three, self-interest, an attribute that 
identifies clientelistic networks, was central in shaping a rational, liberal subject 
(Hirschman 1977). With industrialization, and the appearance of mass-market 
environments where workers and owners participated alike, self-interest was opposed to 
the public good. Therefore, in this dissertation, I step from normative notions about 
political cultures prevalent in social science scholarship and rather look at clientelistc 
networks and media-centered politics as two expressions of the transactional dimensions 
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of liberalism. By looking at the technologies, expert practices, epistemological matrices, 
social positions and affective worlds of the actors that mobilize elections in Colombia, I 
locate Colombia’s political contradictions within the history, mutations and translations 
of liberalism itself.  
The ethnographic material of this project was collected during preliminary 
fieldwork visits to Colombia during the summers of 2007 and 2008 and during a yearlong 
field research from September 2009 to October 2010.  Since the beginning of my PhD, I 
was interested in the formation of political subjectivity in Colombia. However, getting to 
the topic of political consultants and political expertise entailed exploring detours and 
dead-ends, that in retrospect, have enriched my view of Colombian politics in a global 
context. Throughout the different chapters, I interweave my previous interests on 
cynicism, humor, satire and literary genres with a macro-political analysis of liberalism, a 
perspective that I honed through my personal fascination with post-socialist scholarly 
work and its relation to Latin America. As signaled throughout, some of the ethnographic 
vignettes in this dissertation as well as some of the interviews were collected during 
previous visits to Colombia when I sought to tackle this question of late-liberal politics 
from other perspectives.  
The majority of the ethnographic material, however, was collected during the 
elections of 2010. When I arrived in Bogotá, the project of this dissertation was not yet 
formed. Still I was hanging on to my interest in political satire. This interest took me to 
interview political consultants and media makers who had worked in the format of 
political satire in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The interviews and informal 
conversations about the shifts and turns of their careers, and the environment of elections 
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that we were living in, presented political marketing as an exciting opportunity to observe 
how this ethereal thing we broadly name politics becomes tangible, experienceable and 
observable through the specific techniques used to mobilize elections. Additionally, I was 
strategically placed. Many of my friends in Colombia had direct or indirect connections 
with the world of politics, and just by means of referral and talking to people about my 
research interests, I got access to top political strategists, politicians, political managers, 
media consultants, political journalists and local political leaders. Surprisingly, instead of 
finding a field of extreme secrecy, I found a network of people happy to share their work 
with an uninformed stranger asking obvious and naive questions. 
I paired this work among political networks with the work as a political activist. I 
found a job as the international coordinator for a local NGO that promoted civic electoral 
monitoring practices - Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE). This job opened the 
doors to observe the opposite face of electoral politics: that of the promotion of 
transparency practices in the electoral process. Working with MOE, I had the golden 
opportunity to carry out ethnographic research among national and international networks 
that sponsor best-democratic practices in Colombia. All of these networks generously 
shared their work with me, as well.  
Although politicians, political strategists and activists generously opened their 
worlds and practices to my prying eye, throughout the dissertation I use different 
narratives techniques to conceal their identities while dealing with sensitive information. 
In the time I spent among these networks, we built relationships of trust that I am 
strongly indebted to honor. Therefore, I use pseudonyms, fictional characters composed 
of multiple informants, and leave political affiliations ambiguous to protect their 
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identities. I only use names and last names to reveal and make explicit my informants’ 
identities, also a request that I am required to honor.  
The multiple locations I inhabited during fieldwork, and the multiple friendships I 
made regardless of my informants’ leaning in the political spectrum, shaped this project. 
As will be explored in the next section, this project has several analytical registers that 
are constantly at play. My choice to pay attention to matters of scaling in the narrative 
intends to make tangible a sense of dislocation often experienced in Colombian politics 
brought about by abrupt political and economic reform. During these dense times when 
broad macro-structural reforms intermingle with people’s daily lives, the overlapping of 
what social scientists fashion as analytical scales is experienced in everyday life. 
Throughout the dissertation, I gesture to these fissures and overlaps.  
 
Going global 
 
Throughout the world, the opening of national economies to international 
markets, and the introduction of ‘laissez faire’ attitudes towards the economy required 
deep institutional reforms that have severely transformed daily life and individual 
subjectivity in different parts of the world (Paley 2001; Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009). 
One of the most noticeable transformations brought about by neoliberal economics has 
been the reformulation of liberty to be understood as individual choice and realized 
through consumption (Rose 1999). This market-oriented understanding of liberty has 
entered the political arena to redefine what liberal politics looks like and has deeply 
impacted our universal notions of democracy. A democratic country is not defined 
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anymore by the state’s ability to administer vital services for its population, but by having 
an array of political options to vote for during elections. Under this contemporary 
conception of democratic politics, more political parties and more political candidates 
amount for a healthy political system (Payne et al. 2007). And in many parts of the world, 
citizens that do not have the means to consume have had to learn how to strategically 
navigate these new conditions in order to access private and public services (Chatterjee 
2006; Westbrook 2004).  The revolutionary promises that neoliberal reform once 
represented for countries seeking political stability and economic prosperity has 
disappeared as wealth inequality, authoritarian political cultures and social unrest 
mushroom in many parts of the world.  
This dissertation focuses on the introduction of business and market logics into 
politics via the development of the political marketing industry. In this new iteration of 
liberalism, a transactional and contractual doctrine (Westbrook 2004), votes gain business 
value. Votes are not just the expression of people’s will, but they amount to the success 
of a business as a whole. I pay close attention to the different scales at which votes are 
negotiated – chiefly mass-market environments and small-scale transactions -- to 
understand the kinds of political transactions that give shape to fragmented experiences 
of liberal democracy. In doing so, I look at how the introduction of marketing and market 
research into liberal politics lends itself to reproducing historically deep forms of 
segregation. In this way, I argue that the disruptive late-liberal political processes that 
many countries around the world underwent in a very short period of time were 
appropriated and “stabilized” in Colombia by reproducing familiar hierarchical social 
structures that resulted in the moral hierarchization of political transactions. Small-scale 
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transactions are often associated with pre-modern political cultures and are framed as 
detrimental to democracy, while mass-market and image-based politics is desired as a 
political ideal.  This moralization has obscured problematic dynamics within liberalism 
itself, mainly the relationship between choice, associated with mass-market 
environments, and interest, associated with small transactional environments.  
 
 
 
 
Late-liberal reflexive epistemologies have provided the tools for this moralization 
to occur (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994). With the increased rational ordering of society, 
social and political expertise has been geared to explore and intervene social life as a 
cluster of interconnected categories that can be isolated and dissected (Touraine 1971). 
Tools such as market research, which is widely used not just in marketing but in policy 
design, has emerged as a way to organize, intervene in and reproduce particular social 
orders by connecting individual affective worlds, cultural milieux and overarching 
Moreno de Caro is seen among elite political cultures as a populist. His target electoral population is 
low-income urban neighborhoods. For the election of 2010, his advertisement piece was his face 
printed in the 20.000 pesos bill. This political communication piece ironically hints at the idea of 
“buying” votes.  
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political logics (Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009). All by translating complex realities into 
simple measurable categories that can be transformed into straightforward messages -- 
“Just do it,” “Believe,”  “I’m lovin it.” Class in Colombia is one of those filters that 
connect the production of normative organization with individual and collective affective 
worlds.  
As several ethnographic works have shown (Applbaum 2004; Dávila 2001; 
Mazzarella 2003; Paley 2001), market research seeks to organize groups of people into 
distinguishable and neat categories that reinforce stereotypes – X or Y group is different 
because it has a particular trait. For example, advertising for Latinos in the U.S. often 
highlight family since market research shows that Latinos value family life, an identity 
that is also consumed by the Latino community. Market research is crucial for feeding 
this circular logic: I tell you what to consume because you tell me what you consume.  
In the realm of liberal politics, the introduction of marketing rationales defines the 
possibilities for political action by reinforcing stereotypical political cultures. Political 
marketing rehashes the powerful interlocking of census politics and the “politics of 
entitlement,” a mathematical version of representation that defines voting segments 
according to voting numbers, and that guides the politics of representation in the post-
WWII Western world (Anderson 1998)1. Pragmatic political consultants seek to measure 
trends and behaviors to work with them to their best advantage, as well as to have a 
thorough understanding of the rules of the political game and the distribution of political 
                                                
1 As Anderson explains, the segmentation of the vote according to number of voters was born due to the 
massive migrations that the U.S and some countries in Europe experienced. Seeking to organize new 
citizens and new voters, national authorities classified the vote along ethnic lines, and this category served 
as the organizing category to produce forms of electoral segmentation. Unlike the U.S., Colombia never 
experienced massive international migration. Rather, inner displacements and successive civil wars over 
different resources shaped class as a salient ordering principle.   
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power in order to organize successful political strategies that will win elections. In their 
practice, political consultants fix and reinforce the dynamics they observe as inescapable 
and immutable objective realities.  
During fieldwork, for example, I observed how the use of Geographic 
Information Systems were used to map possible voters, socioeconomic condition, and 
voting polls in order to strategically place political advertisement pieces. Campaigns 
work with limited budgets restricted by national electoral legislation and every penny has 
to be spent strategically in order to achieve victory. Usually, billboards were not placed in 
the poorer areas of the city since, according to research, these voters do not vote 
mobilized by advertisement but mobilized through close-knit networks of allegiance. In 
this epistemic operation the terms of political participation were fixated according to 
class-based notions of political behavior.  
In this way, the practice of political marketing provides a unique space to observe 
how liberalism and liberal political subjectivity mold each other via reflexive 
technologies such as market research. In short, it provides the locus to observe the actions 
that produce liberalism, to frame “liberalism as a practice” (Foucault 2010), and also as 
an individual and collective experience. Political marketing offers the possibility to 
observe how subjects are made and organized by normative systems that delimit the 
available subject positions to occupy (Faubion 2011).  
 
Scaling globality 
  
 11 
Framing liberalism as a practice entails paying close attention to those who 
practice liberalism. The industry of political marketing is a locus to observe how specific 
networks and situated expert practices connect historically deep social structures, subject 
making and the production of political logics. Specific social networks and their social 
worlds reproduced in Colombia broader macro-political structures and the different 
epistemological arrangements that frame political life in the country. Politics dramatically 
changed with the opening of markets and the transformation of the political system in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. New legislations were drafted to make these changes 
possible. Also, new technologies were introduced to manage politics. And particular 
social networks were orchestrating and guiding this process. Therefore, understanding the 
historical construction of class subjectivity that informs particular political sensibilities is 
crucial in understanding how macro political processes have materialized in specific 
contexts and how they are experienced.  
Throughout the different chapters of this dissertation, different scales are weaved 
together to look at a ruptural moment in Colombian politics and frame how people 
appropriate change to reproduce familiar structures. My work is in dialogue with the very 
rich anthropological literature on globalization that has taken on the enormous challenge 
to ethnographically observe how global political, economic and epistemic connections 
are produced within the specific space of everyday practices (Appadurai 1996; Clifford 
1997; Hannerz 2004; Ong and Stephen J. Collier 2005; Tsing 2011). I situate my analysis 
specifically in the “Strategic geography of globalization” (Sassen 2007) that shows how 
local institutional arrangements are fractured in a multiplicity of local, national and 
global scales. Sassen’s work calls to follow the different legal and institutional footprints 
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that these processes leave behind. In this dissertation, I look at particular moments of 
institutional change that show how broader macro political processes are translated into 
normative narratives that regulate daily life. I contribute to this analysis by incorporating 
two other dimensions that are crucial in framing the fluid dialogues of global processes 
and daily individual lives: the uses of technologies and the affective worlds that emerge 
in these encounters.  
Elections provide a unique timeframe to explore the materiality of democracy and 
the affective textures that mediate daily encounters with democracy. On the one hand, 
during elections particular technologies and expert languages are used to mobilize 
electoral strategies and also to count the votes. Much of the work of elections rather than 
pondering the reaches of individual liberty in transforming political institutions actually 
is technical (Coles 2007). Political consultants and electoral monitoring activists alike 
pay a great deal of attention to the different technologies involved in mobilizing political 
messages and in the techniques used for counting the votes. These technical 
conversations articulate and produce situated understandings of democracy. How 
techniques are created and used offer an opportunity to observe the mutually generative 
relationship between technology and political cultures. 
Elections, on the other hand, are also a time when affect is laced with public 
emotions. This process occurs at two levels. The first level is the emotional work that 
political consultants and political managers do to stir voters’ choice. In alluring the voto 
de opinión, political consultants seek to translate affective worlds into public messages 
that strike a chord and make voters go to the polls. Political managers in administrating 
the voto amarrado seek to capitalize on enrooted sentiments of allegiance and loyalty that 
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knit political groups together.  At this level, emotion is meant to “set people in motion” 
(Marcus 2002), as the etymology of the word indicates, thus intertwining with rational 
calculations in the achievement of political goals (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001b; 
Zaloom 2009). Here, emotions are namable and distinct. They are articulated to 
discursive practices that are meant to do different things in the world, to achieve different 
political goals. Political consultants, in their calculations, pair up such distinct emotions 
as indignation, anger, or hope with specific political outcomes. In this way, at this level 
of management, emotions appear as “researchable,” measurable, typified and also 
reproducible to accomplish a political goal in mind.  
The second level is the level of affect, the world of the shadows and in “between-
ness” (Gregg and Seigworth 2010), that political practitioners dwell in as human beings. 
At this level, affect is not definable but experienced in “intensities” that affect the body 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987). These intensities connect possibilities of being and yield a 
narrative of messiness and intertwinement of contrary emotions. During elections, desire, 
pleasure and anxiety are part of the daily lives of those who work within politics. Political 
consultants deal with politicians’ moods and mental states as they try to strip their 
practice from any emotion in order not to get clouded by it. And electoral activists 
interweave hopes and fears about democracy and the future in their own technical 
practice.  
In this way, this dissertation approaches elections as a peephole to look at how 
emotional languages are produced, mobilized and experienced in public culture, and to 
observe the mutually generative relations among affective worlds, technologies and 
macro-political structures.  
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Why Colombia? 
  
As a Colombian anthropologist, I have many times being confronted by the 
question “Why Colombia?” to situate my work. We Colombians have a tendency to 
consider Colombia unique in the world, and often this view is reinforced in predominant 
ethnographic works (Taussig 1986; Taussig 2005; Sanford 2004): the most brutal yet 
charming, the most violent yet beautiful.  Magical realism, the national literary genre, has 
helped to create a sense that whatever happens in Colombia is almost magical and out of 
this world. This narrative style, which at some point vindicated political Latin American 
claims against an euro-centered narrative of progress, has been slowly appropriated as a 
form of self-exoticization to gain a distinct place in an international order of 
multiculturalism where difference is key in accessing resources (Fuguet 2001). I identify 
with literary avant-gardes in the country that have explored noir genres to re-inscribe 
Colombia into world flows and that have reacted against the exoticizing view that 
magical realism brings onto daily life. These works tell stories that are not out of the 
ordinary but that can happen in any city in the world. In these stories, what happens in 
Colombia becomes part of a broader web of events that interlink places, characters and 
dynamics. I relate to this sensibility, and accordingly I situate my work in Colombia with 
the intention to tell a story that happens in many other places of the world.  
 Colombia, as many other countries in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and 
Asia, was part of a “wave of democratization,” to borrow Samuel Huntington’s (1991) 
term, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The World Bank and the International 
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Monetary Fund designed political and economic guidelines to prepare these countries for 
democracy, which were adopted in newly designed political constitutions and economic 
systems. New electoral and political systems were introduced and novel forms of 
electoral politics started to arise. American political consultants, who by the late 1970s 
and early 1980s found a saturated market back home, started to export their expertise to 
these contexts where a plethora of political options had been opened and where mass 
media were expanding (Johnson 2009). Colombia is another setting were this global trend 
took place and where one can empirically observe how post cold war geo-political 
orderings interweaved with the spread of liberal political subjectivity.  
 In this sense, the picture is not complete when looking solely at macrostructures. 
There are some particularities about Colombia that contribute to outlining a richer 
narrative of late-liberal politics. The first aspect is the institutionalized pyramidal social 
structure in spite of the participatory reforms. Colombia drafted a new political 
constitution in 1991 that sponsored participatory democracy in an attempt to make a more 
egalitarian society and end the long-standing cycles of violence that have scarred the 
country’s national history. The hope was to make the political and legal system more 
accessible to the population. This promise was partially fulfilled. Although there are 
certain political and legal tools that are widely used, accessing certain resources and 
services is reserved to the privileged. Public services are “stratified,” meaning that there 
is a rank from one to six to classify the population. One is the poorest and six is the 
wealthiest on this scale, which orders land tenure, taxes and how public services are 
charged. This “strata” language is commonly used in daily speech as well as to mark 
where one belongs. Someone belonging to stratum six is conceived to inhabit a different 
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planet than someone from stratum one. The physical space where citizens work, live and 
play, the recreational activities, education and health services vary dramatically if one is 
placed in either extremes of the scale. Most likely, stratum one workers will be the 
employees to stratum six bosses. And this power differential has not been bridged nor 
was even addressed with the reformation of the constitution. Rather, with the increased 
privatization of public services, this fragmentation was further reinforced.  
 As scholars of Latin America have explored, post reform constitutions are an odd 
mix of progressive social and political rights and conservative economic systems 
(Caldeira and Holston 1999; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Holston 2008; Lemaitre 2009). 
Social rights were granted while neoliberal economies that favored wealthier portions of 
the population were set in place. In Colombia, for instance, at the same time that direct 
democracy mechanisms were implemented (such as public consultation, referenda, 
tutela2), the social security system was privatized via a legislative act known as Ley 100 
(1993). This schism between the rights granted by law and the hindrance that the 
institutional arrangements pose to effectively realize these rights has sponsored a highly 
strategic political system – attuned with what other scholars have observed in contexts 
where state services are hard to access, by means of privatization or messy bureaucratic 
administration (Chatterjee 2006; Humphrey 2002; Ledeneva 1998; Muehlebach 2011). 
Populations that cannot access certain services, because they cannot pay for them, access 
them by making strategic connections in the political arena. Elections, when politicians 
are desperately seeking votes, are instrumental for this new guise of the liberal 
negotiation of interest to arise.  
                                                
2 Tutela was one of the main developments in participatory politics. This figure allows any citizen to file a 
complaint to the Constitutional Court if their constitutional rights are being violated. This instrument is 
among the most cherished democratic tools among the Colombian public.  
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 In this landscape, novel forms of political properness and political morality have 
been reproduced in political culture attuned to the lofty ideals of a participatory 
democracy but reproducing socially hierarchical forms of distinction. The networks of 
allegiance and loyalty that often support strategic politics, the so-called clientelistic 
networks, have been many times diagnosed as the malaise that hinders participatory 
political systems from thriving, and are commonly mapped onto urban poor and rural 
communities (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Recent critiques of the literature available 
on clientelism question the assumptions that this phenomenon is a remnant of pre-
modern, corrupt political cultures. Rather, various works propose understanding 
clientelism as networks of solidarity and problem solving (Auyero 2000; Roudakova 
2008; Schiller 2011) and thus a visible locus for the liberal principles of negotiation of 
political interest (Habermas 1989), in a late liberal political moment where State-making 
is a complicated entanglement of private corporations, communities, bureaucracies, 
international organizations, marketing and mass-communication practices (Westbrook 
2004). I contribute to this line of analysis by framing how a class specific view of 
clientelism migrated in the world of policy-making and politics, a world that in Colombia 
is intimately entrenched with academia (Rivas 2007), to produce a hegemonic public 
morality that overlaps political ideals, political behavior and hierarchical notions of class. 
These threads of class, political subjectivity and institutional change that run through the 
different chapters of this work hope to contribute to recent scholarly works that have 
stepped away from multiculturalism as a framing category for late-liberal politics and 
have called attention to class as a production site of contemporary global liberalism 
(Cahn 2008).  
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The pragmatics of hope  
 
 An American pragmatic approach to politics informs much of the political work 
done in Colombia today. The need for research, of understanding socioeconomic and 
cultural contexts for designing successful campaign strategies is rooted in the 
presupposition that reality is consensually built (Festenstein 1997). This kind of research, 
as political consultants believe, helps them access, intervene in and stir the transformation 
of these particular realities they study.  As Applbaum (2004:68) writes about the 
marketing industry, “[t]he proper level at which to observe marketing impulse and 
agency, therefore, is at the level of landscape: marketers seek to determine the 
dimensions of the natural world within which exchange is to take place, and to alter the 
way people know and experience exchange and consumption.” In this sense, this 
dissertation, more than being a study of Machiavellian political pragmatics, focuses on 
world-making pragmatics, those practices that grab elements from here and there to build 
possible worlds to come (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).  
In electoral politics, the construction of political worlds is always in the making, 
and is anchored in a temporality that looks to the future. Every election brings with it the 
promise of a different reality, of the realization of utopia. And behind those promises of 
Change or Hope are teams of researchers and political consultants who are intervening 
the present in particular ways to project it to the future. Specifically, the actions of 
political practitioners of all stripes have consequences in building the present and how 
democracy is experienced.  
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 This pragmatics of hope is explored in five chapters. The first chapter discusses 
the methodological advantages of ethnographic research during elections to situate 
democracy in the context of the particular practices, technologies and materials through 
which it is realized. This methodological approach based on understanding democracy as 
an object produced in specific ecologies opens an analytical door to escape universalist 
ideological presumptions that end up stripping democracy and the concept of “the 
political” from its analytical force. Thereafter, I look at the ambiguous affective worlds 
that I inhabited during fieldwork and how this positioning analytically frames and 
delimits the category of the political.  
This initial methodological reflection is followed by a historic overview on how 
the categories voto de opinión and voto amarrado, which frame political action and 
organize political participation in Colombia came into being. For this purpose, in the 
second chapter, I look at the political and economic reforms set in motion in the 1990s, as 
well as the student leaders and elite groups who fought for these reforms. I trace how 
historically constructed class-based notions about political properness and civility were 
mobilized to make sense of the reforms by organizing and coding a fragmented political 
subjectivity as a problem of class and civility. In this discussion, I look at how political 
elites organize participatory politics by delimiting proper and improper forms of 
participation, thus reproducing hierarchical social structures while retaining a desired 
progressive and modern participatory political framework.  
In the third chapter, I discuss clientelism and media-centered political 
administration as the expression of liberalism in different market scales. I therefore trace 
the specific scales where market ideologies and liberal politics intertwine, and the 
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different logics that inform the administration of political life at these different scales. I 
focus on the constitution and organization of political forms of expertise to manage mass-
market environments and small-scale environments of political transaction.  For this 
purpose, I describe the introduction of an American inspired form of political 
management centered on techno-scientific knowledge geared to administer public 
opinion to Colombian politics, while traditional ways of electoral administration, mainly 
a model based on the negotiation of political interest, was kept in place. In order to 
reconcile these competing forms of expertise, a discourse on political pragmatism with 
class-based moral undertones has been mobilized to organize fractured forms of electoral 
and political administration in segmented socioeconomic political environments.   
 The analysis of the political epistemologies that inform political practice in 
Colombia is followed by an ethnographic exploration of how these different forms of 
expertise produce separate political worlds. In the fourth chapter, structured in two 
sections, I analyze how the communication practices geared to administer the two kinds 
of votes and the means used to mobilize these messages compose different worlds where 
participation looks different. In the first part of the chapter, I focus on the technologies 
and media used to produce a national, synchronous electoral conversation that intertwines 
with personal affective worlds where bourgeois liberal notions about collective and 
individual freedom are produced. In the second part, I continue to look at privatized 
forms of communication produced in clietentelistic networks, like gossip, word-of-mouth 
and political gatherings, which reinforce loyalty, intimacy and proximity as a legitimate 
form of political administration.   
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 In the last chapter, I return to look at the work of the leaders of the student 
movement who pushed for the political reforms of the early 1990s to find them in the 
setting of a citizen-based electoral monitoring NGO. I specifically focus on the work of 
Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) whose executive director and lead researcher 
were two of the visible leaders of the student movement. By looking at the electoral 
monitoring practices, the statistical language that this group uses, and the international 
partnerships that they have built over years of work, I analyze how MOE’s work 
legitimates state institutions and civic action. I frame their use of statistical narratives as a 
language of hope that materializes a desire for a democracy to come in the present, by 
negotiating individual agency in the midst of overpowering power structures, and 
displacing it a future yet to come.   
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Notes on the uses of terms:  
  
Throughout the dissertation, I use different terms that I wish to clarify for an 
easier read on this work. I use the term political practitioner to include anybody who 
works within politics and, in that sense, practices politics. Hence, the term applies to 
campaigning experts, political consultants, politicians and political activists who work in 
electoral politics alike.  
I follow the use of the term political consultant in Colombia, which includes 
campaigning media consultants and political strategists alike. In practical terms, these are 
different although they work in association. The political strategist designs and directs the 
overall campaign strategy, while media consultants focus on particular media aspects of 
the designed strategy. These media consultants and campaign strategists work in 
association with pollsters, who often bring technical insights to the campaigns.  
Political managers are in charge of managing the campaign on the ground, 
mainly working with local political leaders in order to mobilize votes. These political 
managers act as the community liaison between the candidate and the voting 
constituency. The local political leaders are recognized people in their communities who 
work in direct link with the political manager. I prefer not to use the terms political 
broker or middleman to refer to these positions since these terms entail unidirectional 
forms of power. The question that always pops to my head when I see these terms is 
“middle of where”? In fact the distribution of power is more complex within electoral 
organizations and it is hard to spot who is in the middle, holding it all together.  
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Chapter*1*
Dissecting*Elections**
 
Elections are a period to take a peek into how political cultures are produced. 
During elections, collective hopes and fears, ideas about the nation, ideas about political 
correctness, corruption and political virtue are mobilized in public discourse to stir public 
emotions and therefore allure citizens to vote. Media, social media, private conversations, 
public transportation, the streets and virtually any space where sociality unfolds become 
an environment in which the political competition takes place, disrupting these 
environments’ regular flows, but also acting as a magnifying glass to observe what these 
flows are about. Elections are a hyperbole of “normal” life marked by a distinct 
temporality in which political cultures become tangible.  
This sense of distinctiveness of elections is granted by the aim of elections in 
itself: for the people, the “demos,” to show its power by choosing how it will be governed 
until a new election comes around. In other words, elections are a timeframe in which 
democracy becomes tangible. In this timeframe, the object of democracy, the power of 
the people, becomes alive and is experienced as real, as citizens take part in the making 
of government and in how democracy is built. However, this process is messy. And 
during elections it is possible to observe how “the people” and their participation in 
government is not a unified, monolithic category. Rather, elections offer an ethnographic 
opportunity to dissect the plurality of meanings that “the people” participating in politics 
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take and understand how this category is produced and mobilized in creating particular 
political cultures.  
In this chapter, I look at the theoretical and methodological implications of doing 
fieldwork during elections. I first outline why elections offer an ideal space to produce 
situated understandings of what is political action and democracy, and why this 
“situatedness” is critical in delimiting our political objects for ethnographic study. I argue 
that elections open a window to understand the materiality of democracy, the particular 
technologies, practices and materials that mobilize particular notions of democracy. I find 
this route fruitful to escape the analytical traps that performative approaches to elections 
pose, mainly, the ubiquity of the category of the political, which has diminished its 
analytical force.  
In the second part, I reflect on the several moments of ambiguity and the 
ambiguous relationships I encountered working with my informants. I do not mean to 
offer this reflection to illustrate the complicated ethical negotiations that anthropologists 
face in the field, many lucid works have been produced with this preoccupation in mind 
(Jane Fishburne Collier and Yanagisako 1990; Faubion and Marcus 2009; Fischer 2003; 
Scheper-Hughes 2001). Neither do I seek to use the dissertation as a confessional 
medium to heal or justify my own experience. I wish to move beyond a cyclical self-
reflexivity that dead-ends in the anecdote. I rather look at ambiguity as a positioning in 
the field that speaks about the ethnographic object at hand.  
Following Faubion (2009), I am riding a “new wave of objectivism” that reasserts 
that Anthropology has something to say about the world beyond the ethnographer, but 
that takes interpretation as a serious enterprise. This new objectivism is sensitive to the 
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fact that objects interact with their multi-scalar contexts, are named, shaped and brought 
to life by situated ways of knowing and are observed by people with particular affective 
and moral sensibilities. Doing fieldwork in Colombia during elections was like looking at 
one’s own image in a fun house mirror. Even though my fieldwork was in my “native” 
country, among some expert elites that I had access to through my social circle, and 
therefore there was some degree of familiarity, the image that I saw was an unfamiliar, 
distorted version of familiar traits. The hyperbolic times of elections served as some sort 
of ironic distance to observe flows and dynamics in a different light.  
 
All roads lead to Rome?  
 
During the presidential and congressional elections of 2010, I spent my days as 
the coordinator for the international observation missions for the Misión de Observación 
Electoral (MOE)—a civil society NGO for electoral monitoring—and as a very active 
participant observer, almost a confidant, of a political strategy firm in Colombia. I began 
my days overseeing democracy, fighting for electoral transparency and against any form 
of electoral fraud. I ended my days listening to stories about the pragmatics of political 
campaigning in a country whose political culture is still intimately tied to clientelism and 
patronage, and where drug traffickers and illegal armed groups exercise a powerful 
influence over the electoral process. I had breakfast contemplating the reaches of 
participatory democracy, and I had dinner feeling the weight, rigidity and stagnancy of 
Colombia’s political history. I was caught up in between two mutually constitutive and 
reproducing outlooks on politics, with distinctive ethical implications, that could not be 
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disaggregated. I oscillated between the hopeful promises of a participatory democracy 
designed in the 1991 political constitution, and the pragmatic need to navigate, and 
therefore reproduce, rigid structures of power in order to manage politics. Everyday I 
observed how the promise of political participation and authoritative political cultures 
destroyed and rebuilt each other, just as in a Greek myth.   
 I felt torn. But, more than my personal feeling informed by my own positioning in 
the field, I was before what extensive scholarly work has diagnosed as a late-liberal 
cultural logic of fracture (Jameson 1991; Ong 2004; Ong and Stephen J. Collier 2005). 
Like my informants, I navigated a landscape of political “pastiche” where multiple 
political rationales and diverse, sometimes contradictory, ethical engagements with 
politics and democracy were assembled together (Fischer 2003; Faubion 2011).  Different 
international and national civic organizations, national political parties, national and 
international political consultants, politicians, media sources and national regulatory 
entities took part in the making elections and democracy.  
The period of elections offers a window to take a look at how democracy is made, 
not in a figurative way but in a literal one. As Don Handelman (1998:7) points out, 
studying public events provide an opportunity to identify “the logics of their design, 
themselves embedded in cultural matrices that imbue these designs with significance and 
that put them to work in cultural ways.” In other words, studying the production and 
unfolding of public events sheds light on how social and political order is produced, and 
what are the rationales informing these forms of organization. By analyzing elections, the 
observer is able to dissect the particular forms power takes, and the media that mobilizes 
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it, in producing and reproducing a particular system, or in systems breaking down to 
become something else.  
 Handelman’s approach offers the possibility to study the particular technologies 
and materials at work in the construction of democracy. Anthropology has a long-
standing tradition in analyzing the function of events in the reproduction of systems. 
Rituals, festivals, ceremonies, carnivals have been the object of countless ethnographic 
work. This line of ethnographic inquiry has paid close attention to the symbolic 
dimensions of public events (Geertz 1973), thus highlighting the performance and 
repetition of roles as a metaphor of the broader social system from which they emerge. In 
this way, elections have often being conceived as “social dramas” (Turner 1988) where 
the ritualized performance of social roles evince and help negotiate conflict and power 
struggles (Bowie 2008; Nimmo 1985). For instance, across elections in different parts of 
the world it is common to find similar political and public figures such as the underdog, 
the patron, the eccentric, or the satirist negotiating their positions in similar ways. These 
observations may indicate that politics behaves in the same way in spite of cultural 
differences; after all it is about human nature. But, politics do different things in 
particular contexts, and this variability is also analytically relevant. By shifting attention 
to the “design” of public events, Handelman steps away from the performative 
dimensions of events and opens the possibility of observing the “making” of public 
rituals, as another entry point to understand how order is produced and what it does in 
particular contexts3.  
                                                
3 Kimberley Coles (2004) has critiqued a ritual-oriented approach to elections for obscuring the production 
of knowledge and authority at work in the assemblage of electoral instruments. The literature on ritual is 
quite extensive and offers different routes to approach this question that are not contrary to ANT 
sensibilities. The problem is not ritual, but performative approaches to ritual that do not take into account 
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 This approach has been fruitful to frame the sense of fracture and stagnation that I 
found myself in while studying the congressional and presidential elections of 2010 in 
Colombia.  The multiple networks I was immersed in -- their different agendas and 
multiple ways of feeling and understanding politics – produced radically different 
versions of democracy. While some networks attuned with international standards of 
transparency and best democratic practices highlighted the role of participation and free 
information in building a healthy democracy, other networks more attuned with 
Machiavellian political pragmatism stressed the strategic mobilization of political 
resources (media, networks, political conditions) in the making of democratic political 
dynamics. Depending on where I was situated, democracy looked either like virtue or like 
a strategic game. All of these networks moved within a widespread sense that Colombian 
politics is stagnant and never changes. I found myself in between different versions of 
political competition that saw politics having the same result, no matter what actions 
were taken, and how different these actions were. Analytically, I was trapped between 
multiple and contrary discourses and practices and predictable outcomes. How could all 
roads, if so different, lead to Rome?  
 Studying elections ethnographically as a site where democracy and politics are 
designed provided a way out of this analytical maze.  As Kimberley Coles (2007:32) 
conveys in her analysis of electoral monitoring in Bosnia-Herzegovina:  
 
                                                
the interaction of citizens, things and forms of expertise. In this way, I also find a problem in just seeing 
elections as technologies where knowledge and authority is produced. This approach obscures the 
production of affect at work in how citizens approach these democratic instruments or how particular 
expert networks mobilize affect to “do” particular things in the world. An approach that focuses on the 
“logics of the design” of the ritual elucidates the intentionality of the set-up of elections, the expectations 
this intentionality generates and the ways in which expert networks and citizens interact with the 
production of this order.  
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Analyzing the techniques of electoral and democratic government 
demonstrates that much of the work done is epistemological. The 
seemingly unimportant notes attached to the registration forms matter--a 
lot. Complex interpretive and technical tasks articulate democratic 
governance and its possibilities.  
 
This call to study the epistemological operations articulated in the design of elections 
situate seemingly universal practices in particular contexts, therefore showing how these 
practices are being appropriated within particular historical structures that produce 
specific political cultures. Moreover, by situating political practices within specific 
networks it is possible to observe the ways in which “universals” travel and get 
reinforced as such. Although Coles’ work deals with electoral monitoring, her emphasis 
on probing electoral techniques is relevant to frame the work of other networks that make 
elections happen, such as political managers, political consultants and political strategists.  
 The work of electoral observers, political consultants, political managers and 
politicians has a material dimension that is crucial in situating democracy and drawing 
boundaries around the objects of ethnographic study within politics. In a recent article, 
Matei Candea (2011), following Joan Vincent’s appreciation on political anthropology, 
notes that by being suspicious of rigid and ethnocentric definitions of what is politics and 
what is not, anthropology has pushed politics to every topic the discipline deals with. The 
discipline has seen an explosion of works dealing with the “politics of _____” (plug in 
your interest), which has left the category of “the political” relatively untreated. As 
anthropologists, we are skeptical of offering any definitions, but this skepticism has 
rendered the political as some sort of mystical affair that is possible to recognize when 
seen, but that is too great and diffuse to define.  
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 Adding to Candea’s point, public and widespread circulated notions of politics 
that anthropologist encounter in fieldwork also contribute to the ineffability of the 
political. Those people who work within politics or who offer commentary about politics 
often treat the inner dynamics of electoral competition as a matter of “human nature.” 
They reify a sense that politics has been and always will be politics after all, in spite of 
the setting it is situated in, in the work they produced. During my fieldwork in Colombia 
I found this analytical trap that was constantly reinforced by political practitioners and by 
opinion makers alike.  
 Daniel Samper Ospina, a renowned Colombian political satirist, appeals to an 
intuitive public sense about politics as immutable in order to connect with his audience. 
His weekly columns are a written cartoon of Colombia’s politicians and political 
customs. He draws on daily life topics to convey a sense of irony that his readers can 
connect to, by linking stereotypes, a sense of eternal repetition in politics and the 
grotesque:   
 
[Referring to a political scandal] This scandal is about the eternal problem 
of land tenure in Colombia, the same pettiness of the governing class, the 
same corruption, the same impossibility [of changing things]. Who doesn’t 
draw a huge nose to Juan Lozano [local politician who has this salient 
physical feature] in a hyperrealist painting? I try to make a correlation 
between both things [physical features and political behaviors]: between 
obesity and corruption, for instance. Between ugliness and dirty political 
behavior, like in the case of Valencia Cossio, for example. (…) The simple 
humanization of all of these characters, the fact that people feel they are 
within reach, it makes them vulnerable. It’s a very emotional way of 
making them vulnerable.  
 
Samper Ospina in making his written cartoons appeals to affectivity towards politics that 
anybody can connect to and that appeals to an understanding that certain political 
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behaviors are an expression of human traits. Like Samper Ospina, in order to mobilize 
people in political ways, political consultants and political managers also appeal to this 
“raw” and intuitive understanding of politics. Camilo Rojas, a well-known Colombian 
political strategist, described his work as understanding human nature. Besides the 
modern techniques he used for gaining insight about political behaviors, like focus 
groups and polling, Greek mythology was also a source to gain insights on modern 
politics. The attributes of the Gods and their power struggles provided a reflection on 
what core human actions and human sociality are all about. This widely spread definition 
of the political that locates it within the definition of humanity itself rendered it almost 
impenetrable. I was before the Minotaur’s maze.  
 But, as Argentinean poet Leopoldo Marechal writes, “the only way out of a 
labyrinth is from above.” Candea offers a methodological route to look up and exit 
analytical entrapments of the political that relegate it to totalizing and ethnocentric 
definitions, or as equivalent to human nature, and therefore present in every human 
action. Candea argues for introducing the distinctions of what constitutes political action 
in relation to the context where these actions come from, as a way to ethnographically 
redraw analytical boundaries. Looking at the design of elections, the materials and 
technologies used to mobilize certain messages and political actions, how these messages 
and actions are crafted and conceived, and how the environments for political action are 
organized show how politics is set in motion. Electoral competition season provides a 
perfect setting to look at the materials that mobilize politics and democracy as a way to 
escape the mazes built by exclusively situating the analysis in the performances of 
subjects and informants.  
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Making environments in democracy    
 
In recent years, materials, networks and objects have gained increasing attention 
in political theory (Latour and Weibel 2005; Braun and Whatmore 2010; Bennett 2010). 
Recent works have focused on how resources, technology and government are mutually 
constitutive, like the importance of oil (Mitchell 2011) or metallurgy in shaping 
governance (Barry 2010). These works pay special attention to the epistemological 
operations that inform how things and people are governed. In this sense, these works 
have sought to break down Aristotelian hierarchies that decouple materiality from 
immateriality, and that produce very distinct spaces for humans and things (Stengers 
2010).  Recent scholarship has reframed these distinctions and has rather focused on the 
generative flows that both make things and people, and to the kinds of relations that 
people and things have.  However, as Ingold (2007) points out, this processual approach 
is not a form of contemporary animism that sees life or “agency” in objects but rather 
sees how things are part of life. Ingold then calls to look at “environments” where objects 
“are not objectively determined nor subjectively imagined but practically experienced" 
(Ingold 2007:14). 
  The design of environments for electoral purposes, how these environments are 
organized, and the objects that compose these environments tells a larger story about how 
cultural specificities ground, code and compose such broad ideas as power, liberty, 
participation and democracy. The creation of particular emotional environments is a goal 
in political management in order to effectively deliver a particular message, create bonds 
 33 
of allegiance and set people in motion for a particular political goal. In more market-
oriented polities, these spaces appeal to individual emotion (Brader 2006), in more 
transactional liberal polities these spaces appeal to a sense of indebtedness and loyalty to 
a group (Auyero 2000). How these environments are crafted tells a story about how 
specific political cultures imagine political action to be; for instance, do the voting polls 
represent individual will and choice or are they an instrument to achieve collective well-
being?  
 This question of what environments are supposed to do for people and the objects 
used to organize these environments are among the main concerns of this dissertation. 
The ways these spaces are designed and the experiences that citizens have with these 
spaces are a point of entry to probe the encounters of normative ideas about politics with 
political practice, and the political cultures these spaces are producing. This 
methodological concern has been a way to find a different angle to reified notions about 
Latin American political culture. As Auyero (2000) explains, political science scholars 
and local Latin American elites have often associated clientelism to rural and poor areas, 
linking the concept to some sort of political pre-modernity, an antithesis of the liberal 
state (an experience very close to the study of Mediterranean political cultures where 
patronage has been similarly treated). This treatment of clientelism and patronage has 
overseen how these political formations tell compelling stories about how citizens are 
encountering the state, in a time where state functions have been privatized and when the 
state has been blurred. By focusing on how the environments of electoral politics are 
organized and what they are meaning to organize, I step away from ethnocentric and 
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class-centric normative notions of political purity and rather turn my eyes to see how 
these norms are produced and how they organize political practice.   
 Market segmentation, for example, is one of these organizing principles of 
elections. Colombia imported the industry of political management from the U.S. in the 
early 1990s. With it, a principle of market segmentation was introduced in the 
administration of political life. Market segmentation entails organizing populations 
according to selected criteria, and figuring out what those groups are more likely to 
consume. For this purpose, surveys and focus groups are paired up with Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) and ethnographic fieldwork to appropriately design 
successful sales strategies. With the marketization of politics around the world (Fritz 
Plasser 2009), these technologies have increasingly been used in the belief that as a 
product of market research, these technologies will reach voters more efficiently. 
However, this widespread global practice of politics is also culturally nuanced. The 
criteria selected to organize populations in different parts of the world vary, often 
revealing the sensitive topics that strike a chord in particular political environments. 
 In Colombia, a historically highly exclusionary and highly hierarchical country, 
the main organizing criterion is socioeconomic class. Electoral politics is divided into 
those activities catering to middle and upper-middle class populations, and tactics 
specially geared to lure the poor, as will be explored in the following chapters. This is not 
the case for instance in the U.S., where race and racism are historically contentious 
issues, and therefore race and ethnicity are more salient criteria than socioeconomic class 
in organizing markets and producing social order (although class has made a comeback 
specially after the 99% movement). Rather than the middle-class or the working-class 
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vote in general, political analysts and political consultants seek to understand how 
middle-class “Latinos,” or the middle-class “white,” or middle-class “African 
Americans,” or middle-class “Asians” behave.  
In this way, the organizing categories to segment markets, as well as the 
techniques, tactics, and instruments used to appeal to the different market segments 
reveal historically constructed fields of contention that politics is supposed to sort out. 
The epistemological operations contained in forms of expertise elucidate cultural 
anxieties and hopes about what politics and democracies are supposed to achieve and 
how they are organized. In the course of fieldwork, I observed how these categories 
where produced in very ambiguous terrains. By working among these expert networks, 
by building relationships of trust and negotiating ethical viewpoints about politics, I 
could delve deep into these pools of ambiguity, which also informed the relations I was 
establishing. But, as will be seen in the next section, working in ambiguous terrains is not 
a disadvantage or an analytical hindrance. Rather, ambiguity is a place for reflexivity 
where we can learn very much about how we are positioned within our fieldwork and 
about our objects of study.  
 
The politics of ambiguity: Doing fieldwork among political experts  
 
But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, 
it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the 
imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have 
never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to 
live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin 
than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue 
soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil. Hence it is necessary for a 
prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not 
according to necessity. 
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(The Prince, Machiavelli)  
 
Machiavelli saw ethics as a radical separating line between the world of politics 
and the world of daily life.  For him, the decisions that a Prince had to make could not 
follow pedestrian or religious understandings of virtue or evil that sees them as clearly 
distinct realms. In politics, rulers have to always favor their people and this imperative 
often leads political leaders down uneasy and winding roads. As Sir Isaiah Berlin (1990) 
later iterated in his essay The One and the Many, the realization of liberty, and therefore 
choice, in plural contexts where there is not a cohesive agreement on virtues brings the 
very idea of absolute virtue into question. Decision makers often face cumbersome 
situations where choosing the lesser evil, what will do less harm, becomes the right 
choice even though is not the ‘good’ choice.  
To this day, this notion of political pragmatism informs the work of those who 
work within politics and therefore defines what politics is. And this understanding makes 
politics ambiguous. Political strategists and political managers in Colombia work under 
the axioms of contemporary political management, stirring the given conditions to 
achieve a goal, in a country where the given conditions involve illegal militias and drug 
trafficking. These grey areas often look very grim, and as a Colombian interested in 
politics doing fieldwork in Colombia, the frictions I had with some of my informants 
were many. As other anthropologists who have done their fieldwork in contexts where 
moral conflicts arose (Holmes 2000), I found myself caught in areas where discomfort 
and friendship entangled in intimate and uncomfortable ways.   
I became a good friend of Nicolás, one of the several political strategists that I 
interviewed during fieldwork. I disagreed with his methods and with his ways of looking 
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at politics. He justified working with very shady figures in Colombian politics, by saying 
that politics was a business and a distinct field where daily life morality was not 
applicable. This pragmatic take on politics made him a savvy politician. He was the 
person to go to in order to know what was really happening behind the latest scandal, to 
the point that several journalists from different media sought him as a reliable source. He 
knew how to handle those relations strategically. He knew when to give out information, 
and he knew when to withhold it. Information in his business is a strategic asset that can 
bring a campaign down or boost it up. In this way, Nicolás was an expert in aligning 
resources and in knowing how the relationships he kept could be potential resources for 
his political aims. He knew how to handle iffy political relationships without crossing the 
boundaries of legality, but certainly moving in ethically uneasy areas. He would access 
information that very few people could access by knowing the right people, even if the 
right people were publicly perceived as corrupt, and in some cases, were people who had 
pending judicial affairs.   
We met on a weekday for lunch with a journalist who was looking for some 
reliable information to write a story. Nicolás made us laugh with his very blatant remarks 
about politics. The journalist wanted to know more about Nicolás’ relations with a 
politician who had been recently involved in a corruption scandal. Nicolás, turned around 
and humorously answered “As an old politician used to say, I will tell you when the 
statute of limitations expires.” In the format of a joke, he leavened what could have been 
a tense situation, a line of questioning seeking a confession. The irony of the joke, the 
gap that it opened between truth and fiction, between earnestness and doubt, played with 
the very grey areas that those who work in politics sometimes face. The journalist taking 
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part in the joke asked him “How can you sleep at night?” in between chuckles. I jumped 
into the joke and answered for him “he’s Dr. Evil” (like the character of the Austin 
Powers saga). We all jumped into the joke, into an area of double-entendres, holding our 
cards close to our chest behind the protecting shield of irony and humor.  
But, humor, irony and jokes became more than a shield. Sharing a laugh about 
even tragic situations, built my relationship of trust with Nicolás, as it did with many of 
the people I worked during fieldwork. As Vladdo, one of the main political cartoonists in 
Colombia told me once, “I laugh to keep from crying.” And many of the people that I 
encountered during fieldwork coped with the sense of stagnancy, rigidity and indecency 
of Colombian politics by laughing at it. Joking provides a way to deal with ambiguity and 
the contradictions that rigid political structures carry along, mainly the highly formal 
discourse of properness that politicians appeal to, and the dramatic realities of violence 
and corruption that blatantly contradict those discourses. In this way, joking is a form to 
negotiate how one is positioned in a field that is never what it seems to be, a field 
populated by grey areas and loops. And, therefore, joking contains the possibility of 
reflexivity, the possibility of encountering those we might find morally reprehensible in a 
different light and understanding where they come from, to the point of building heartfelt 
friendships.   
 But, joking also hints at the ambiguity of the political field in another way; it 
complicates notions about what being a political expert means. As will be explored in 
following chapters, the industry of political management is cemented in a rationality of 
calculability, which presupposes predicting and managing human emotions and steering 
choice. The development and correction of objective market research tools, such as polls, 
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surveys, and focus groups, seek to be able to predict how the electorate will behave and 
inform the design of campaign strategies. This form of expertise plays with the idea that 
there is an objective knowledge about the irrationality of human emotions, and therefore 
human emotions can be stirred in a calculated way. But, as Boyer (2008) points out, one 
of the traps that the anthropology of experts and expertise has fallen into is reifying the 
belief that experts are what they do, and therefore are often depicted as rational beings 
stripped from any emotion. In fact, as Boyer explains, often experts dwell in the very 
ambiguous space of affect, where the production expertise, epistemological operations, is 
intertwined with anxiety and desire. Cracking a joke about one’s own expertise or about 
the political field, plays with the pretensions of objective know-how about human 
emotions that political practitioners brag about, and the constant struggle to strip one 
from any emotion towards politics in order to effectively manage politics, to have a 
balanced view.  
In the many lunch meetings I had with Camilo Rojas, a well-renowned political 
strategist and professor of Political Ideas who generously showed me the ropes of his 
practice, the stories about campaigning, political communication and power struggles in 
Colombia intertwined with lessons in history and political philosophy. The story of 
Caterina Sforza, duchess of Fiorli, was a favorite to illustrate what Camilo described as 
strategic thought in politics, characterized by the dispassionate management of political 
conditions to one’s own favor. Caterina Sforza lived in a time of political turmoil, when 
the Borgia family, as head of the Vatican, attempted to consolidate their power. Her life 
unfolded between battles, looting and fortresses. A famous episode of her life came when 
the rival family Orsis murdered her husband Girolamo; Sforza and her children were held 
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hostage. Sforza managed to escape by offering her services as mediator between the 
Orisis and a neighboring city that would not surrender to their power. She left her 
children behind as proof of her good intentions. However, once out, the legend tells that 
she threatened the Orsis with revenge. The Orsis threatened to kill her children who were 
still under their control. In response, Sforza exposed her genitals and yelled: “Go ahead, I 
have the means to make more.” Her uncle came in her aid and with his help Sforza 
regained control over Fiorli. Caterina Sforza’s story summarizes what a good strategist is 
supposed to do: tame one’s own affects in order to better calculate and evaluate the 
political conditions given. Camilo always highlighted Sforza’s detachment, even from her 
motherly instincts, as a proof what a savvy State person is supposed to act like, what a 
keen political strategist should be like. The defeat of one’s own passionate nature is the 
first quality that a good politician should have. A clear judgment guided by reason rather 
than by emotion is what any student of politics should strive for.  
This quest to self-dehumanization in order to enhance political abilities is 
anchored in western political thought, which has posited an absolute divide between 
emotions as belonging to the private, individual realm and rationality as the ground that 
builds public life. However, political practitioners are human after all and their practices 
elicit the fluid relations that emotionality and rationality hold (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 
1990). Politicians, political managers, and the different people I interviewed during 
fieldwork who worked within the political field talked about politics in very intimate and 
emotional terms. Their live histories, their personal memories and the feelings they had 
about specific political situations mediated the narratives they put together about their 
 41 
work. Moreover, these very intimate narratives also mediated my understanding of 
elections. 
 Experts working within the development of political campaigns highlighted how 
emotional campaigns are for all those who are involved, not just for the people who 
follow them. Without exception the politicians and political consultants that I interviewed 
highlighted the “adrenaline rush” that they get from working in political campaigns. As a 
political strategist said, “winning a political campaign is one of the most exciting 
experiences in life.” But, this “rush” comes intertwined with feelings of crisis and 
anxiety. Sometimes campaigns stall, and it is not due to the objective conditions of their 
development but due to the state of mind of those who are working in it, starting by the 
politician.  
Nicolás, for instance, sought to put this alluvium of affectivity to work for his 
own purposes. In a visit to his office, he was looking for a graffiti artist. His idea was to 
put up graffiti against the candidate of the opposing campaign. The graffiti were not 
meant to stir the voters’ perceptions about the opposing candidate. Rather, he placed 
them near the opposing candidate’s house for that person to see. He knew how vain the 
opposing candidate was and how upset the candidate would be by seeing this comments 
painted on walls. With this maneuver, Nicolás attempted to win some time for his own 
campaign, he knew that this action would generate a negative emotional response from 
the opposing candidate that would be a hiccup in that campaign.  
In a moment where the state function has been increasingly blurred by private 
interests administrating public life, the divide between public and private (Lutz and Abu-
Lughod 1990), between rationality and emotionality (Gal 2002; Fraser 1990; Warner 
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2002), on individual and collective (Reddy 1999) are not obvious. The industry of 
political management is one of these places where public and private intertwine, where 
there is a strategic use of emotions in coordinating and achieving a goal, as scholars 
working on new social movements have also diagnosed (Hirschkind 2001).  These new 
settings evince the dialectical relation that emotions and rationality hold. And this 
relation cannot be disaggregated or mapped into distinct, separate spheres of human 
existence like public and private. Rather, these emergent formations invite the social 
researcher to probe rationality and emotions as reflexive discursive strategies at play in 
constituting particular ways of being within politics. And elections offer the perfect 
setting to draw out these objects of ethnographic inquiry where the intimate links 
between rationality and emotionality can be observed in tangible ways. In the following 
chapters, I explore the materializations of these links between affectivity and rationality 
by looking at the work of people who make elections and electoral democracy happen.  
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Chapter*2*
Local*Universalisms*
 
Electoral times are hectic and chaotic: massive amounts of information are being 
produced about the development of the electoral competition and different factions use 
the means available to pursue and achieve their goals. In Colombia, these practices range 
from legal communication practices, to shady electoral negotiations that sometimes 
border illegality, to plainly illegal brutality such as the coercion to vote for favored 
candidates by armed groups. Elections in Colombia have the whole spectrum. Citizens 
are constantly being bombarded by information that circulates through established media, 
through social networks or the gossip that travels in informal networks. Political 
practitioners of all sorts –political consultants and managers, politicians, campaign teams 
and democracy activists—take part in the production and circulation of the electoral 
information. But, they use certain categories that organize, the sometimes convoluted, 
political reality and that frames the analysis of political behavior. These categories filter 
the design of any sort of political action and how these actions are read and coded.  
I became particularly puzzled by two categories regularly used both in public 
media and in expert discourse to convey and explicate a sense of living within a 
fragmented polity: voto de opinión [informed voter] and voto amarrado [tied vote]. The 
former category is used to describe middle to upper urban class, educated voters who are 
mobilized by media messages that articulate both emotions and arguments. The latter 
category is used to describe poor urban and rural voters organized in clientelistic 
networks of favor exchange and problem solving who are mobilized by the satisfaction of 
needs (Auyero 2000; O’Donnell 1998).  More than descriptive or indexing categories, 
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these two forms of understanding and existing within Colombian politics are semiotic 
fields (Faubion 2011). They are historically and culturally specific ways of inhabiting 
politics shaped by institutional shifts and sociological configurations of class.  
In this chapter, I focus on tracing the particular political and social processes in 
recent Colombian history that gave birth to these notions. I focus my attention chiefly on 
the generational sentiments, national events and geopolitical scales at work in the 
reformulation of the political constitution of 1991—a major defining political event in 
Colombian politics. First, I start by explaining how James Faubion’s (2011) program for 
an anthropology of ethics provides an appropriate toolkit to understand how political 
subjectivity is organized in Colombia. I look at how local and hierarchical notions of 
class, collective desires and global discourses on participatory democracy organize the 
semiotic field by shaping the available repertoire of possible [political] subject positions 
(Faubion 2011). Secondly, I look at the reforms introduced in electoral politics and party 
politics to understand the institutional frameworks that support the divide between a voto 
de opinión and a voto amarrado.  
 
Class-ifying voters 
 
The congressional and presidential elections of 2010 were marked by 
polarization. The candidates, independently from their political affiliation, were mainly 
divided in those who supported outgoing President Alvaro Uribe, probably the most 
popular president in Colombian history, and those who were against him. The 
Presidential race revolved around the public images of Uribe. His successor, Juan Manuel 
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Santos, was portrayed as the continuation of the successful political pragmatism 
characteristic of the Uribe era, a style of government associated with authority, security 
and order. In opposition, Antanas Mockus, Santos’s adversary, crafted an image as a 
symbol of anti-politics, of anti-corruption and of fiscal asceticism; as a symbol of 
political virtue. Mockus stood as the ethical opposite of Santos, who as Uribe’s heir was 
accused of continuing and deepening the political traditions of corruption, clientelism, 
and exclusion so many times blamed for the country’s political instability4. On his part, 
Santos accused Mockus of being naïve and not having a grounded grasp of the country’s 
narco-violence, security and economic needs.  
On both sides, political strategists and political managers worked hard in crafting 
these images, in attaching these images to specific recognizable messages, thus steering 
the candidates’ public recognition. The political strategists and political managers of both 
campaigns played on two mutually constitutive themes--two publicly recognized ways of 
participating and inhabiting politics--that are in constant and unresolved tension in 
Colombian public culture: the idea of a yet undelivered, but plausible, political maturity 
embedded in individual rational calculations benefiting the collective, condensed in the 
concept of the voto de opinión. And a sense of living in a stagnant reality of corruption, 
violence and social exclusion that requires dexterous pragmatism, and communal care in 
order to make a living, articulated in the notion of voto amarrado.    
                                                
4 Uribe’s government was surrounded by several corruption scandals. During the elections 
particularly two of these episodes had special media attention and were deemed as evidences of clientelistic 
arrangements. The first one was the use of the program Familias en Acción (designed to give public 
assistance to families of low income) by some of Uribe’s supporters to win votes. The second one was the 
use of the program Agro Ingreso Seguro (designed to give incentives to small farmers) to benefit landlords 
who had the ability to mobilize voters in their regions.  
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I understand the distinction between two kinds of votes as the electoral expression 
of culturally specific, historically situated ethical discourses of class. As Faubion (2011) 
discusses à propos Foucault, in the ethical field free and reflexive subjects fashion 
themselves according to esteemed qualities. Faubion proposes an anthropology of ethics 
that accounts for the limited variability of these subject positions in different 
sociocultural systems, but that also accounts for the creative and generative ability of 
individual reflexivity and virtue. Subjects can occupy different subject positions at the 
same time and be reflexive about it. Hence, his program starts with praxis, with the 
different things people “do” in becoming those subjects of esteemed qualities, but is also 
attentive to the normative order of reproduction of the ethical field, what he calls the 
“themitical dimension of the ethical field” (Faubion 2011:25).  In this sense, this program 
invites the researcher to pay close attention to methodological design and analytical scale. 
It begs for the systematical observation and interpretation on how cultural specificities, 
historical processes and global generalities compose fields of meaning, fields where 
collective communicative practices unfold and reproduce.  Simply put, Faubion argues 
for a systematic understanding of how we come to being, what counts for us as a “life 
worth living” (2011:24), how we reproduce those ideals of living, and how we reflexively 
encounter and style our modes of existence.  
 The voto de opinión and the voto amarrado at first glance appear to be 
instrumental categories for the mobilization of voters during electoral times rather than 
stable forms of being in the world. However, these two categories rehash longstanding 
discourses about class, education, and nation making at the core of Colombia’s public 
common sense (Lakoff 2002). Elections are the perfect scenario for these cultural 
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dispositions to surface since political practitioners play on this known repertoire of 
available subjectivities to effectively deliver their messages. Anyone who has grown up 
in Colombia can understand, feel moved, get touched, and compelled to mobilize by the 
cues and winks underlying political propaganda pieces and political performances. The 
voto de opinión and the voto amarrado speak to senses of self and belonging in a socially 
hierarchical political and national landscape.  
During the congressional and presidential elections of 2010, the division between 
two types of vote organized by class was present in every space where politics was 
performed and discussed. One of those spaces is the “septimazo,” a Friday afternoon 
urban event where one of the main roads of Bogotá (carrera séptima) is closed in the 
downtown area for pedestrians to enjoy. Musicians, street vendors (mostly illegal), and 
street performers all come together in this space. Those who come to walk around can 
enjoy all sorts of activities, from Guinea-pig track races to portable karaoke singing. 
During elections, the “septimazo” provides a vibrant scenario for political demonstrations 
and rallies. It is a display window for anyone who wants to deliver political messages.  
The campaign of Antanas Mockus organized a demonstration on the septimazo 
that mostly gathered a young, middle to upper-middle class population. Green t-shirts, 
green balloons, sunflowers, whistles, tambourines, and drums were part of a procession 
of enthusiasts who hoped to add more followers to their lines.  One of the organizers 
explained that they were doing this massive demonstration to reach those people that 
normally do not use Facebook. The demonstration was organized via Facebook, but its 
purpose was to reach people other than the population segments that were already 
supporting Antanas Mockus, chiefly middle-class urban young people. They were hoping 
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to attract “all those people who are tired of politics, who are seeking something different, 
and who believe that with education everything is possible,” one of the organizers 
claimed. In a rhythmical mantra, the Green party concentration chanted as they walked 
down carrera séptima: “Voto inteligente, Antanas Presidente” [An intelligent vote, 
Antanas for President] or “Mi profesor, mi Presidente” [My professor, my President].  
The messages that the Green Party participants delivered alluded to the idea of 
appealing to the voto de opinión. The representations of this kind of vote that circulate in 
the Colombian media and political spaces articulate liberal notions of citizenship. The 
opinion voter is portrayed as an autonomous thinker (Kant 2009), an informed and 
educated individual able to engage in public spaces for rational-critical deliberation that 
will positively impact the common good (Dewey 1954; Habermas 1989). This voter is 
also prone to emotion—but not the paralyzing deep passions--but the inspiring sentiments 
of collective indignation spurred by injustice and hope for a better future5.  Building a 
citizen culture through education has been the center of Mockus’s intellectual and 
political program. When he was Mayor of Bogotá, he put in motion different programs 
for citizen pedagogy seeking to transform Bogotaneans’ ideas of the public space. He 
used pedagogical methods such as the public scorning of selfish behavior in public space, 
like mimes mocking those who did not respect the pedestrian strip to cross the street. In 
his campaign in 2010, education and being a better citizen respectful of the common 
good continued to be his political message. He appealed to those ‘intelligent ones’, the 
                                                
5 Scholars who have approached social movements from a cultural perspective have reconciled the long-
standing western binary of emotions as opposed to rationality (Archila 2006; Edelman 2005; Goodwin, 
Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Lemaitre 2009; Satterfield 2004; Scott 1976). This perspective acknowledges 
how common moral frames, especially collective ideas and representations of justice, spur emotions that 
are strategically mobilized in generating common identities and coordinating actions. I will expand more on 
this topic on chapter 3.        
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educated middle class, as his base for support and sought to transform the undesirable 
behaviors of those who did not engage the public according to this normative worldview.  
 
Class in the making  
The transformation imperative that Mockus and his followers vehemently 
demanded is anchored in long-standing class formations. Class in Colombia has often 
being understood through a Marxian framework of ownership (or dispossession) of land -
- the principal means of production (Fals-Borda 2002; LeGrand 1986). This lens has 
often served as explanation for the perdurability of a civil war where the names of the 
actors change, but where the inequalities remain the same. For instance, up to this day, 
the state has interiorized these inequalities in its own intuitional functioning.  Public 
services are hierarchically organized in strata and charged accordingly, where stratum 1 
is the poorest and 6 is the wealthiest. The (very real and present) materiality of class 
organization, however, overshadows the more complex class relations in urban settings, 
relations that are at play in the constitution of the political discourses mobilized during 
elections. In cities, more prevalently, class is also filtered through family genealogies, 
claims to taste and education, rather than just money (Bourdieu 1984). Historical depth 
provides a sense and a linear narrative of being in the world that is not just anchored in 
possession/dispossession dichotomies. Although their historical depth render these class 
dynamics quasi-static, there is a further complication to class, a form of mobility that can 
be achieved through the cultivation of education (Faubion 2011). In this way, class is a 
dislocated and fractured notion prone to controversy and conflict. Class is materially and 
historically defined, but also overflows these definitions. These contentious class politics 
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were at the core of political messages during the elections of 2010.  
Mockus’ flag on education as a tool for transformation is a known theme for 
Bogotaneans and those from other regions who have arrived to Bogotá. The nation 
building projects in the XIXth century were carried out from Bogotá, even though the 
city was visibly poorer than other more prosperous regions of Colombia (Samper 1969). 
The economic depression was so widespread that the white elites of Spanish descent 
cohabited with the traditionally poor (the indigenous populations); the spatial layout in 
the city did not serve as a marker of class distinction, unlike other productive and wealthy 
areas in Colombia (Mejía 1999).  
The impoverished elite of Bogotá legitimized and reasserted its bureaucratic 
power, as well as their class position, by claiming as their identity markers education, 
good manners, civility and a euro-centered cosmopolitanism (Martínez 2001). Bogotá 
became to be known as the “Athens of South America” since the small intellectual circles 
of bureaucrats (who were also often poets and philologists) held their meetings in Greek 
(Deas 1993). Soon, education, rather than economic privileges, became a class marker in 
the microcosm of Bogotá. Being a good citizen, being civil, could not be bought by any 
goods but only achieved through conscientious cultivation. Such an ideal became a 
contentious notion within the national project that would be replicated and contested 
throughout the Colombian territory.  
In the history of Bogotá, a history intimately tied to the national construction of 
Colombia, this idea continued to be rehashed in different moments. During the 1950s and 
1960s, when the developmental framework was at full force worldwide, Bogotá became a 
synonym of rationality and progress (Saldarriaga 2006). The populations displaced by the 
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bipartisan civil war arrived to a context where their rural practices were deemed 
undesirable and contrary to the ideals of the city.  These new inhabitants had to learn how 
to become urban.   In the later decades of the 20th century when participation became the 
leading model for politics, Bogotá became an inclusive space for all. Mockus, in his first 
term as Mayor of Bogotá, led this flag. His project for inclusion was systematic. He 
advocated, as a good Habermasian6, for constructing through education a common 
rationality and a common ethical ground were conflicts and differences could be 
negotiated, a particular form of inhabiting the polis framed by the boundaries provided by 
the law.  
In the 2010 election, Mockus’ political platform was based on this life-long project that 
resonated with Bogota’s and Colombia’s history. His democratic ideal strived to educate 
in order to accomplish a political civility that served as the foundation for a more 
horizontal society.  In another moment of the “septimazo,” the contentious politics of 
                                                
6 In a public statement, Habermas, among other intellectuals, endorsed and supported Mockus’ presidential 
Campaign for 2010 (see textbox).  
 
Declaración de apoyo a Antanas Mockus (Semana, May 26th 2010) 
Nosotros, los abajo firmantes, expresamos nuestro fuerte apoyo a la candidatura de Antanas Mockus a la 
presidencia de Colombia. 
 
El dramático éxito de las iniciativas que emprendió como alcalde de Bogotá le han hecho merecedor no sólo del 
apoyo y la admiración de millones de sus conciudadanos, sino también del interés y la cooperación de expertos 
en políticas públicas urbanas y científicos sociales, como nosotros, en muchos países. 
 
El núcleo de su aproximación imaginativa y única a los problemas urbanos -desde el ahorro de agua hasta la 
protección a la vida- es una idea simple y poderosa: Cuando no podemos monitorear el comportamiento de los 
ciudadanos ni resolver problemas con pagos de dinero, podemos apelar a lo mejor en cada uno, y dejar que los 
ciudadanos se hagan mutuamente responsables de acuerdo con los principios renovados de la cultura ciudadana. 
 
Dada su reputación de integridad, la presidencia de Antanas Mockus ofrecerá una oportunidad única para 
cambiar el clima dominante de desconfianza que obstaculiza la paz social y el crecimiento económico en 
Colombia. 
 
(continu  next page) 
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class arose in spite of the civilizing inclusion of Mockus’ discourse. The anti-fascist 
skinheads organized a parallel demonstration to the one organized by the Green party. 
They marched down the street as a disciplined army as they chanted, cursed and accused 
the Green Party project of being fascist. To avoid any fights, and honoring their political 
ideals, the Green Party members patiently waited for the skinhead army standing quietly 
on the curb holding a pencil up in the air, as a symbol for the transformative power of 
education. Nothing happened. Education and peacefulness combined allowed the Green 
Party demonstration to keep going its way. They continued their task of inviting people to 
join, chanting as they walked: “Señor peatón, únase al montón, vote por Antanas si quiere 
educación” [Mr. Pedestrian, join the crowd, vote for Antanas if you want education]. 
Some joined. But those who are not part of Mockus’s model for the polity stayed aside, 
sometimes throwing insults at the green crowd, composing a very coarse visual image of 
marginality. A street vendor yelled from the top of her lungs: “Booo, down, Mockus, you 
trash!” Fury lit her eyes.  “Basura!” [you trash]. In his years as Mayor, Mockus, in his 
attempt to recuperate the public space, he engaged in a battle with illegal street vendors. 
Often, police cars would raid the city to ‘clean’ public spaces from street vendors, 
confiscating their merchandise. “All of us street vendors are against Mockus” the woman 
explained. “We almost never vote; we don’t have anyone to organize us nor to help us. 
But I already talked to friends and family (…) Us the poor are much more than the rich, 
and that man [Antanas Mockus] won’t come to power!” 
This vignette illustrates the contentious class encounters that arise when the voto 
de opinión meets the voto amarrado [tied vote]. As Auyero (2000) argues, elaborating on 
the argument of Guillermo O’Donell (1994), clientelism in Latin America has been 
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overrepresented in expert discourse as the main political form of engagement of rural and 
poor populations without carefully analyzing its implications for the operation of the state 
at the local level. As this vignette shows, rather than the voto amarrado being an “empty” 
and simplistic category susceptible to reform, it is an active form of engaging with the 
state under very real conditions of dispossession and marginality. As the statement of the 
street vendor conveys when she regrets not having anyone to organize her “friends and 
family,” clientelistic networks formalize ties of solidarity and trust for political purposes, 
in order to “help” those who cannot access state services by institutional channels, those 
who by means of sheer hunger fall out of the scope of civilizing discourses. Seen in this 
light, the “voto amarrado” is yet another iteration of an ethics of face-to-face care and 
solidarity within a neoliberal state that increasingly narrows its welfare services 
(Muehlebach 2012). 
These very complex class conditions that articulate opposite ethical imperatives 
form the landscape where politics is mobilized. While there are groups that overtly work 
for the reformation of a political culture of clientelism, there is a wide consensus that 
these clientelistic networks and arrangements are the “natural” locus for politics. While 
the opinion vote is very volatile, the tied vote is predictable and stable. While opinion 
voters at times might not participate, the “tied vote” is the heart of the political machine. 
In this fashion, anyone working within the realm of politics, from NGOs to politicians, 
navigates these ethical discourses, negotiating their own political identities in doing so.  
Often these negotiations occur within the framework and through the language provided 
by participatory politics.  
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The framing power of participatory politics   
The introduction of participatory politics with the constitution of 1991 provided 
the Colombian public with a normative discursive formation to both reassert and contest 
class positions within the polity. During electoral times, campaigns play with this 
language in order to convey ideas of hope for a future of lawfulness and political 
inclusion. In the presidential campaigns of 2010, for instance, Santos’ campaign appealed 
to a socially and politically inclusive future to be “constructed together”, while Mockus’ 
highlighted the need to move from Uribe’s militaristic state to the reinforcement of a 
“culture of legality” respectful of norms. The brighter futures that both campaigns 
portrayed played with two notions that since the 1980s and early 1990s have become 
synonyms of a desired political modernity in Colombian public culture: legality and 
political inclusion.  In short, legality and political inclusion are a metaphor to talk about a 
desired modern nation, and have provided a linear form of narration that inscribes the 
nation within the modern ideal of progress (Bhabha 1994); more legality: more inclusion: 
more progress: more modern.  
This discursive formation is so pervasive in talking about and imagining politics 
that political claims and political messages are often delivered in a participatory key, with 
an underlying class commentary. One of the least known candidates of the 2010 
presidential race chained himself to the Simón Bolívar statue, located in the main square 
of Bogotá, to reclaim participation and inclusion. Robinson Devia, a newcomer in politics 
who appeared out of the blue and could register his candidacy by collecting one million 
signatures7, was protesting for barely receiving media attention. His main claim was that 
                                                
7 The electoral legislation allows candidates and political movements, independent from recognized 
political parties, to register their candidacy by collecting citizen signatures 
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Santos and Mockus were overrepresented in media and that the other voices also taking 
part in the presidential race were silenced. For that reason, he and his closest followers 
chained themselves to Bolívar and started a “hunger strike” to end when their claims 
were satisfied. 
The candidate and his followers wore the t-shirts that represented their political 
movement. All of them shared a long chain that chained them to one another and to the 
statue of Simón Bolívar. There was no food, just some tinto [coffee] to calm down the 
hunger, keep the energy up and the bodies warm. Sleeping bags, trash bags, pigeons and 
clothes served as the back setting. A little bucket and a black cloth served as the “private” 
latrine. “The candidate has to go to the bathroom,” someone yells. Another collaborator 
rushes to him with the black cloth and the bucket. They cover him up and hand him the 
bucket while the people at the Bolívar Square stare at the scene. The TV News crew 
arrives.  The candidate stands up and makes good use of the media attention. He delivers 
a speech sending his main point across and, in passing, advertises his political platform. 
In the meantime, I approach the statue to try to get an interview. The media manager of 
the campaign approaches me. She is the only member of Devia’s team who is not chained 
and who has clearly had a chance to take a good night’s sleep and a shower. She lets me 
through to talk to one of Devia’s collaborators, a man chained on the other side of the 
statue, hidden from the public eye.     
We are protesting because the media haven’t showed balanced 
information about the campaigns. We have filed complaints to all the 
electoral regulatory entities. We get what any common citizen gets, 
answers delaying the petition. Our candidate is a common citizen, he 
belongs to stratum three, ordinary people can identify with him. We 
decided to chain ourselves because the Colombian people are also 
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chained, it is a symbol (…) what can a regular citizen do when her 
rights have been violated and the State8 is not there to defend her? 
Chains are the only answer. (…) It’s time for Colombians to rule their 
country. Our symbol is the butterfly. Our political constitution is the 
butterfly that we have to become, but still we are in a worm (sic) State. 
We know we are a butterfly because the law tells us so, but those who 
have governed us are worms and keep us in a worm (sic) state.    
 
Butterflies, worms and citizenship are mixed together in a narrative of individual 
and collective transformation. Devia’s collaborator conveys, in rather crude terms, the 
desire to morph from a state that works for a few to a state that includes all, ideas that 
were introduced and legitimated in public culture with the drafting of the political 
constitution of 1991. This new legislative framework was expected to give birth to a new 
polity inhabited by new citizens. This new polity would not be elitist or hierarchical, 
neither would it be embedded in a rigid social class structure or in party bipartisanship.   
Rather, this new polity would be observant of civic rights regardless of socioeconomic 
condition, political beliefs, religion, ethnicity or gender. This new polity would promote 
unity and inclusion, while respectful of cultural differences. But for Devia and his 
followers, as for many other Colombians, the promise has never been fulfilled but still 
remains a plausible reality worth chaining oneself for.    
                                                
8 Devia’s follower played with the words state, as a condition of being, and State, as the Liberal State, for 
his metaphor.  
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Julieta Lemaitre (2009) identifies this collective fascination with legalistic 
discourse as “legal fetishism.” The law, more than a normative prescription that defines 
the parameters for sociopolitical interaction in Colombia, is the representation of 
collective desires for peace, lawfulness and order. The law symbolizes the possibility of a 
different political world and the possibility of becoming participant and responsible 
political subjects. Law is an object of desire that is written but not enforced (Taussig 
2005)9. In this sense, the written law gives shape to a future, nonexistent world that 
contrasts to a very real and current sense of living in a world of chaos and corruption. 
Discourses about law and political participation provide a plausible utopia in the land of 
dystopia, and therefore are highly effective in mobilizing collective hope. Politicians 
                                                
9 In Bogotá alone the impunity rates for murder from June 2007 to June 2010 reached 71.2% (El 
Espectador 2010). 
Roinson Devia’s Hunger Strike. Bogotá May 12th 2010, Personal Photographic Archive.  
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during electoral season appeal to it, but also everyone else trying to legitimize their 
actions in the political arena. For instance, in the past years, the National Development 
Plans10 have been named as follows: “Propesperity for all” (2010-2014), “The 
Communitarian State: development for all” (2006-2010), “Towards a Communitarian 
State” (2002-2006), “A Change for Peace” (1998-2002), “The Social Leap” (1994-1998), 
just to name a few. This language stands in contrast to a highly hierarchical social 
structure of class. Ideas of sharing prosperity, the state, or peace are crafted in public 
discourse to contrast a reality of disenfranchisement and poverty11.  
In this way, the political constitution of 1991 epitomizes a fracture between civil 
rights and economics (Caldeira and Holston 1999), which as in other Latin American 
reformed constitutional frameworks, is an odd mix of progressive social rights and a 
conservative (read neoliberal) economic model (Dezalay and Garth 2002; Lemaitre 
2009).  Looking back at the social movements and political actors that pushed for the 
constitutional reforms in the early 1990s, it is possible to observe these paradoxes of class 
and participation. The social movement organized by upper-middle class students from 
Bogotá to reform the political system successfully attained its goal by articulating and 
translating a global language of open markets and civic participation to localized 
sentiments. In this process, global discourses on participation were coded in a class key. 
The local elites asserted their social position by bridging universals constructed 
internationally with the realities at home (Delazay and Garth 2002). As Samuel 
                                                
10 Every new government is required by law to make public a plan of Government at the beginning of each 
term, containing the programmatic guidelines that will be executed. Citizens can hold accountable their 
governments by overseeing if the goals have been met.  
11 According to the latest information available on wealth distribution worldwide, Colombia is the 8th most 
uneven country in the world (CIA-The World Factbook).  
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Huntigton (1991) analyzes, the “third wave” of political democratization around the 
world (1974-1990s) had elites play a preponderant role. Although Huntington provides 
more of a descriptive analysis, this observation is fruitful for questioning how local elites 
mediate global discourses of participation from their elite social position and construct 
local political epistemologies reproduced in public culture (Delazay and Garth 2002).  
During the fieldwork months of fragmented political experiences, the awareness 
of social class unified the different political actors that I interacted with. The main key 
informants of this project belonged in one way or another to the generation that reformed 
the constitution. They were all part of an intellectual or an economic elite. For instance, 
the visible heads of Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) started their political lives 
as the leaders of the student movement that pushed for the reformation of the 
constitution, while the political strategists I worked with learned the ropes of political 
managing during their involvements with the governments of transition.  
Although my informants pretty much stand in separate camps, they all appealed to 
the division between voto de opinión and voto amarrado to explain the country’s political 
situation. In these notions, they assert very subtle class positioning evinced in claims 
about the ‘proper’ ways to partake in a novel participatory democratic political system. 
But, in order to understand how class disposition and ideas about political modernity 
intertwine in these categories that frame political participation, let’s take a look back at 
the historical processes unchained with the reformation of the political constitution in 
1991.     
Going back to the root: Séptima Papeleta Social Movement 
Everything was like an express cooker: the bombs exploded among us, 
the dead bodies fell on us, and the congress decided that a reform to the 
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political system was not possible. It was like walking on a dead end 
street, the people in charge were incapable of making decisions. Were we 
supposed to remain seated and wait until they killed us all? We were 
mobilized by collective indignation  (Interview with Claudia López).  
 
Claudia López, journalist and political analyst, belongs to the last generation of students 
who believed in changing the world through collective mobilization. She was member of 
the student movement of “La séptima papeleta”12 that transformed Colombia’s 
institutions by achieving the unthinkable: calling for the reformation of the political 
constitution of 1886. As Julieta Lemaitre (2009) explains, the political constitution of 
1886 only allowed any amendments via congressional actions; there was no room for 
civil movements to participate in any constitutional reform. These students’ claims for 
the modernization of political institutions found an important support network in their 
professors (who had connections in the government), some sectors in the traditional 
political parties, the leftist political movements that had recently abandoned the armed 
struggle, and the liberal print media. Out of very diverse motivations and interests, an 
array of groups formed a civilian coalition to claim and promote, what was seen at the 
moment as the rebirth of the state or the outlining of a new “social contract.”   
 Starting with a clean slate by dismantling the institutional foundations of the 
political traditions of Colombia became an imperative. The situation begged for such 
drastic actions. The rising industry of drug traffic had spread its tentacles of influence to 
the higher levels of government. Scandals of corruption, violence and death were the 
                                                
12 The “séptima papeleta” movement that pushed for the reformation of the constitution got its name from 
a mobilization tactic. Since the 1886 constitution did not allow referenda, this social movement in 
conjunction with the government proposed to have an extra ballot in the local and regional elections to 
express the civil will for reforming the constitution.  This ballot was not officially issued. Rather, a variety 
of civic actors (including the liberal newspapers) printed and handed out the ballot for people to take to the 
voting polls.  
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centerpiece in the daily news. As several analysts argue (Leal Buitrago and Davila L. 
1990; Lemaitre 2009; Thoumi 1999), the exclusionary, clientelistic and authoritarian 
political structure of the country was a fertile ground for drug moneys and narco-cultures 
to succeed. Moreover, the lack of any means for public control, accountability or 
transparency practices lent itself to shadowy associations. Politicians and drug lords 
benefited from one another. The mafias had the money to sponsor any political endeavor; 
the politicians had the political power to benefit this thriving illegal business.  The 
situation became so dramatic that in 1989 three presidential candidates were murdered. 
Claudia López remembers this episode with profound indignation. As she recalls, “the 
country was moved by the murder of Galán [the liberal candidate], I was devastated by 
the murder of Bernardo Jaramillo [the leftist candidate].”13 The situation had reached a 
point in which it did not matter what political color anybody wore: everyone had a soul to 
mourn.   
In this context, the call for unity and civic mobilization beyond partisan lines 
constituted a horizon of hope for a new collective future without violence. To this end, 
the political constitution had as its main goal to decentralize and pluralize the government 
structure.  The longstanding exclusionary and clientelistic bipartisan tradition of 
Colombia was the target of these reforms. The different and diverse actors involved in the 
movement for the reformation of the constitution agreed that the party structure of the 
country, and its distribution of political power, was at the heart of the widespread 
political violence (Posada-Carbó 1998). The exclusionary partition of power between 
                                                
13 During the Presidential elections of 1990, three presidential candidates were murdered in cold blood. 
Galan’s death was attributed to Pablo Escobar. Galan had openly denounced the increasing influence of 
Escobar in the government. Carlos Pizarro, former M-19 guerrilla leader, and Bernardo Jaramillo, UP  
candidate (leftist party), were murdered by paramilitary hands.  
 
 62 
Liberales and Conservadores, which in the 1960s had delivered peace, was now to blame 
for fueling violence.  
In order to understand better the party dynamics that the reforms were aiming to 
disarticulate, we have to shift attention to a landmark in Colombia’s political history, La 
Violencia. During the 1950s, Colombia experienced one of the bloodiest episodes in its 
political history. The bloodshed was so brutal that this historical event is named “La 
Violencia” with capital letters, to signal that violence was the only thing that happened 
during those years. Liberales and Conservadores, the two traditional political parties, 
engaged in a crude civil war mainly in rural areas, while the cities remained relatively 
peaceful. In the countryside, Liberales (mainly) were being displaced and dispossessed of 
their lands by the Conservatives through brutal violence. The motivation was the long 
years of exclusion from the political system that the party experienced during Liberal 
rule. In return, the Liberales organized guerrilla warfare to avenge their dead. In 1953, a 
military coup instated a four-year dictatorship that “pacified” the country. When civilian 
rule returned, Liberales and Conservadores agreed on a truce known as Frente Nacional 
to avoid future conflict.  
From 1958 until 1974, Liberales and Conservadores shared power by a rule of 
alternation. What this meant was that every government period had to be alternated 
between the two parties. When one party was in office, the other one was guaranteed to 
have a share of bureaucratic positions. This arrangement would ensure that the state 
resources would be equally divided between the two parties. The state sponsorship of a 
party-oriented bureaucratic apparatus went as far as to grant the infamous auxilios 
parlamentarios to congresspeople. These were state resources given to each 
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congressperson with virtually no strings attached (Hoskin 1998). In a country where 
industrialism was fairly incipient, and the biggest employer was the state, controlling 
state resources was the core of the political game (Palacios and Safford 2002). The 
regional political chiefs and their political machines of clients and bureaucracy managed 
how the Colombian state worked. These associations distributed public offices and public 
contracting among party factions, leaving no room for the broader public to participate in 
how budgetary lines were distributed (Leal Buitrago and Davila L. 1990). In short, no 
one other than Liberales and Conservadores was allowed to take part in this game.   
But, in the 1980s with increasing pressures for economic and political 
liberalization from international organizations as the World Bank, the institutional 
conditions would change. Liberal President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) was committed 
to the economic liberalization and the institutional organization of the country. In 1989, 
he echoed the collective sentiments of the social movements that were assembling around 
the idea of reforming the constitution by passing a project for constitutional reform to 
congress that would open political spaces for other groups. The project was blocked 
several times. In the eyes of the social movements in favor of reform, these congressional 
actions were evidence of how the representational and deliberative functions of Congress 
had been undermined by regional clientelistic arrangements (Hoskin 1998; Lemaitre 
2009; Steven Taylor, Botero, and Crisp 2008). A seat in congress represented a group of 
bureaucratic interests rather than citizen claims. “The people in power were incapable of 
making decisions” as Claudia López felt, and this was a call to civil society to shake the 
structures through which decisions actually were made. Following longstanding 
discussions on party theory, it was time for civil society to stir its political future and 
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reform the power structures of the country reflected in its party system (Sartori 1976; 
Weber 1978). By reforming parties and political competition, society would be 
completely transformed—at least that was the aspiration. The campaign slogan of the 
man who would become president in 1990 and who led the drafting of the new 
constitution, Cesar Gaviria, reflected this sentiment of hope for a new Colombia: “The 
future is now.”  
But, what did this envisioned future look like? The reforms introduced citizen 
participation, decentralization and the flexibilization of the terms to form political 
associations beyond the traditional parties. The expectation was to disarticulate the highly 
concentrated forms of power by asserting the citizens’ “sovereignty at every level of 
government” (Hoskin 1998:60).  For this purpose, the possibility of electing governors, 
of participating in plebiscites, referenda, popular consultations, open meetings, legislative 
initiative and recall were introduced as constitutional citizen rights (Cepeda 1998). The 
hope was that citizen groups would closely oversee government, and had the legal tools 
to take action to protect their own rights. Moreover, state services were decentralized. 
The local municipalities became administrative units of water, health and education 
services. Opening the channels for direct citizen participation and decentralization in the 
instances of political and public expenditure decision-making was expected to remedy a 
long-standing tradition of patronage, middle powers and brokerage.  Participation would 
bring the so longed-for future, that of “progress” and development (Bell Lemus 1998).  
Late liberal rationales are at the core of these notions of hopeful, utopian futures 
and collective wellbeing. The political reforms in Colombia are the localized incarnation 
of what are often considered ephemeral global conditions. The political processes of the 
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late 1980s and early 1990s are part of a globally configured constellation of moral 
imaginaries, economic rationales, and political dispositions (Ong and Stephen J. Collier 
2005; Charles Taylor 2004). The very intimate sentiments of those Colombians who felt 
in their gut the need to take action in a perceived context of political decay intersected 
with macro-scalar phenomena of a post-cold war world.  The rising enthusiasm for the 
worldwide rebirth of democracy and civil society after the downfall of leftist and rightist 
authoritarian rule provided the Colombian public with a language to imagine a future 
without social exclusion and war. Participatory politics, social democracy and the “Third 
Way” (Giddens 1998) were the conceptual tools that would provide localized elite agents 
a framework to think about alternate institutional designs and ways of practicing politics. 
The return to civic power was the new legitimate remedy to what has been dubbed so 
many times a “failed state.” The privatization and civil administration of public services 
would fulfill the role that the state was unable to sustain (Bushnell 1993).14  
This new recipe, proposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, entailed opening markets, decentralizing resources, and promoting private 
investment.  The formula assumed that development and economic success depended on 
healthy and strong institutions supported by free elections and civic overseeing of 
government, in order to prevent the vices of corruption. Spontaneous social movements 
were seen by these international organizations as key actors in implementing these 
transformations in contexts lacking strong civic organizations, political parties, electoral 
rules and legislative apparatuses (Payne et al. 2007). “Third Way” politics was 
                                                
14 As Bushnell (1993) notes, during the late 1980s and early 1990s the private security services boomed. 
Since the state was unable to stop the surmounting violence, the privatization of security offered a temporal 
solution. Sadly, as history shows, these private services sometimes resulted in the organization of 
paramilitary squads, specially in the rural areas, that keep feeding violence in the country. 
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particularly appealing to a fragmented political constituency living in a highly stratified 
society with a highly centralized political system. The “third way” was the hopeful path 
for civil society to thrive and regain control of its political and economic future beyond 
partisan lines. It was the moral call of a generation that had seen individual liberties being 
suffocated by stagnant, and now ontologically empty, ideological divisions and 
authoritative modes of political engagement. Reminiscing about the call of her 
generation, “politics can be transformed through politics,” Claudia López vehemently 
affirms.  “Politics can transform the life of people in a good way. Politics can not screw 
people over, it can not displace them, it can not murder them, it can not steal from them, 
it can employ them, it can make their life better, it can make the life of a child better. All 
that can be achieved through politics.”  
 
Political rejuvenation 
For politics to change through politics, the reformation of the political and 
electoral system was imperative.  As in other countries in Latin America, in Colombia 
this task was carried out under a government of young technocrats closely aligned with 
and influenced by the United States (Lemaitre 2009).15 The media satirically named 
President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) and his cabinet “Gaviria’s Kinder”, a label that 
pointed to the rejuvenation of a political class that was publicly regarded as stagnant and 
mummified. This new class of political practitioners contrasted with the old class of 
“gentlemen politicians” in their trust in technocratic knowledge and mertitocratic systems 
                                                
15 It is interesting to note that my informants who were active in politics during this period of transition 
have different connections to the U.S. They have either studied in the U.S, worked at the Organization of 
American States in Washington D.C,  have involvements with U.S based non-profit organizations or some 
sort of relation with the U.S government.  
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rather than the use of personal connections for political management (Dezalay and Garth 
2002). Miguel Silva, top Latin-American consultant and private secretary of Cesar 
Gaviria’s government, looks back on his generation to analyze a major shift in the inner 
workings of politics:   
 
I do believe there was a whole generation of young people-- 
who went into politics after the constitution on 1991--who 
inherited that romantic outlook of being able to do politics 
without political machineries; who believed in and appealed 
to the ‘voto de opinion’. What happens at the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s is the emergence of an 
urban opinion vote. When the country [had a demographic 
structure] where 30% was urban and 70% was rural, there 
was one political reality. When this reverses, the political 
reality changes. And it is very interesting indeed because an 
independent voter starts to emerge (…) As this opinion vote 
emerges, and the political parties [and their machineries] are 
unable to channel this vote, independent candidates start to 
appear. 
  
Miguel Silva’s explanation articulates the point of view of a generation who went 
into politics to reform it from the inside, and who transformed all the institutional 
platforms of the country according to perceptions of a changing social and political 
world. This generation believed in a dramatic shift in the political behavior of 
Colombians due to the urbanization processes unchained by years of civil war and inner 
displacement.  
The history of electoral reforms in Colombia, after the constitution of 1991, points 
to the historic tension between desired political futures designed by urban and 
technocratic elites and an institutional infrastructure that favors clientelistic networks. 
This is another locus where the historic class configu
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The association of urban environments to an independent, self-reliant voter who acts on 
self-judgment rather than on necessity has produced a fragmented conceptual mapping of 
Colombia. As Serje (2005) discusses, the legitimate expert knowledge of intellectuals and 
technocrats designing public policy reproduced a national landscape of segmentation. 
Urban areas were socially constructed as hegemonic spaces of order and modernity, 
while rural and “frontier” areas served as the reversed mirror of that modernity -- as what 
Foucault calls heterotopias. These spaces of lawlessness, but also of possible liberation, 
legitimized the need for a modern ordering.  In Colombia, this territorial configuration 
has been so pervasive that throughout the two hundred years of republican history there 
have been different attempts to integrate both kinds of territories into a unified national 
project. In the XIXth century “the warm hinterlands”16 were the object of “pacification” 
and civilization through multiple civil wars, commerce and religious missions (Bolívar 
and Arias Vanegas 2006), while in the late XXth century participatory democracy and 
administrative decentralization constituted the promise of national unity.  
  In this fashion, the political and electoral reforms of the early 1990s both sought 
to transform rural political practices and also sought to give an institutional platform for a 
burgeoning urban vote to thrive. The electoral and party system underwent a radical 
rupture that deeply shook the strategies for exercising and practicing politics successfully. 
As was mentioned earlier, the constitution introduced more flexible rules for political 
                                                
16 The Conservative President, Miguel Antonio Caro, who took part in the drafting of the constitution of 
1886 used the pejorative term “warm hinterlands” to refer to the Colombia other than Bogotá. He 
considered Bogotá to be the center of civilization in Colombia and the legitimate place for a civilizing and 
unifying national project to spread. In one of his essays about the Spanish Conquest he regrets “¡Cuan 
profunda tristeza causa la idea de que en vez de haber dilatado la civilización su radio, en muchas partes ha 
perdido terreno!” (1951: 291). [The thought that civilization instead of broadening its radius, in many part 
it has lost terrain is profoundly sad!] 
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association. The constitution recognized grass-root social movements as legitimate 
political organizations that could enter the political arena, thus harvesting a plethora of 
movements organized along ethnic, civic and religious lines (Moreno 2005). The 
enthusiasm for participation was such that by 2002, 85 political parties were officially 
registered (Reyes González 2004). This unexpected outcome in party numbers was not 
foreseen with the reformation of the constitution. The new legislative framework 
introduced the programmatic vote along with the flexibilization of association, a modality 
that legally binds candidates to effectively delivering their electoral promises, as a way to 
have more direct citizen-candidate overseeing and hence a tighter representative regime. 
The expectation was that the programmatic vote would ensure that the “opinion voter” 
would have the adequate tools actively and effectively to participate in the democratic 
process, from election to government implementation. It was assumed that political 
parties would organically organize attuned with their voters around programmatic lines.  
  However, the explosion of political parties is indicative of the persistence of 
politics mobilized by personalized networks in Colombia’s electoral process in spite of 
the constitutional reforms (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008).  As several analysts have 
described (Crisp and Ingall 2002; Cristina Escobar 2002; Moreno and Escobar-Lemmon 
2008; Steven Taylor, Botero, and Crisp 2008), the pre-reform, bipartisan electoral system 
sponsored the creation of electoral “entrepreneurs” within the two traditional 
Conservador and Liberal parties. The electoral system allowed having several voting lists 
for a given electoral district within the same party. This form of organization promoted 
the creation of factions and intraparty competition undermining party discipline and 
encouraging the creation of personalized networks of candidates and voters connected by 
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the negotiation of different degrees of personal benefit.  
The constitutional reforms did not reform the party list system. The traditional 
political parties and heads of party factions benefitted from this situation in order to 
maintain the control of the electoral machines in this moment of party-explosion. 
Through most of the 1990s, the Liberal party maintained a majority in Congress by 
putting in motion what was known as “Operación Avispa” [Operation Wasp]. This 
operation consisted in having as many party lists as possible in order to have more 
chances to win seats (Moreno and Escobar-Lemmon 2008). This situation increased the 
political power of electoral brokers who played a crucial role in finding and organizing 
the votes for particular lists (S. Taylor, Botero, and Crisp 2008). In this way, the 
traditional clientelistic arrangements were perpetuated while the long sought institutional 
order seemed further out of sight.  
By 2003 a political reform was passed in Congress in order to organize what had 
become a competition of electoral machines and entrepreneurs. The multiple party list 
system was debunked. Political parties were also subject to strict conditions for legal 
recognition and for accessing state funds, such as establishing a voting threshold. Soon 
the number of parties narrowed down but the intraparty competition increased. The 
single-list system introduced with the 2003 political reform gives the possibility of 
having either a closed list or an open list. If the party decides to run with a closed list, this 
means that votes are cast for the whole list and the seats are allotted according to the 
division of the total number of votes the list obtained by the quota needed to gain a seat. 
The candidates in the list win a seat according to their placement in the list. For instance, 
if X list gets 5 seats, the first 5 candidates inscribed will get a seat. With the open list 
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system, the voter has the option to vote for individual candidates within a particular list 
regardless of the position of the candidate within the list. In this way, it is possible for the 
last candidate in the list to win a seat. In this modality, despite their party lines, 
candidates ferociously compete for the votes, just as in the old system.  
Therefore, the intra-party competition and the still loose regulations for party 
discipline became a central point for further reform after the public learned about the 
scandalous associations of congress people and paramilitaries in 2006.17 Hence, in 2008 
another reform was passed that sought to regulate party discipline by penalizing dual 
party militancy and party switching, and also obliged parties to penalize those members 
with ties to illegal groups.  Up until this very recent moment, the legislation allowed the 
overlapping of actors across political organizations (Moreno 2005), thus undermining 
group control and therefore rewarding personalistic political attitudes.  
This contradictory institutional environment has fostered a visibly fragmented 
electoral system mobilized both by factional allegiance and by the “opinion vote.” As in 
many other places in the world with democratic systems, in Colombian elections 
entailing a local territorial circumscription, clientelistic networks run the show. By 
contrast, in elections entailing a national circumscription the vote is eminently an 
“opinion vote” (S. Taylor, Botero, and Crisp 2008). Electoral observers, political analysts 
and political practitioners of all sorts work within this framework, thus recreating the 
social construction of a fragmented cartography of political modernity in Colombia. The 
local elections, where decentralization is at work in that localities are choosing their 
                                                
17 By 2008, after the parapolitics scandal saw the public light, 25% of congress was either being 
investigated or in jail. One of the main concerns for the 2010 election was the paramilitary and mafia 
infiltration in the campaigns (MOE 2010).  
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governments, are represented in public discourse as the space for a rural and poor 
political “anti-modernity” to surface. In contrast, the Presidential election where the 
distance between the candidate and his or her constituency is mediated by image-based 
politics is represented as the space for the modern subject to awake. Nevertheless, these 
two sides of the coin are inseparable and belong to the same political logic. As all of my 
informants so many times repeated regardless of their position in the political game, “In 
time for the presidential elections, the machine has already been oiled”. Oiling the 
machine entails putting all of its parts to work together. Hence, by the time of the 
presidential elections the local, regional and national political structures are in tune, 
aligned to work together. The management of the two kinds of votes is an art that 
professional political consultants and managers master in Colombia.  
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Chapter*3*
The*Division*of*Electoral*Labor*or*the*Location*of*Politics**
 
Every political campaign entails the synchronicity of a variety of forms of 
expertise. Market researchers provide political strategists with the technical analysis of 
public opinion and voters’ attitudes. Political strategists provide insights for the 
organization of a campaign plan according to market analysis and by interpreting the 
political conditions in which the campaign develops. Advertisers translate into 
audiovisual products the strategic directives. Campaign managers, campaign promoters 
and volunteers mobilize local allegiances with civic organizations that translate into 
votes. At the center of all this stand the politicians, who direct and are the front faces of 
this immense machinery.  
The assemblage of different forms of expertise in the industry of political 
management evinces the intimate intertwinement of political and economic rationales in 
late liberal politics.  In Colombian political administration, mass-market environments 
managed through marketing intersect and interact with small-scale environments for 
political negotiation, where face-to-face networks of allegiance and interest prevail. 
These interactions have sponsored the dislocation of the political to different scaled 
spaces that presuppose different logics, as well as the creation of conglomerates of what 
appear as contradictory forms of expertise. Looking closely to campaign dynamics in 
Colombia, these seemingly inconsistent expert landscapes find points of connection 
through the division of electoral labor.    
 
 
 74 
In this chapter, I argue that even though these distinct forms of management are 
contradictory in appearance, they share a liberal core. Liberalism entails a contractual 
relation present both in the management of mass-markets environments and also in the 
negotiation of private interest (Westbrook 2004). With the rise of business-oriented 
approaches to politics, the calculations to win votes have become imperative, therefore 
making this transactional aspect of liberalism more acute. Votes are valued, and the value 
of participating in the electoral political race lies in the votes. However, the scales in 
which these contractual relations operate are different, showing that in late liberal 
politics, these scales are porous and fluid, making scales sometimes overlap. We are not 
talking anymore about the stock exchange market on one hand and the corner bakery as 
opposite. Or the presidential race on one side and local councilman race on the other one. 
All scales are articulated. As the local bakery will be affected by the fluctuations of the 
stock market, presidential races are also affected by the most local politics.  This 
overlapping poses real challenges to the operation of the political field and to how 
political management is organized.  
In the realm of electoral politics, marketing rationales and other forms of 
constructing political identities are in constant tension. The political marketing practices, 
geared to galvanize public emotions around certain identity markers (liberal and 
conservative issues of public interest, styles of government, political parties, class, 
ethnicity, gender, for example), compete with other forms of emotional identification, 
chiefly networks of allegiance. Both of these forms of management are stabilizing models 
to obtain and manage information, and therefore conduct “human nature,” but differ in 
the scales that they approach. Marketing is geared to stir PUBLIC OPINION as a faceless 
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social phenomenon while small-scale political environments are grounded on close-knit, 
atomized sociopolitical organizations. In our current political moment, the perspective of 
scale is blurry, thus too often rendering ontologically different phenomena equivalent. 
Therefore, the technical, transparent management of a mass-scale society is desired as 
political correctness (Marilyn Strathern 2000) while smaller spaces for political 
negotiation are often labeled through such problematic concepts as corruption (Hasty 
2005; Haller and Shore 2005), as if they pertained to the same analytical level. Adding 
complexity, the Colombian cultural filter codes the moralization of these different scales 
as class behavior.       
I start by outlining the introduction of expert management into Colombian 
politics, and explain how it combines and reconciles competing forms of political 
rationality; mainly a media-based, public opinion oriented management and the 
administration of private networks of interest. I explore how the institutional reforms and 
the notions of a fragmented vote in Colombia are compatible with a late liberal moment 
in political communication, that of political marketing, characterized by the segmentation 
of the electoral markets (Fritz Plasser and Gunda Plasser 2002).   
Secondly, I look at the debates that arise in what political management is 
supposed to be or do, as an entry point to probe the tensions and points of discussion 
between market-centered models of political administration and an interest-centered 
political model. I thereby trace the historic evolution of liberal politics and economics in 
shaping political practice.  
Last, I analyze how the interpretation of the principle of segmentation according 
to class lines shapes also a fractured political practice where different forms of expertise 
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are put forth to administer these segmented realms. In doing so, I bring to question the 
inner traits that make the political field distinct from other professional fields. In 
managing the voto de opinión, techno-scientific instruments and forms of expertise are 
deployed in order to conduct public emotions. This kind of management is associated 
with normative notions of democracy and is often carried out by public elite figures. In 
managing the voto amarrado, interest and need mediate relationships of care managed by 
seasoned politicians and community organizers who claim experience as their source of 
legitimacy.  
 
Managing personalities: U.S consultants in Colombia  
With the introduction of participatory politics, the dismantling of a bipartisan 
party system, and the liberalization of the market, the professional industry of political 
management was born in Colombia. Although there is no official history of the entrance 
of political consultancy to Colombia, the different political strategists I interviewed 
throughout my fieldwork signaled the presidential race of 1985/1986, between 
Conservative candidate Alvaro Gómez and Liberal candidate Virgilio Barco, as the first 
campaigns to follow strategic directives. Virgilio Barco hired Jack Leslie, a U.S political 
consultant, to help design his strategy. This event in Colombian electoral politics marked 
a shift in political practice in the country, from an eminently close-knit, face-to-face 
network oriented form of doing politics to the need for an expert management of public 
opinion and media practices.  As in other countries that underwent political reforms 
during the eighties, Colombia’s opening political system begged for expert media 
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management. The U.S tradition of media-oriented, candidate-centered political 
management provided a model to follow (Johnson 2009).    
Eduardo Mestre, a senior politician who was a member of the central committee 
of Virgilio Barco’s campaign, remembers this time as a point of inflection in politics. As 
he recalls, when the presidential race began, the conditions were not favorable for 
Barco’s campaign. The Conservative party was strong in power. For Barco to stand a 
chance, he would have to stir an apathetic voting population profoundly disenchanted by 
the bureaucratic arrangements that the parties had resorted to in previous years. Jack 
Leslie was hired to help design a strategy in a context where political parties were losing 
disciplined members as well as their ability to agglutinate, and in which television was 
becoming the major source of entertainment and information for the broad population18.  
The situation demanded drastic changes in electoral competition and the U.S 
consultants brought in innovative tools that would change politics forever. Mestre 
remembers how media management took a preponderant role in this campaign.  The first 
action was to hire an opinion poll and conduct focus groups, something that had been 
done for marketing purposes but that was done for the first time in politics. Both the 
design and the interpretation of the results of the polls and the focus groups were under 
the U.S campaign team’s command.  
Second, the campaign established an advisory technical committee to give unity 
to all the publicity and media materials of the campaign. The speeches that Barco 
delivered were carefully written and revised according to strategic directives rather than 
                                                
18 The demand for TV was increasing so much that in 1985 Belisario Betancourt relaxed open the 
institutional way for private cable TV to exist. In 1987 the first cable company started operations. 
Previously, all TV channels were publicly owned.  Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, sala virtual 
http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/exhibiciones/historia_tv/1985.htm).  
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letting the candidate improvise, a talent that traditional politicians were expected to have. 
For the first time, the public image of a candidate, his charisma, was built through expert 
techniques rather than left to its own devices. 
Virgilio Barco was not charismatic; he was a “technical executive”, as Mestre 
describes him. Therefore his campaign team had to work to build an image that the 
television consumer would like. He didn’t appear in any televised debates since his 
conservative opponent was known for being an astounding public speaker. Rather, his 
television appearances were planned to the last detail. Mestre remembers how this was a 
constant source of tension between the candidate and his international advisory team. In 
one of these appearances, the U.S team strongly suggested to the candidate to wear a new 
tie that would look better on TV, something more suited for television. Barco took deep 
offense. He loved his old ties. Most importantly, he did not understand how a tie would 
win an election. Mestre laughs out loud as he remembers this incident.  
Even though it may seem only a funny anecdote, this episode is indicative of a 
moment of change in political rationales. Certainly, a tie would not win an election, but 
for the first time, a tie would help to win one. Barco’s campaign took off after the sad 
events of November 1985 when the M-19 Guerrilla held the Supreme Court hostage.  The 
military intervened, and in a very confusing operation, all of the magistrates were 
murdered and some workers of the Supreme Court were reported as disappeared. The 
conservative president Betancourt was heavily criticized for how he handled this crisis. 
Barco and his team seized the opportunity. In every medium, Barco openly denounced 
the government’s handling of the Supreme Court’s events. He also promulgated a return 
to an all-liberal government, a return to the liberal party’s identity. As Mestre remembers, 
 79 
liberals started to “creep from under the rocks.” With the chant “Dale, Rojo, Dale19” [Go, 
Red, Go] stirring public emotions, people felt that they were part of something again. 
Hope had returned. And the media management of this hope won the election.    
The rise of American political consultancy as a global practice mainly occurred 
during the 1980s when television became the lead medium worldwide (Fritz Plasser 
2000; Fritz Plasser and Gunda Plasser 2002; Fritz Plasser and Lengauer 2009). The long-
standing tradition in American politics of using television and advertisement techniques 
for political purposes expanded to other regions of the world where party politics was 
being disarticulated to give way to a personality-based politics20. Also, this expansion 
was due to internal American politics. The ferocious competition in the political 
consultancy industry within the U.S pushed political consultants to seek other markets 
(Johnson 2009). In a time where political campaigns were increasingly more chaotic due 
to changing conditions, the image that “consultants’ tricks could somehow bring order 
out of the chaos of a campaign” (Sabato 1981:11), an image that U.S political consultants 
had sold internally, was in demand elsewhere.  
 This shift in campaigning around the world is indicative of the rise of expertise 
and the professionalization of politics in a late liberal, market-oriented polity (Abbott 
1988; Larson 1977). The “tricks” of political consultants are a coherent set of measurable 
and reproducible expert techniques, a “dispassionate outlook on politics” as consultants 
in Colombia often describe it, used to calculate and organize political life according to 
economic notions of rationality (Beck 1994; Coles 2007; Mitchell 2002). Analyzing the 
                                                
19 This slogan was taken from the cheer for a local soccer [football] team, America de Cali. When Barco 
was in Cali, someone started to yell this cheer, and the rest of the people followed. Since then, this cheer 
became the official campaign slogan.   
20 The main markets for American Political Consultancy were Latin America, Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe (Johnson 2009).  
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industry of political campaigning around the world, Plasser and Plasser (2009:3) note 
that, “[a]s party loyalties have eroded and electoral volatility has risen, the concept of 
selling politics has been gradually replaced by a political marketing approach, where the 
priority is to identify voter needs and to capture competitive niches in the marketplace.” 
The underlying assumption is that political identities are constantly in the making through 
consumption (Cahn 2008; Dávila 2002; Lukose 2005; Mazzarella 2003), and marketing 
expertise provides the tools to standardize and direct this process (Rose 1999).  
In Colombia, the reformist political institutional platforms and political cultures 
supporting the personalization of politics provided the perfect backdrop for an U.S-
inspired political management industry to flourish. The disarticulation of political parties, 
the emergence of a volatile kind of voter independent from any party structure, and the 
personality-based networks of clientelism all share personalization as a political logic that 
well fit the crafting of media-oriented personality cults sponsored by the “American way” 
of doing politics. However, Barco’s campaign still knew that the support of different 
factions within the political parties, the “machineries”, were important to win an election 
and to be able to govern. After years of bureaucratic arrangements, political practices and 
agreements would not change overnight. Therefore, as Mestre remembers as their key of 
their success, Barco’s team defined their strategy by saying  “el gobierno nacional es del 
partido, y el de las regions de los parlamentarios” [the national government belongs to the 
liberal party, the regional governments belong to congress people]. What this expression 
conveyed was that the central government in Bogotá would be eminently liberal while the 
regional governments would be mixed according to local voting outcomes. This 
arrangement, which reproduced the bureaucratic arrangements of a previous political era 
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in the distant space of the regions, allowed Barco’s government to maintain good 
relations with the Conservative party.  
The industry of political management today in Colombia continues to combine 
technical expertise with the skillful interaction with clientelistic networks and 
bureaucratic arrangements. As Miguel Silva, top Latin American consultant, claims, most 
of the political consultants in Colombia trained in those first years of transition have 
learned and mastered the ropes of technical campaigning in the market era. The 
specialization and professionalization of political campaigning has produced a particular 
ordering within campaigns. Political consultants and political strategists handle media 
practices while campaign managers administer the relations with local leaders and 
networks of favor exchange.  The articulation of both of these forms of expertise wins 
elections, although not without some debate about what politics and its management is 
and should look like.  
 
The Debate 
In Colombia class segmentation continues to be reproduced as the main category 
to classify voters, as the main criterion used to design and mobilize electoral strategies. 
However, class segmentation provides a very fractured political landscape that 
presupposes radically different forms of political administration. In this landscape, the 
political and its management emerges as a contentious field, slippery to any 
straightforward definition.  
The lack of consensus of what managing politics looks like is an ongoing 
conversation among political consultants in Colombia. The different experts that work on 
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political strategy and political marketing agree that there is still a long way to go in this 
field. The main complaint is the lack of research and political grounding of many 
political campaigns.  As many political consultants agree, often campaigns are handled 
by advertising experts who do not take into account market research or political 
conditions into the design and development of a campaign. The results, as these experts 
claim, are very appealing advertising pieces without a clear message to transmit or a 
substantial view of how the political field behaves in the country. Although the idea that 
there is not enough research or technical expertise is a widespread notion, there is not 
really consensus on what political practice should look like. Depending on the side of the 
campaign that these different experts participate in, the answer varies. There are some 
who are more inclined to a marketing approach to politics while others stress the 
importance of understanding the distribution of power across the political board in order 
to adequately practice politics. Colin Rogero, an American political media consultant 
who worked in one of the Colombian presidential campaigns in 2010 alongside 
Colombian consultants, observed this fragmentation and explains it in this way:  
 
I think probably because the United States has so many people 
running campaigns in every election like, our biggest kind of gift or 
advice we bring to the campaign is structure. We have the structure, 
we’ve got down the science (…) in the United States when you create 
polls you generally do that mostly by phone and the poll is as good as 
your sample size and you can easily increase your sample size 
because is easy to increase the phone calls. That is a more difficult 
preposition to do in Colombia because the large percentage of the 
voters are outside of areas that have landlines, so you can’t contact 
them so what you have to do to get an accurate reading about what 
people are, is in personal interviews. It takes a long time to set the 
process up, a long time to do the interviews and then take a long time 
to readjust that research into your comprehensive plans (…) the 
research companies [in Colombia focus less on] political polls and 
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more on policy and marketing polls.  So the [information] is a little 
difficult to get, we have to help to structure polls and then get the 
information we need.  
 
Rogero’s view as a foreigner practicing politics in Colombia pretty much 
summarizes the inner preoccupations and tensions among political consultants who work 
within the framework of an establishing industry. He points to three crucial elements in 
understanding how electoral politics is practiced in late liberal Colombia, and the issues 
at stake in managing public behavior. First, Rogero points to how techno-scientific 
approaches to politics imported from the U.S work on a limited level due to structural 
economic conditions. The technological platforms available, and the interactions of 
disciplined voters, those voters who are part of the political machine, with those 
platforms are very limited. The urban voto de opinión that is easily reached by media-
oriented technologies is not an organized vote; it is rather very volatile and changing. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to actually take “the temperature” of elections since the 
thermometers available often take reads on public sentiments of those who do not 
participate in a predictable fashion in the voting polls. The second point is the actual face-
to-face contact in actually reading political behavior in Colombia. The design of 
interviews and more ethnographic approaches to politics is more effective in a country 
where publics are not easily located in a media-oriented public sphere. The third point is 
how the Colombian political consultancy industry has privileged marketing approaches 
that sometimes do not really map out to the political dynamics of the country.  
 These three elements point to the fact that the question of how to conduct political 
behavior and “human nature” does not have a straightforward answer in Colombia. 
Rogero’s view as an unfamiliar expert synthesizes the question that political consultants 
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in Colombia face every election: What should a campaign privilege, those actions 
targeted to stir a disciplined vote or those actions geared to mobilize the voto de opinión?   
Political and public opinion consultants who have more of a market research 
orientation strongly privilege marketing techniques in order to stir politics. Gonzalo de 
Francisco, marketing expert and political consultant amusingly claims, “If a company 
sells a lot of chocolate, that is the company to make politics happen because of emotional 
marketing, I’m a fan of emotional marketing.” In the same vein, César Valderrama, 
director of one of the major public opinion research companies and director of the 
department of Marketing at Sergio Arboleda University, analyzes the political 
consultancy industry in the following way:  
  
I believe that political marketing does not exist in Colombia. Rather, here 
we have some qualitative and quantitative insights provided by [basic] 
research and a group of political strategists that only base their work on 
communication practices: it’s a more advertisement-oriented industry. 
Marketing, which is in the middle of these two, which is the one that ties 
everything up and defines the strategy, doesn’t really exist.   
     
In these definitions, politics is conceived as a mass phenomenon where individual choice 
can be dissected, directed and extrapolated to understand and predict how society 
behaves. On the other hand, there are those political consultants who see themselves 
more as strategists. Political strategy entails the dexterous manipulation of given 
conditions in order to win political power, meaning the power to represent a group of 
people (Bourdieu 1991). In this view, political communication and marketing practices 
are amply combined with personal interpretations of how political interests and political 
power are organized. Rational forms of measuring intertwine with the not so rational, but 
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very effective, political “instinct.” Camilo Rojas, a major Colombian strategist and 
professor of political ideas at Universidad del Rosario, has made this the center of his 
approach to politics. As he states:   
It’s important to see how people behave but also to observe the political 
forces. In politics what matters is to win (…) politics is very intuitive. The 
[real] politician has intuition, the “feeling” [sic] to connect and manage 
interests. This [skill] is not technical. The strategist offers some insights 
[for the politician to make decisions]. 
 
This conception of political practice is attuned to what Pierre Bourdieu observed as the 
pairing of a habitus, meaning incorporated (made corporeal) social relations and 
dispositions constructed over time, and the organization and inner rules of a field for 
political production. For Camilo, the know-how of politics is “felt,” incorporated, rather 
than learnt as a mere intellectual exercise. As Bourdieu (1992: 66) describes,    
[The] ‘feel for the game’ (…) [is] the almost miraculous encounter 
between the habitus and a field, between incorporated history and an 
objectified history, which makes possible the near-perfect anticipation of 
the future inscribed in all the different configurations on the pitch or 
board.  Produced by experience of the game, and therefore of the objective 
structures within which it is played out, the ‘feel for the game’ is what 
gives the game a subjective sense – a meaning and a raison d’être, but also 
a direction, an orientation, an impending outcome, for those who take part 
and therefore acknowledge what is at stake. 
 
Different from techno-scientific regimes, Camilo points to politics as being a field with 
its own particular rules; rules that cannot be measured but that have to be felt and 
experienced. His view is aligned with other political consultants and politicians in 
Colombia who, for instance, jokingly say that when U.S political consultants arrive to 
Colombia they take more time figuring out that “Pennsylvania is a town in Caldas [a 
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region of Colombia where there is a town called Pensilvania]” than working in the 
election. In this joke, they ironically convey that the instruments that U.S consultants 
develop sometimes say little or nothing about how politics behave, and that to manage 
politics it is required to have an embedded knowledge, so to speak, of the context where 
it develops.  
The discussion between the use of techno-scientific resources in politics and a 
more experiential approach points out to a very particular feature of late liberal politics, 
the intersection between epistemological rationales and political imperatives.  The 
rational need to predict outcomes through technical instruments in an environment that is 
highly unstable and volatile is translated into politics in the idea of managing human will. 
Liberalism is supported by a permanent tension between an organizational need of states 
to govern the people and an ideology of personal autonomy, as David Westbrook (2004) 
points out.  In a late liberal moment of corporate capitalism, this tension is rehashed 
under the guise of market and marketing practices geared to conduct individual choice 
(Moeran and Dewaal Malefyt 2003; Rose 1999). Choice and consumption are concepts 
that articulate the liberal concern for individual autonomy in a market-economy language 
(Applbaum 2004; Dávila 2001; Mazzarella 2003; Miller 2010). You are what you 
consume, and responsible individual choices guarantee the health of the economic 
system, just as a responsible citizen guarantees the existence of the social contract. Often, 
both of these premises are used interchangeably and an apparatus of expert practices are 
assembled to understand, stabilize and predict individual choice both in the economic 
field as well as in the political field, creating available political identities ready to 
consume.  
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In this landscape, negotiations and agreements, the job of lobbyists, party brokers 
and middlemen—which oddly is at the core of liberal doctrine—are often seen as 
detrimental to democracy itself. This space is often deemed as irrational since no 
technique mediates the process of negotiation of self-interest; rather the raw political 
“instinct” of those more curtailed in politics is the key for success. The birth of this 
techno-scientific world of political practice has a particular historicity where liberalism 
has been turned inside out, bringing the administration of individual and individual 
choice to the limelight and relegating to the “backrooms” of political practice (Goffman 
1959) the management of contractual relations and negotiations, which paradoxically is 
how representative regimes are constituted. In this way, what has become the meat of 
political competition is extremely rational but profoundly apolitical, that is the 
management of elections. Techno-scientific regimes guide the manufacturing of images 
and messages expected to conduct public emotions and therefore political choice. 
Electors ascribe to these images rather than having a concrete space in which to negotiate 
their demands and hand their power, so to speak, to their representative. Apparently, what 
constitutes the ideal transparent democracy contradicts its own philosophical core. How 
is this possible?  
 
When politics met the market[ing]  
The fluidity between politics and economics marks contemporary political 
practice. Looking back on the history of liberalism one can clearly observe the ongoing 
making process of liberalism as a modern project, a project that involves the constant 
articulation of politics and economics in managing “human nature.” Following Lyotard’s 
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(Lyotard 1984) definition, “A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. 
Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and 
this state is constant.” Liberalism in late liberal times, where different scales overlap, is 
nothing else than liberalism at its inception. Therefore the different forms political life 
takes are deeply liberal and deeply modern, even if following seemingly contradictory 
logics.  
The key to understanding the fluidity and overlapping of scales that inform 
political management lies in the intimate intertwining of politics and economics in the 
liberal doctrine. In his intellectual history of the rise of capitalism in the XVII and XVIII 
century, Albert Hirschman (1997) explores the political and philosophical debates around 
the place of passions and interests in the rising market economy and incipient liberal 
state. As Hirschman demonstrates, self-interest—the immediate satisfaction of personal 
needs and the love for moneymaking—shifted radically in the moral imagination of 
Northwest Europe. Before the Renaissance, when the principles of our market economy 
were shaped, the pursuit of any form of self-interest was perceived to be sinful and 
undesirable. However, market economies brought the question of constancy and 
predictability of human actions in order for the “invisible hand,” read rationality, of the 
market to work. What to do with the volatile, passionate nature of human beings? How to 
conduct them? The art of statecraft, the Machiavellian preoccupation of “administering 
man as he really is” (1997: 13), became key in shaping the economic and political 
subject.  
Interest, understood as self-love, was privileged in public discourse and political 
training as a way of taming the unruly passions so pervasive in the public world of men 
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(and women, to a certain extent). The positive valuation of self-interest, translated into 
making money, provided the ruling elite with a moral compass to guide society. Taking 
care of oneself, acting in one’s best interest would result in benefits for society as a 
whole.  As Hirschman emphasizes in complementing Weber’s view on how the 
Protestant imperative of individual salvation became economic, “the diffusion of 
capitalist forms owed much to an equally desperate search for a way of avoiding society’s 
ruin, permanently threatened at the time because of precarious arrangements for internal 
and external order” (1997: 130). The individual, the owner of passions, had to be stripped 
from its passionate humanity and reshaped into a being of reason in order for a capitalist 
society to survive. This was both an individual exercise and an exercise of the ruling 
elites that shaped political and economic institutions.  
By the XIXth and XXth centuries, after the industrial revolution and the 
establishment of mass economies, the positive valuation of self-interest was revised. The 
disenchantment of capitalism, mostly articulated in the Marxian economic and social 
critique of capitalism and liberalism, shows the rising inequality among humans as 
evidence of the alienating force embedded in the capitalistic system.21 Central concepts 
such as class struggle, and the public emotions of “social resentment” triggered by it, 
brought into question the redemptive power, neutralizing character and rationality 
attributed to the pursuit of self-interest (Hirschman 1997). Soon, emotions were back in 
the spotlight as a central feature of social life, and therefore of managing politics. The 
question, nevertheless, was not how to repress public emotions but how to effectively stir 
                                                
21 As Howes (Howes 2005) notes, Marx’s critique on alienation went as far as to denounce the 
dehumanizing decoupling of the individual from her senses. In late-capitalism, the return to rich sensorial 
experiences, what Howes call “hyperesthesia”, are the base of consumerist cultures and marketing 
practices.    
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them and conduct them. By the turn of the twentieth century, works on social 
psychology, such as the ones of Gustave Le Bon (Bon 2006) and Edward L. Bernays 
(Bernays 2004) in studying crowd behavior, became extremely influential in shaping 
politics. Both Le Bon’s and Bernays’ works became a source of inspiration to Joseph 
Goebbels, who is a model, although a negative one, of the emotional reaches that 
effective political communication may have (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 2004).   
As mass liberal economy framed within the nation-state transformed into a diffuse 
and transnational late liberal economy, the standardization and professionalization of 
emotional management became a central characteristic of social and political 
organization. The pioneer ethnographic work of Arle Hochschild (Hochschild 1983) on 
the world of flight attendants provides interesting insight on how late liberal rationales 
shape subjectivity. In this groundbreaking work on what the author terms “emotional 
labor,” Hoschild argues that emotional handling is central to post-industrial logics where 
interpersonal communication rather than human-machine relations define work. The need 
to manage emotions in these communicative settings corresponds to new definitions of 
what counts as productivity. Making the client feel good is a guiding principle in a world 
where human labor has been displaced from production sites to the realm of service 
providing. 
In our contemporary world, marketing practices increasingly mediate the 
individual experience of reality (Applbaum 2004; Dávila 2008; Debord 1994), and the 
question of public emotions and the pursuit of self-interest as evidence of human 
rationality have found new definitions that blur any previous meanings. Scholars working 
on markets (Zaloom 2009), marketing (Malefyt 2009) and political communication 
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(Brader 2006; Marcus 2002) point to a widespread preoccupation for understanding, 
guiding and standardizing the emotional character of decision-making. In the industries 
of advertisement and political consulting, the main objective is to build an emotional 
“resonance” (Schwartz 1974) or connection between a product and the buyer. Different 
techniques have been developed in order to accomplish this goal -- for instance, the 
segmentation of markets according to forms of social identification as a way to appeal to 
ideas of self and belonging when marketing products. Increasingly, the advertisement 
world, including political marketing, is more concerned with crafting the emotional 
environments in which visual messages are delivered than crafting the messages in 
themselves (Moeran and Dewaal Malefyt 2003). A song, an emotional image, or the 
places where the messages are situated are deemed to be more powerful in conveying an 
idea and “striking a chord” in the public than the message itself. The crafting of 
emotional environments is supposed to stir political choice at the most intimate level of 
the self. Personal experience is the raw material that composes the messages that circulate 
in public environments; it is the meat for public making.  
  
An intimate journey into the public self 
 
 Political consultants work in close association with market researchers in order to 
get the “temperature” of the public and therefore design and put in motion appropriate 
campaign strategies. Quantitative as well as qualitative techniques are used to get the 
picture of what people think and feel. Quantitative research, such as polls and surveys, 
are mostly used to scope the opinions over certain topics, while qualitative research such 
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as interviews, focus groups and ethnographic methods are used to observe how people 
act, how they feel and who they are. The objective is to observe and understand cultural 
configurations, mainly conceptualized as the collective unconsciousness. 
 In Colombia, a conglomerate of experts, who move between politics and 
academia (Rivas 2007), and who belong both to a political and intellectual elite, are in 
charge of this job. In the electoral division of labor, taking the temperature of the voto de 
opinion requires a set of techno-scientific tools and forms of expertise that are accessed 
through education and international networks. In the Colombian grid of class, both 
education and an international cosmopolitanism are closely linked to esteemed class 
qualities. Therefore, this realm that requires research, international partnerships for the 
importation of new technologies, and compliance with international standards for 
transparency is positively valued and associated with elite circles. In the past few years, 
several graduate programs in different universities have opened due to the increasing 
demand for political marketing as a desired career option.      
  In this techno-scientific environment, focus groups are one technique widely used 
for inquiring into the intimate realm of the political self, segmented according to 
demographic criteria and voting practices. The main interest of political consultants is to 
get representative groups of people who actually vote. In calling the participants for these 
sessions, the market research companies select people who are in the voting age and who 
normally attend the voting polls. As political consultants recognize, this population more 
or less maps out urban populations that belong to stratum 3 and higher, i.e. middle to 
upper class22. Therefore, and following the segmentation principle of contemporary 
                                                
22 This selection criterion for these groups and the rationale behinds it radically contrasts with the idea that 
clientelistic machines, usually composed more prevalently by lower strata, are the ones who vote more. 
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marketing, focus groups are usually broken down into age groups, regions of sojourn and 
social strata, information that political consultants ask for.  
 At the end of one of these groups in Bogotá with young people (18-25) from 
stratum 3, the moderator, a clinically trained psychologist, ends the activity with an 
exercise to probe the archetypes of leadership lying in the collective unconscious. After 
three hours of work with the group, the psychologist speaks in a very mellow voice, 
 
Let’s close our eyes and relax. We’re now 22 years old. Let’s go to the 
past when we were 20, 17, 15 years old and we were in high school. Now 
let’s go way back and peruse our memories and try to remember someone 
who was a leader for us. Someone that we remember for that specific 
characteristic, someone we remember for being a guide. Maybe it’s 
someone we met in kindergarten, when we were kids. How did that person 
make us feel? What did we like about that person? The way she or he 
dressed? The way he or she walked? Did we have a good time with that 
person?  (pause) Let’s focus on those memories. Who was that person 
meaningful in our lives? What does a leader represent? Maybe it was a 
person who invited us to follow him or her even if it wasn’t for a good 
purpose. Let’s grab a piece of paper and let’s write about the person we 
have in mind. Let’s describe this person and say why this person is so 
meaningful to us that we even remember him or her today in this session.  
 
After the group writes their memories, they deposit the sheets in envelopes for the market 
research firm to analyze and send a report to the political consulting firm that hired the 
study. Following up on this focus group session, I interviewed the leading psychologist to 
ask more about this qualitative methodology. With an eclectic theoretical toolbox that 
incorporates phenomenology, hermeneutics and social interaction approaches, the kind of 
focus groups and qualitative research that this psychologist has designed seeks to 
                                                
However, these networks fall out of the direct scope of political consultants and are rather left to handle by 
campaign managers. Political consultants take into account these networks in their work but usually fall out 
of their direct practice. In the following section of this chapter, I will explore more this class-based division 
of electoral labor and its implications for political practice.  
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“understand human behavior, the rationality that governs this behavior and explain the 
reasons and emotions in how people make a choice,” as she explained.    
This approach is mostly informed by current methodologies used in the field of 
brand marketing that basically consist in identifying the emotional connections that 
individuals have with specific commodities. Thus, marketing companies have developed 
methodologies to identify those connections to market products. For instance, a particular 
product can bring cherished childhood memories and those associations are capitalized 
by marketing companies to effectively create emotional environments in which 
consumers can identify themselves with products. In politics, the process is very similar, 
and political consultants tailor political media images and media messages according to 
circulating and established public perceptions. This is not to say that politicians are made 
to fit a particular perception. Rather, public consultants are specialized in spotting and 
highlighting the attributes of their candidates’ personality that positively resonate with 
already existing perceptions. In other words, the game is not how to convince people by 
smashing an already existing perception but how to stir the existing perception and turn it 
into a positive image that will favor the candidates’ popularity. This process entails 
spotting the emotional connections that publics have with certain issues and styles of 
leadership, but also digging into the particular images and notions that compose public 
perceptions. Focus groups are also a preferred methodology for this purpose:  
 
Moderator: Imagine we’re throwing a party and inviting the people in 
these images. Everyone knows the people in these pictures? Who knows 
this blond man? Who are these? (pause) These are the presidential 
candidates. Who arrives to the party first?  
 
Man 1: Noemí [conservative party pre-candidate], because she’s the only 
woman.  
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Man 2: and women are often more on time than men. 
 
Moderator: How do you imagine they’re dressed?  
 
Woman 1: very elegantly  
 
Man 3: with fancy dresses that show us that they are confident in 
themselves, that they are reliable.  
 
Man 2: like making us believe that the deception is believable.  
 
Moderator: Which one of these people drinks the most?  
 
Man 3: That who looks like a drunk, he is hungover [Gustavo Petro, 
Leftist party candidate]  
 
Moderator: Who drinks the least?  
 
Woman 2: the young one, Arias [Conservative Party Pre-Candidate] 
 
Man 1: Noemí. Generally women take care of themselves and therefore 
drink less.  
 
Moderator: And with whom do we sit down to have a drink and chat for a 
while? 
 
Man 3: I pick the drunk. He looks like a chill man from a dive bar 
[tienda]23. He looks like he would sit next to a jukebox and throw coins in 
it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 A tienda is a neighborhood’s corner store where often people gather to drink and listen to music. 
Tiendas are often associated to common people and popular social environments.   
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Andrés Felipe Arias- votebien.com  
 
 
 
 
Gustavo Petro by Laura Rico Gutiérrez de Piñeres 
The scenario methodology was specifically designed for the needs of a particular 
campaign, and sought to understand the areas in which candidates could innovate and 
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distinguish themselves from the very popular President Alvaro Uribe. The idea was to 
explore the different associations and differences that people traced between the 
presidential candidates and Uribe.  Although in the excerpt of this focus group this 
particular feature does not come up, it is interesting to highlight how the particular 
campaigns underscored certain characteristics that people in this particular focus group 
attribute to the candidates. Arias’ campaign strongly associated him with Uribe and his 
work ethics; Petro presented himself as being close to the people, while Noemí focused 
her campaign on the fact of being a woman. Playing with and reinforcing individual 
perceptions in order to create recognizable public images is a central feature in mass 
communication practices.  
 The introduction of these particular practices in the realm of politics, and 
particularly democracy, raises important questions about the location of political practice 
in mass-market society.   In the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
Habermas (1989) observed with horror mass society and the rise of political marketing as 
a technology of government. In his view, the psychological and advertisement 
characteristics that this industry introduced as the locus for politics defeated the whole 
purpose of a democratic regime. The “periodic staging, when elections come around” 
(1989: 215), of non-ideological, consumption-oriented, massive public environments  
“manipulated” by private political interests, read political parties, in which citizens do not 
enter freely, consciously and willingly to debate are, according to Habermas, a symptom 
of a fragile democracy:    
 
[I]deology accommodates itself to the form of the so-called consumer 
culture and fulfills, on a deeper level of consciousness, its old function, 
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exerting pressure toward conformity with existing conditions. This false 
consciousness no longer consists of an internally harmonized nexus of 
ideas, as did the political ideologies of the nineteenth century, but of a 
nexus of modes of behavior. As a system of other-directed consumption 
habits it takes a practical shape in the guise of a practice (1989: 214-215)  
 
This kind of consensus formation would be more suited to the enlightened 
absolutism of an authoritarian welfare regime than to a democratic 
constitutional state committed to social rights: everything for the people, 
nothing by the people (1989: 219)   
 
This depiction of undemocratic regimes under democratic form characteristic of 
the welfare state is close to conceptualizations of the populist impulse in mass political 
communication. In larger scales, where transactions lose their “face,” political exchanges 
get blurry. Rather than having particular demands and interests being negotiated with 
possible representatives, the operation resembles more the logic of populism. In this 
logic, a chain of particular (unfulfilled) claims and demands are aggregated into a single 
signifier that encompasses them all; anyone can feel identified without solving their 
particular concern (Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005). Overarching images and messages are 
crafted as the base for obtaining political support, as ready-made identities to be 
consumed. Thus, it is common to see in political campaigns geared to this kind of vote 
broad messages such as “Change,” “Hope,” “Peace,” “Prosperity” that resonate with 
public sentiments of frustration but do not really address any concerns in particular.  
Seeing the kinds of publics that emerge through the techniques of political 
marketing from this light, they appear as easily manipulated crowds without political 
intention or any sort of will. They become some sort of hyper-publics, in Baudrillard’s 
(Baudrillard 1994) sense, in which liberal qualities of the public are projected and 
amplified over a structural reality that does not bear a close relation to their constitution. 
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The pristine bourgeois public sphere that Habermas imagined has no grounding in a 
mass-scale market economy.  Therefore, consensus, individual participation, and freedom 
are part of these hyper-publics but in a way that is not political anymore (or not political 
in a narrower, class-specific, definition of the term).  
 The picture gets even more complicated when adding some layers of complexity: 
is communication a one-way process? In several interviews, political consultants stressed 
the fact that they did not brainwash publics but rather played with given conditions. As 
Alejandro Gutiérrez, a software developer who works in close association with political 
consultants, blatantly puts it “People are not dumb.”  This idea brings to mind what 
several scholars working on media studies point to, the active role of audiences in 
shaping the actual messages circulating (Boyer 2005; Dornfeld 1996; Fairclough 1995; 
Martín-Barbero 2000; Warner 2002). In this view, audiences are agents (in diverse ways) 
in the communication process and not just mere receivers of messages; they actively 
signify the messages. For instance, there is no direct correlation between a propaganda 
piece and the individual act of voting. Political consultants hope to affect and influence 
political behavior, but the outcome is always uncertain. All of these techno-scientific 
instruments are in place to process information in seeking to stabilize and predict the 
terrain of human will, but without any certainty of achieving their goal.   
In this sense, the hyper-public appears as a mirage of unity in an actual terrain of 
fracture and fluidity. The spaces in which people appropriate propaganda messages, the 
parallel conversations that these messages encourage, the prevalent existence of the 
backrooms of politics, point to the diversity of public environments that are hidden from 
the eye of media and advertisement publicity. To this point I will return in chapter four. 
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The loose relation between political communication production and reception 
underscores the fracture between the technologies in place to manage “human nature” 
and the uncertainty of “human nature,” at the level of a broad-scale market economy. 
This fracture makes the interplay with more stable forms of political management, read a 
disciplined, tied vote, an imperative that any campaign has to take into account.  
  
The politics of interest 
 
In Colombia, the voto amarrado is broadly associated with rural, anti-modern and 
marginal political environments. Clientelism is often problematically characterized as a 
deeply emotional form of political practice that blurs the private and public divide and 
thus escapes any form of public accountability, as the works of  Auyero (2000) and 
Roudakova (2008) explore. It is commonly framed as belonging to “traditional” and 
“anti-modern” forms of political engagement where personal loyalties are mobilized in 
exchange for personal favors or protection in an incipient state framework (Bailey 1971; 
Scott 1976).  However, these places take many shapes that often do not map onto 
economic poverty, but that do match spatial representations of peripheral and frontier 
areas according to an urban elite normative order.  
The most striking encounter I had with this spatialization of politics occurred in 
my job as international coordinator for civil society electoral monitoring missions with a 
local NGO. The different participants, activists mostly from Europe and the U.S, 
frequently expressed their desire to support the local observation teams in those regions 
where democracy is more fragile, meaning regions where political violence and drug 
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traffic are most prevalent. These observers were sent to work in regions far from Bogotá, 
often in not very large urban environments. For those who stayed in Bogotá, I helped 
design a circuit that mainly focused on visiting voting polls in marginal areas of the 
capital, but that also included some stops in middle class and upper middle class areas. I 
was working and reinforcing ideas of an existing order anchored in notions of 
transparency and ascetic political participation that oppose notions of anti-modernity 
expressed in getting personal benefit from politics, intimately tied to images of the 
periphery.  
The political constitution, understood as a renewed social contract, introduced and 
legitimized participatory politics as a desired form of government. The basic premise is 
that for political success the broad participation of “the people” in state making, 
government supervision and making decisions is necessary. This kind of participation 
presupposes a participant subject that works for the collective benefit and not for a 
reduced personal benefit. Thus the spaces for participation granted by the constitution 
should be open for public scrutiny. The creation of electoral monitoring missions, for 
instance, follows this constitutional mandate.    
In reality, often these participatory spaces are environments in which the publicly 
scorned clientelism thrives. Neighborhood associations, Juntas de Acción Comunal (local 
community councils), trade union meetings, political parties’ meetings and any other 
form of participatory space is often a place in which interests, allegiances and favors are 
mobilized. In here, society as a whole does not participate. Rather it is the locus for small 
groups with particular, recognizable interests to interact and compete (Schmitt 2007). 
Although these spaces are more visible in lower income strata, they are present in 
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different social environments. These spaces are profoundly political and also commonly 
portrayed in public culture as profoundly immoral.24 The most dramatic case is the lack 
of public trust in the representation organizations par excellence, Congress and the 
political parties. In the most recent report of Transparency International on citizens’ 
perception of corruption, Colombia got a score of 3.4/10, being one of the mostly 
perceived corrupt countries in the region (Morales 2011). 
Embezzlement scandals and associations with illegal groups have mostly 
undermined these institutions’ legitimacy, and therefore I don’t mean to be apologetic. 
But the persistent gap between what “the people” conceive to be an appropriate 
government and the actual practices of politics begs closer analysis.  Back in the 
sixteenth century, Machiavelli (Machiavelli 2003) analyzed how politics and common 
sense morality followed different imperatives and thus could not be measured by the 
same standards. He sought to find and approach to explain the moral relations between 
politics and society by looking at the making of politics as a non-moral artifact of power 
(Berlin 1971). This research call still is current in the era of third way politics and civil 
society, a program that social theorist Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1991) has developed in 
his sociological vision of contemporary politics. 
Bourdieu’s emphasis is on the professionalization of politics. In his view, the 
political field has its own internal logic mastered by a few professionals who struggle 
with each other in seeking the monopoly on the “right of speak” for those others who are 
not within the political field, but who are the source of legitimacy of our representative 
                                                
24 In recent years, with the introduction of drug traffic moneys and paramilitarism into politics, spaces 
organized behind closed doors for private negotiation are publicly repudiated for bordering the lines of 
illegality. Also, these spaces are therefore often associated to the publicly repudiated uneducated, nouveau 
riche detrimental to the ideals of transparency and participation.  
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democratic regimes, i.e. the people. In a moment of participatory democracy in mass-
scale political systems, the participatory spaces for “speaking-up” (instead of “speaking 
for”) intertwine with the closed environments of politics where the most skilled 
politicians navigate the objective conditions of the political field. Following Bourdieu 
(1991: 72), these spaces are "sites in which, through the competition between the agents 
involved in it, political products, issues, programmes, analyses, commentaries, concepts 
and events are created" for a broader non-professional, non-political public to consume. 
These are the spaces for making agreements, for making alliances and negotiating 
political support.  These spaces presuppose other forms of conducting “human nature,” 
not anchored in conducting public emotionality, but rather in conducting and managing 
interest and sentiments of loyalty in order to produce the basic outline in which politics 
will behave. These are the spaces in which the people who are in the business of politics 
interact, they are smaller scale face-to-face spaces in which to negotiate interest, and 
therefore require a great deal of political instinct.     
A month before the Congress Election in Colombia, Nicolás,25 a political 
strategist with whom I had been working, took me to interview Raúl, the “Leader 
Coordinator” for one of the congress candidates he was managing. I could not quite 
understand the mechanics of electoral campaigning in a country that publicly recognized 
the division between two kinds of votes. The purpose of this meeting was for me to get a 
better grasp of how the division of electoral labor works.  
Raúl was in charge of negotiating political support for the candidate among local 
and civic leaders responsible for mobilizing their communities to vote. Nicolás wanted 
                                                
25 The names of the people in this section have been changed according to confidentiality requests.  
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me to see for myself what politics was really about, and the best person to show me was 
the man who had to negotiate the political support for the candidate amongst social and 
political groups of all sorts. We arrived at the political headquarters of the congressional 
candidate, a house in the British style located in a middle-class neighborhood in Bogotá. 
The space was filled with photos of the candidate in all sorts of situations: photos of him 
posing for political publicity pieces, photos of him delivering a speech in a public setting, 
and photos where he appeared dancing with women from the municipalities and localities 
he works with. There were almost as many photos as there were small corridors and 
locked doors. Behind one of those doors was Raúl, and before his door was a line of 
“local leaders” who had been waiting for their turn to speak with him. We waited for 
some minutes until he made a slot in his busy agenda. He took us to a more private room 
located on the second floor of the house.  
“What Nicolás does is virtual politics,” Raúl said as he stared at him. "What I do 
is real politics.” As he continued to explain, virtual politics is the expression of politics in 
media: the management of communication strategies targeted to steer public opinion, the 
opinion of those voters who do not have a direct interest in politics. On the contrary, he 
continued, real politics is the negotiation with local leaders who in exchange for a benefit 
for themselves and for their communities organize their constituencies to vote for a 
certain politician. This job requires instinct and political savvy, skills honed through 
experience and an intimate knowledge of what people want. Raúl emphasized that in this 
business he had to learn how to tell apart whom to trust and whom not to trust. As he put 
it, it was a matter of reading “the vibes” that one gets from people, and the only way to 
get this skill is by spending time in those places where people are getting something out 
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of politics, often economically marginal environments. “I sometimes let the people touch 
my buttocks, I listen to them. People just want to be heard” Raúl said.  
Although this description of politics might seem a little esoteric, it points to 
central characteristics of what constitutes a political space. For starters, liberal politics 
entails antagonism among parties. At the level of mass politics and media practices, this 
antagonism of interests is not relevant since the industry seeks to build generalities that a 
broad portion of the population can identify with (Mouffe 2000). Second, the political 
field requires a sort of knowledge and administration that is contrary to techno-scientific 
regimes; it requires a “practical sense” of how to interpret political moves:  
 
This 'practical sense' of the possible and impossible, probable and 
improbable stances for the different occupants of different positions is 
what enables the politician to 'choose' suitable and agreed stances (...) This 
feel for the political game, which enables politicians to predict the stances 
of other politicians, is also what makes them predictable for other 
politicians: predictable and thus responsible, in other words, competent, 
serious, trustworthy—in short ready to play, with consistency and without 
arousing surprise or disappointing people's expectations, the role assigned 
to them by the structure of the space of the game (Bourdieu 1991: 179).   
 
The stability of the conditions given and knowing how to anticipate how other people in 
the political field will act and react is what gives this space the stability that a mass 
environment does not guarantee, and thus makes it appealing as a simultaneous setting 
for political practice. Getting a “feel” for or understanding “the vibes” entails 
understanding how political power is distributed and how the key actors in that field are 
positioned in relation to one another. In this sense, these political spaces are smaller 
environments in which the unpredictable character of “human nature” is managed 
through face-to-face negotiations. In these negotiations, both interest and sentiments of 
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loyalty play a crucial role. Sentiments of allegiance and gratitude interact with rationality 
broadly defined, as calculating what is more beneficial. Political managers and local 
leaders capitalize on both of these forms of interaction to mobilize the voto amarrado. 
Raúl invited me to see what his job was about. I followed him and the politician 
he worked for around poor areas of Bogotá. The first stop was in a neighborhood 
categorized as stratum 1, a neighborhood that had started as an illegal urbanization in the 
fringes of the city. A meeting was happening in the middle of the street. There was a 
construction truck that served as an improvised stage. On the stage was the local leader 
who had organized the meeting, a mariachi band and a powerful sound system.  The 
houses surrounding the political setting were covered in political propaganda. In front of 
the truck, campaign promoters (cheerleaders hired for the occasion) danced in the middle 
of a half-drunken crowd. “Un aguardientico? Una gaseosita?”26, promoters offered as 
they walked around the crowd.  
 
                                                
26 Aguardiente is the popular alcoholic drink of Colombia made of sugar cane. “Gaseosa” [Gassy] is the 
popular name given to carbonated drinks.  
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Political Meeting-Personal Archive     
 
The leader in charge of organizing the meeting delivered a heartfelt speech: 
“Today we are gathered to support the son of the council man that we have traditionally 
supported in this neighborhood, El Gordo27. He worked for the strata 1 and 2 to bring you 
paved roads and the aqueduct. Politicians often remember us just to ask for votes but not 
to work for the people. We are very grateful to this political family. More gaseosita for 
the people, please!” After, the promoters stood on the stage with a banner-sized print of 
the ballot for congress. The promoters cheered: “whom do we vote for, for the house of 
representatives?” the crowd cheered the reply, “and whom for the senate?” the crowd also 
replied excitedly. They repeated the exercise several times, as a way for the attendants to 
                                                
27 In Colombia, the use of physical traits as nicknames that express affection and proximity are very 
common. Usually, these expressions are used among friends and family expressing the intimacy of the parts 
involved. The use of this kind of nickname to refer to a political representative elicits the close relations 
sought within the political machine. 
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memorize what to do when at the voting polls, and then invited the attendants to dance 
and drink to the mariachi music.  
Although this account might be a political anecdote expected to happen in 
marginal areas of any country, the recurrence of this way of political management in 
face-to-face environments invites the researcher to stop and look more carefully at the 
assumptions at stake when observing a phenomenon as quotidian and yet as foreign as 
politics. Independent from objective economic conditions, people who work within 
politics and who move in these small scale environments rehash the liberal principles of 
the negotiation of interest and the creation of alliances as a form of political 
administration.  
I accompanied Nicolás to meet with one of the key men of the Governor of a 
region of Colombia who had recently been involved in a corruption scandal, and whose 
political future was hanging from a thin string. We met at the lobby of a hotel in the north 
of Bogotá, where this man, Mr. D, came to greet us with the governor and a congress 
man part of his political structure. In our meeting, Mr. D offered me some “tapes” that he 
had involving his political opponents in another corruption scandal. For some reason, and 
maybe because of the fact that “anthropology” rarely rings a bell, he thought that my 
research was some sort of investigative report that would help him get out in the media 
this information to expose his political opponents.  When I told him I was not interested, 
he was surprised, and the conversation shifted to the point of the meeting: for Nicolás to 
get more information on another candidate. As Nicolás later explained, Mr. D knows 
what is boiling beneath the surface, he knows how politicians move, and he is an 
excellent source for political information. He is also a “shady” character who by means 
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of handling sensitive information in strategic ways, by exchanging favors and having 
people owe him, negotiates and gets what he wants out of different situations. To me it 
sounded like blackmailing. Nicolás laughed at my righteousness, “that’s politics,” he 
said. As he ironically conveyed, “In the U.S political consultants get sensitive 
information about opposing candidates and launch negative publicity ads and here 
everyone admires them. In Colombia, negative publicity is illegal and it’s done under the 
table. And when it’s done here, everyone points out fingers in indignation to how 
unethical it is. Politics is politics everywhere!”  
These two accounts of how political structures are assembled and mobilized in 
different economic strata point to the inner professionalization logic of the political field, 
a topic that theorists committed to understanding the modern state have so many times 
visited (Latour 2010; Weber 1968). Although these stories look like another iteration of 
patronage politics contrary to our very modern understanding of professionalization, 
when seen in closer sociological detail they emerge as closed political environments that 
follow a particular set of rules and parameters of legitimacy. Rhetoric devices, senses of 
historic allegiance and gratitude, as well as favor exchange are strategically mobilized in 
a network for problem solving where loyalties and affections circulate. In these networks, 
the functions of the state take the face of particular individuals, a characteristic trait of 
modern bureaucracies and political organizations (Gupta 1995; Hull 2003). In these 
closed spaces, as was explored earlier in this chapter, knowing how agents move and 
anticipating these moves is crucial to the objective of politics, which is maintaining 
representative power. This skill is cultivated through experience rather than through 
education, and experience is regarded within the political field with great esteem. Often, 
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when electing public officers we are more interested in knowing the track record of the 
politician of choice than his academic titles. Experience and “feeling the vibes,” having 
the right instinct, are the source of legitimacy of a professional field that, in our highly 
techno-scientific world, is often demonized and closed to any scrutiny. However, the 
political still exists, it’s more alive than ever, posing complicated questions for how 
public life unfolds.  
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Chapter!4!
Strategic!Public!Worlds!
 
Publicity is one of the main features of electoral politics. For a candidate to win 
votes, an electing constituency must know who the candidate is. It doesn’t matter what 
kind of reputation the candidate has, that’s what political managers and public relations 
experts are there for, what matters is that people know him or her. The cliché premise 
“there’s no such thing as bad publicity” that celebrities often use to justify scandalous 
behavior is an axiomatic principle in electoral politics. Therefore, in every political 
campaign, the management of publicity is carefully crafted. Some campaigns are built to 
enhance the public recognition of a candidate who is just starting a political career and 
does not aspire to immediate election; some other campaigns are devoted to managing 
and capitalizing on the already existing public reputation of seasoned politicians. The role 
of political managers, particularly political strategists, is to steer the public recognition of 
a candidate by assessing who the candidate’s constituency is and designing a 
communication and campaign strategy accordingly.  
In Colombia, political strategists assess communication strategies according to the 
logic of segmentation. As has been explored in the previous chapters, segmentation is 
culturally coded as a problem of class ordering, and it works as an interpretative lens to 
understand society and “human nature” by coupling liberal economic and political 
rationales. In this way, as treated in previous sections, segmentation according to class is 
the organizing principle framing political epistemologies and the division of electoral 
labor in Colombia.  
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In the context of electoral competition and political participation, this class-based 
mode of segmentation results in class-specific publics with particular forms and rules for 
participation. In this chapter, I examine how class-based notions of the polity inform 
different communication strategies, the media they use, and the kinds of publics they give 
shape to. I argue that in these spaces particular networks assemble to strategically 
mobilize politics, and I call into question the operability of a public/private distinction 
based on the liberal conception of deliberative democratic politics.  
I frame the design of different communication strategies as a particular way of 
“world making” (Goodman 2001) where participation is reaffirmed as a universal 
principle but also “styled” (Ossman 2002) as a particular class-based experience. I see 
political strategists as makers of politics who work with objects such as tangible 
messages, networks and platforms of communication in order to compose different 
worlds where political experience is different. In doing so, I distance myself from a 
definition of politics as a merely representational regime and rather focus on the matter of 
politics, “the lively materiality of technological objects within the collectivities in which 
we live in” (Braun and Whatmore 2010: xi), and ethnographically observe how these 
technologies are at the same time constitutive of our collective life (Latour and Weibel 
2005; MacKenzie 2002).   
The chapter is structured in two sections. The first section looks at the production 
of synchronicity of media in constituting an all-encompassing national conversation 
during elections. I trace how the technologies, networks and practices at work in 
configuring a national agenda of public debate intertwine with bourgeois liberal notions 
of individual and collective freedom. In the second part, I frame clientelistic politics as a 
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form of strategic politics mobilized by groups portrayed as “in need” to access the 
slippery state apparatus. I focus on privatized forms of communication that reinforce 
loyalty, intimacy and proximity as a legitimate form of government, in a time of 
privatized state services. I finish the chapter by showing some ways in which strategic 
politics has been paired up with mass media communication to create highly effective 
communication formats for governing that in complicated ways conjoin bourgeois liberal 
notions with strategic politics.  
!
PART!1!
 
The problem of synchronicity or the making of the bourgeois public sphere 
 
In Colombia, during elections, heated arguments at the family’s dinner table, 
among friends in a bar, tears, yelling, and loud laughter are not at all uncommon. On the 
contrary, they are the format of informal political discussions. Many times, I found 
myself in these social settings hiding my political preferences to avoid piercing glances, 
or the interminable arguments that often ended when someone abruptly left the room in a 
sign of indignation. I also avoided talking too much about my fieldwork, and I kept my 
tagline as vague as I could make it, so I wouldn’t hurt any susceptibilities or provoke one 
of these never ending epic battles. However, sometimes plunging into the deepest pools 
of political affectivity and melodramatic performance, much in accordance with 
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Colombia’s telenovela tradition,28 was inevitable. These moments contrasted the 
dispassionate and cynical outlooks of my informants, and provided a window to look at 
the ways in which the work of political strategists and political managers become part of 
everyday public and private life.  
During electoral times, national and local media, social networks, public meetings 
and every conversation in cafés or private gatherings somehow arrive at the latest news in 
the electoral competition. Poll numbers intertwine with personal preferences; discussions 
about the future of the nation intersect with gossip about candidates, their personal lives 
or their political trajectory. Everyone becomes a political pundit, and even the most 
politically skeptical are drawn into this overwhelming synchronicity of topics. Personal 
emotions intersect with public issues in a dance that brings together intimate sentiments 
with the political news of the day. In political thought, the theorization of these spaces in 
which private citizens engage in public discourse and mobilize it has been theorized as 
the public sphere. The liberal idea of an existing civil society that oversees government 
has been usually framed as an actually existing space, natural to any democratic setting. 
However, most evidently in contemporary, media-centered politics than ever before, 
these spaces are created, managed and mobilized by experts in political communication, 
who reproduce normative notions of what participating in democracy looks like. In this 
first part, I focus on how “anonymity”- based media, such as social media, TV, and 
                                                
28 Omar Rincón, Colombian media scholar expert in Latin American political communication, sees that the 
format of the Telenovela is also very used by politicians as an effective tool to deliver political messages. 
“What these individuals [televisual presidents and governments] recover is people’s common, on the 
ground knowledge; they coin idiomatic expressions, as well as narratives and media aesthetics (…) In Latin 
America the success of political communication as a form of government can be better understood if 
framed by the logics of Telenovela and melodrama and not classical politics. These “lads” are 
melodramatic heroes who come to save the mistaken people, the people who have chose the wrong 
presidents, the wrong governments.” (Interview with Omar Rincón).   
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advertisement, are fashioned as the locus where normative ideas of citizenship and 
participation are evoked and reaffirmed as an actual existing reality. And since 
constituted as a normative horizon, it seems inescapable and omnipresent; it is constituted 
as the framework of reference for all politics.  
The all-encompassing, engulfing nature of normative ideas of participation is 
mostly felt during elections. The synchronicity of topics, spaces, and conversations is 
brought together by the strong gravitational pull created when all media engage in one 
single conversation, because it’s electoral times --that’s what’s current, and that’s what 
every citizen ought to be interested in. I felt this stifling environment of elections in my 
fieldwork. I started dreading electoral politics to the bone. I was tired of being asked over 
and over again about what I was finding or being treated as some sort of political expert. I 
was tired of talking endlessly about politics. Some days I just wanted to hang out, listen 
to music and forget that an election was going on and that I was doing fieldwork in this 
setting. But still politics came up in the conversations with my most intimate group of 
friends, and here, there was no place to hide, no excuse to give. One of these moments 
was with one of my closest friends. She wanted my opinion on whom to vote for for 
Congress. “I’m not going to vote,” I replied. “Learning what I’ve learned about the 
manufacturing of politics so far with my fieldwork, I feel like voting is not that useful.” 
Unexpectedly, she burst into inconsolable tears, “You have to vote, if it’s not us, who’s 
going to change things?” Jaded by exhaustion I had turned into an utter cynic. And for 
me, my vote was not a big deal; in my eyes nothing would change if I voted or I didn’t. 
But for my friend, voting, participating, was a matter of changing the world.  
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The intrusion of public affairs in intimate conversations, or the deeply entrenched 
understandings of personal actions as affecting the collective are in dialogue with a 
liberal conception of the polity. Liberal notions of public forming such as Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of “seriality” (Anderson 1998,1999) or Jurgen Habermas’ “Public 
sphere” (Habermas 1989) hinge upon the idea that anonymous subjects are engaged and 
synchronized in a collective project of state-making, greater than them, while 
highlighting the importance of individual actions in putting this project in motion. Both 
Anderson’s and Habermas’ projects elaborate on the Kantian concept of 
cosmopolitanism: both projects explore the ways in which the exercise of rational 
freedom stands in a dialogic relation with the creation of one world, a cohesive 
ontological, systematic unit, where universal citizenship is possible, varying in modes but 
not in kind. 
 In Benedict Anderson’s “homogenous, empty time” of unbounded seriality, 
citizens enter and create one world, united by a shared sense of politics recreated by 
reading the daily news, by engaging in one language that is intelligible to all. News-
making creates “grammars of representation,” ideas and concepts that circulate at the 
same time and that are iterated in different contexts reaffirming their currency. These 
“grammars of representation” provide the blueprint for the conversations worth having, 
the concepts worth imagining, discussing and fighting for.  But foremost, as Anderson 
argues, news-making synchronizes time and the world by presenting events as if they 
happened at the same time and at the same level of reality. In this play of production, 
circulation and appropriation a world as a whole emerges, even if those participating in 
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these conversations do not agree with what is being said, or even if they access it from 
different entry points.  
This idea of the liberal polity is very close to Habermas’ notion of the bourgeois 
public sphere. For Habermas associations of private citizens come together around issues 
that are of common interest, hence becoming public issues. These citizens have equal 
access to the debate of these issues, since they affect them all, and since they share the 
same communicative rationality that makes the debate intelligible to all. Concerning this 
last point, Habermas would later elaborate on this enabling backstage of political 
communication, which he calls “lifeworld” and defines as a correlate of intersubjective 
processes of understanding, open to “subjects who make use of their competence to speak 
and act” (Habermas 1984:112). What this means, bluntly put, is that people who 
understand (and therefore experience) the world in similar terms are able to 
communicate, reach agreement and coordinate actions. 
 Scholars across disciplines have extensively critiqued this conception of the 
liberal polity and political participation for overshadowing power relations and forms of 
domination, and for taking for granted that we all inhabit indeed the same world of 
politics where public spheres exist (e.g Fraser 1990; Warner 2002; Weintraub and Kumar 
1997). I will explore deeper some of these critiques in the next section of this chapter. 
But, for now, I want to focus on the productive aspects that Anderson and Habermas 
offer to understand the formation, circulation and establishment of a hegemonic political 
discourse. In both of their works, they place their attention at the inception of the 
bourgeois state from the point of view of the bourgeoisie or the elites in the new 
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nations,29 thus exploring how the “grammars of representation,” to borrow Anderson’s 
term, are formed and what they look like.   
The bourgeois state is the state of a market economy where rational, anonymous 
individuals participate in a rational system that corrects any behaviors that threaten its 
reproduction. Legal and political systems developed both to secure a rational functioning, 
expressed in anonymous, segmented and specialized bureaucracies that guaranteed equal 
access and equal regulation to every citizen participant in the system. In this system, as 
Habermas and Anderson explore, media and publicity play a crucial role for this rational 
anonymity to become the glue of sociality. Both thinkers highlight the role print media 
had in creating a shared sense of inhabiting and taking part in the same world. They also 
make the case that there is an intimate relation between the production of capital, the 
formation of political and economic interests, and the production of a space (the public 
sphere) where citizens who have a direct interest in the legal and political regulations of 
the market economy can express their voice. This space guarantees the regulation of state 
operations in relation to private interests, and is established as the “appropriate” and 
desired space for civil society (private citizens) within a nation-state with a market 
economy to exist. By focusing on the producers who mobilize these channels for civil 
society to become a tangible reality, both Habermas and Anderson reinforce the 
Gramscian notion that “[t]he bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous 
movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and 
economic level” (Gramsci 2009: 79). 
                                                
29 The elites in many of the new nations of the early 19th century cannot be considered properly bourgeois. 
They share the elite position but not the objective conditions that gave rise to the bourgeoisie in Europe. In 
the new nations, the elites deployed connections to European nobility, based their wealth and power in 
inheritance and extensive land ownership, conditions that harshly contrast the entrepreneurial spirit 
characteristic of the bourgeois, the bourgeois revolutions and the establishment of liberal politics.  
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Hobbesian Cybernetics 
 
 The idea of a media-centered public sphere as the appropriate space for civil 
society to express its will and for anonymous individuals to exercise their rational will in 
the best interest of the common good is deeply rooted in Colombian public culture. 
Political managers and people within the political field in general often map out the ideal 
voting practice of the voto de opinión (explored in detail in chapter two) onto the spaces 
of print media and digital media, and to a certain extent, to television and highly visible 
public gatherings. It is generally accepted that these media-centered public spaces are the 
“natural” locus for the voto de opinión and their architecture is crafted to promote and 
enhance the democratic ideals this kind of vote stands for.  
 However, before we get into the particular forms of these spaces and their relation 
to the ideas they promote, it is necessary to clarify the scale at which they operate, and in 
this sense, the scope of sociality that they enclose, the world they constitute. Media 
studies scholars have diagnosed the shrinking, multiplicity and volatile nature of publics 
in the era of rapid and individualized information exchange (Boyer Forthcoming; Warner 
2002). Cell phones, social media, and bloggers have constituted disrupted networks of 
information that contrast the broadcasting model that was prevalent during the twentieth 
century. However, during elections, it appears that all media take part in the same 
conversation, and in this sense they are aligned as belonging to a same conversation, to 
the same plane of reality, to the same world.  As Nelson Goodman explores (2001:5), 
world-making entails “the analytic study of types and functions of symbols and symbols 
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systems.”  Every world that we make is a version of the one world we have, but in each 
particular world we create we isolate or highlight different elements. Every version we 
make is functionally distinct and, in this way it constitutes a world in itself. To unveil 
what Goodman means, we can think of reality as an entanglement of threads connected 
and disconnected in many ways. When we carry out analytic operations in an attempt to 
organize the mess and make it intelligible, we are pulling out threads from the original 
entangled knot. Each thread is functionally distinct, and in this sense, each thread frames 
reality in different ways. What happens within what is encompassed in one thread may 
not happen the same way, or may be absurd, in what is encompassed in another one.  
 This world-making approach is productive in thinking about public-making 
because it elucidates the question of scale. As was discussed in the previous section, 
when engaging with public formation at a normative level, we find ourselves in the land 
where authors in hegemonic positions produce universals. Here, the production of shared 
normative meanings functionally reproduces a broader moral frame.  The spaces created 
as the “home” of the voto de opinión are “normative spaces” (Hirschkind 2001) where 
political virtue and democratic ideals are reaffirmed. Within them, individuals invest 
themselves in producing cosmopolitan senses of belonging that give shape to the 
national, the international, and the cosmic as felt and real political spaces, as material 
realities shaped by specific information networks and by specific information practices.   
Norbey Quevedo, a prominent political journalist of El Espectador, one of the 
main newspapers in Colombia, explained from the point of view of a journalist how the 
synchronous, media-centered public sphere is produced during electoral times:  
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I believe a main characteristic of journalism is its sense of immediacy and 
urgency [coyuntura]. In media, as in any other business, we have a daily 
scheduling of activities as well as an annual agenda. In January of this 
year [2010], we already knew it would be an electoral year and hence all 
media, even all of the sections of the printed newspaper and the online 
version were aligned to fulfill the readers’ expectations about the 
information on elections. In that sense, all of us journalists take the time 
from our regular schedule to cover politics (…) This [creation of 
synchronicity] conforms to an environment in which communications 
strategists and political consultants play a central role, and therefore a 
communication circle is formed where four main actors intervene: some 
strategists, some political candidates, some media and some journalists” 
[italics are mine].  
  
Quevedo has been working as a political journalist for many years, and he is an 
experienced journalist in these matters. In the excerpt of the interview above, he hints at 
the “situatedness” and authoritative character of public making. The communication 
circle, setting a national agenda, and determining what people will talk about, is a very 
fine interplay between political and economic interests -- what will sell-- and the ethical 
imperative of journalism of acting as society’s critical voice.  His interview evinces how 
some actors with some interests and some ways of looking at the world produce an all-
encompassing national conversation in which they narrate what the nation is and what it 
should be. This intimate relation between newsmaking, knowledge making and politics 
making is not at all foreign to Colombia’s history. Rather there are many examples 
throughout Colombia’s republican history where intellectual circles comprising artists, 
politicians, journalists and businessmen have marked the country’s political imagination, 
the production of a shared sense of a real nation, and sometimes its fate.30  
                                                
30 Circles as Los Leopardos in the 1920s, El Círculo de Barranquilla where Gabriel García Márquez and 
Julio Mario Santodomingo (the wealthiest man in Colombia) took part, and La Revista Alternativa in the 
70s owned by Enrique Santos, journalist and part of Juan Manuel Santos’ prominent political family, are 
some examples.   
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 The intellectual histories that look at these circles in Colombia show common 
threads on how authoritative voices are constituted, threads that continue to be important 
to this day in marking the desired formats for a national, public conversational home of 
the opinion vote (Arias 2007; Jaramillo Uribe 1977; Rivas 2007).  Authors at different 
moments in time reinforce ideals and norms that transcend their own particular authority, 
as some sort of “transcendental anonymity” (Foucault 2003) at work. In the particular 
case of Colombian republican life, these norms constitute and define the appropriate 
formats to participate in a national political conversation and are anchored within class 
specific ideas of what republican life is. Nevertheless, even though this “transcendental 
anonymity” is situated, the axioms that it reinforces appear to be universal and timeless.  
The praise of print media, rhetoric, and a cosmopolitan outlook that brings the “world” to 
the local lived space are the parameters that these groups reinforce through time (see 
chapter two). In contemporary Colombia, these ideals have been transposed to the world 
of the Internet.  And during the elections of 2010 where campaigning on the Internet 
became a key player in managing the voto de opinión, ideals about anonymous and 
critical engagements, about the exercise of individual’s rational freedom in stirring the 
future of the nation, are rehashed in a synchronous dance that produces a very real 
national scale. 
 In his exploration of the emergence of digital newsmaking and its relation to late 
liberal logics, Dominic Boyer remarks the adaptability of liberalism while maintaining a 
distinct epistemological core. In Boyer’s words (in press: 260-261), in its different 
iterations liberalism retains the “valorization of individual freedom, the celebration of 
seemingly autonomous and self-generative individuality that Beth Povinelli has aptly 
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termed ‘autological.’ Liberalism’s most fundamental epistemic operation is to foreground 
the experiential fact that to some extent we can always believe ourselves to be unrelated 
beings, encountering the world ‘out there’ through individualized senses, ideas and 
bodies that are to a significant degree self-sovereign.” The Internet and its digital 
socialities fit, feed and reinforce this “epistemic operation” of liberalism by respecting 
and promoting individuality within the generation of a productive network. Individual 
stations constitute a web, and these individuals are anonymous to one another but 
working together in the maintenance and reproduction of the web in which they are 
embedded, the sovereign web on which every individual is dependent. It is Hobbes’ 
wildest dream come-true, a cybernetic, quasi-psychedelic Leviathan. And it is no surprise 
that republican ideas get rehashed in association with digital practices, as liberal sociality 
is also embedded in these phantasmagoric fantasies where invisible hands, collective 
unconsciousness, and national imaginations work as the glue for collectivities. 
This liberal political subjectivity in its later iterations was evident in how 
campaigning on the Internet was conceived in Colombia. During the 2010 Presidential 
elections, for the first time in Colombian politics web-based social media and online 
news became very important players in the political game. Antanas Mockus’ campaign, 
especially, relied heavily on Internet-based media to reach his supporters, and the 
expectations this new campaign strategy generated among the Colombian public showed 
the power of these tools for electoral politics. The use of Facebook and Twitter to 
organize and coordinate public gatherings, or to circulate publicity pieces made by 
citizens who wanted to contribute to the campaign, played with a widespread notion 
among Internet users: the internet is free and is a tool for the people to express their will 
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(Coleman 2001; Kelty 2008; Trippi 2008). This notion fit perfectly Mockus’ campaign, 
which was aimed at promoting a culture of transparency, legality and civic government 
control, a program of civility and individual discipline à la 21st century. And the strategy 
on the Internet was coherent with this view of the polity. It was conceived as the place 
where those Colombians who were outside politics, who did not believe in traditional 
politics, and who were willing to participate uninterestedly in politics found a space for 
their voices to be heard. And these Colombians, to which the campaign catered, were 
mainly middle and upper-middle educated, urban sectors, the ones who have Internet 
access.31   
In Colombia, being savvy on the Internet is understood to be the same as being 
current and global. The Internet provides information that otherwise cannot be found, and 
is conceived to be the space where wealthy and powerful moguls cannot reach. The 
meanings that in Colombia are ascribed to the Internet, and that were especially 
circulating during the presidential campaign of 2010 in relation to Mockus’ campaign, 
played on what Morozov (2012) calls “cyber-utopias,” the blind faith that the higher 
connectivity that the Internet brings, results in the effective actualization of democracy.  
For the elections of 2010, the Internet represented a promise of liberation from the 
long-standing structures of power of the country. Catalina Lobo-Guerrero, director of 
Votebien.com, a web-site sponsored by the largest media conglomerates of the country 
meant to provide electoral information to citizens, felt that the fact that the news outlet 
she ran was on the Internet provided her with more freedom. She did not feel any 
pressure to comply with the secret political agenda of media moguls or to be tied to any 
                                                
31 According to the World Bank data, 36.5 Colombians out of 100 have Internet access 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2).  
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particular ideology. She felt her webpage was marginal since it did not draw as much 
attention as the main media that Colombians pay attention to (radio and TV), but it was 
relevant since key opinion makers would mention it in their columns or radio shows to 
provide facts. As she put it: “Votebien is not behind making a few bucks with its rating; 
rather [votebien] is on the side of the citizen, therefore we don’t sell empty contents, 
empty images.” On the contrary, she saw herself as exercising the job of a reporter, of 
shedding light on the dark world of politics, and the unregulated character of Internet 
allowed her to do so. The Internet was a place in which real journalism could be 
practiced, a place in which the interests of the powerful would not reach.  
Similarly to Catalina, Ana Piñeres, a TV and film producer, fervent and devoted 
follower of Mockus, found an empowering source in the Internet. Along with some actors 
and TV people, she produced a political spot for Mockus where faces well known to the 
Colombian TV viewers shared why they supported Mockus. The format was very similar 
to Obama’s spot featuring Scarlett Johansen or to Mexico’s campaign to allure younger 
voters, “Rock the vote”.32 Like many other publicity pieces in the Mockus campaign, this 
was a citizen initiative, and it ran independently from the campaign. As Ana remembers 
with sparks in her eyes about the process of shooting and publicizing the spot,  
 
This was a process from the heart that started because many friends in our 
group who are on Facebook, we started to see that we converged on things 
that we posted. Someone posted an article about Mockus and everyone 
else commented on it. We started talking with Juan Sebastian Aragón, his 
wife and other of our friends and we said “we must do something.” 
Sometimes we lend our faces for money to promote a moisturizing cream, 
or give our testimonials to promote the TV y Novelas awards and that 
makes the awards stand out, why not support somebody who we are 
                                                
32 Both Obama’s 2008 campaign spot and Rock the Vote show hip young celebrities supporting a political 
cause and a candidate.    
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convinced can deliver the country that we dream about? (…) so we started 
calling people, and the day when we were shooting, more people than we 
were expecting arrived. It was endearing because everyone who arrived 
knew there were many people on the set, so one arrived with a cheese 
board, another one arrived with a bag of cheetos, the other one with 
bocadillos. It suddenly turned into a gathering of friends who had not seen 
each other for a long time. And it was amazing, a beautiful energy was 
flowing, nothing was preconceived, everything was about people talking 
from their hearts. It was like four, three, two, one and as they saw the red 
light bulb turn on, the green light bulb also came on33 and they 
[spontaneously] said why they wanted to vote for him [Antanas] (…) I 
was in charge of uploading the video to the Internet. I had messages on my 
Blackberry all day long, every day. The first two days my phone went out 
of service because I got around 2500 messages of people thanking us, 
messages saying how wonderful the spot turned out to be. People in media 
[media-makers] messaged me, I’ve found that most people in media are 
with Antanas, the thinking people [la gente pensante], column writers. 
Everyone we sent the spot linked us immediately, after 25 minutes of 
uploading the spot, Semana, El Tiempo, El Espectador, City TV34 and El 
Mundo in Spain had it on their webpages (…) I get goose bumps because 
this is the first time that I’m living an electoral process where I feel I’m 
actually participating, and where I feel I can be myself. I can be a 
transparent, legal, clean, person who pays taxes, who owns her own 
company and who is working to be better and doesn’t trick the country. At 
last there’s someone that I sympathize with, someone who thinks like I do.  
 
Catalina and Ana come from different sides but convey a similar sense of how the 
Internet works in relation to political processes. Catalina, the responsible journalist with a 
strong ethical stance on journalism and politics, and Ana, the ethical political activist 
with access to media networks, highlight the openness and transparency that the Internet 
brings for citizens to make informed decisions. In the Internet, citizens can find 
“uncontrolled” and “unaltered” information. They can access different voices. By the 
same token, the Internet is also a medium for citizens to express their voice freely. And in 
this sense, it is a place for the exercise of critical thought as the exercise of positive 
                                                
33 The red light bulb is the indicator that cameras are rolling. The green light bulb is an allusion to the 
Green Party.  
34 These are the main political magazine, the main newspapers and a very well known TV station based in 
Bogotá.  
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freedom for the realization of real participation and of a real democracy, as the story told 
by Ana conveyed. This positive freedom, in Sir Isaiah Berlin’s words (1990:161), is the 
one where the self is her own master, a late-liberal sense of freedom prevalent since 
WWII:   
I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, 
from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not 
being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or 
by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of 
playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own 
and realizing them.  
 
However, like any technology and as Morozov (2012) points out, the Internet is 
also highly regulated and rather than being a place where libertarian dreams are 
actualized, it is a place where power differentials, questions of access and democratic 
practices manifest themselves in different ways. The Internet has developers, experts, 
institutions and companies that mediate its uses. And this highly mediated nature of this 
environment is most clear when observing political campaigning on the Internet. As both 
Catalina and Ana highlight, the role of networks of opinion-makers in making their work 
nationally relevant is fundamental. The Internet enables the access to the national and the 
international realms, but it is key opinion-makers who make these scales real and 
tangible. In the case of Catalina, the opinion-makers who regularly consult Votebien.com 
for the facts and comment about it in their own media validate the information of a news 
outlet that is immersed in an overwhelming ocean of information and news production 
(Boyer in press). For Ana, being part of a group of people who shared the notoriety of 
television making and also having access to a data base where she could spread her 
information guaranteed the success and viral nature of the Mockus spot she helped 
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produce. This fact points to the less visible aspect of media work: its management. But, 
during elections, these highly managed environments surface, debunking any libertarian 
fantasies about absolute individual freedom and self-actualization enabled online.  
 
Circles made into working networks: When political managers and political consultants 
step in  
 
 The importance of networks and the deliberate production of synchronicity to 
produce a national agenda are more evident when looking at the media practices of 
political managers during elections. Although from an “emic” perspective, political 
managers and citizens on the Internet are different, from an “etic” perspective they share 
a fundamental similarity: to be relevant they must navigate certain networks. Let me 
explain. Ana and Catalina recognize themselves to be completely different from political 
managers, they are transparent, they are not pushing a secret agenda, and the Internet 
helps them to do so. On the contrary, the business of political managers is to work within 
the networks of power and stir them. And this stirring is many times hidden from the 
public eye. However, from an etic perspective, the work of political managers is also 
embedded in particular networks of opinion making geared to stir what they conceive as 
the voto de opinión.  From the perspective of managers, the Internet, TV spots and the 
relation with print and radio are part of the same package. And they have devised 
different techniques to manage these media, techniques that constitute expert practices in 
the business of public relations. However, even though managed, the ways that political 
consultants and political managers direct and conceive of the spaces for the voto de 
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opinión is in dialogue with the notions outlined above. In their practice, it is possible to 
observe the networks and action at play in producing synchronicity and an all-
encompassing national conversation.  
 Edward Bernays (2004: 7), father of public relations, described this field as “a 
vital tool of adjustment, interpretation and integration between individuals, groups and 
society.” This alignment of sociality that Bernays describes is still one of political 
management’s main goals. As seen in chapter three, understanding and directing public 
perception on different issues or about a candidate is the meat and potatoes of the 
business of political management, especially when situated in managing the media-
centered voto de opinión. Therefore, stirring and producing a national conversation by 
spreading a “disciplined message,” meaning a consistent message, among different 
media, lies at the center of the media practices of political consultants. In doing so, 
political consultants hope to set the agenda, the ongoing national conversation that will 
positively impact the campaign that they are managing. And for this to happen, their 
techniques are organized in a quasi-military discipline.  
  Santos’ campaign was directed in this way. The day after Juan Manuel Santos 
won the presidency, I met with J.J Rendón, his chief political strategist, in a restaurant in 
the north of Bogotá. He celebrated victory with a glass of wine, and with the enormous 
satisfaction of having delivered in spite of all the negative publicity that surrounded his 
arrival to the campaign.35 He explained how he achieved victory, “When I arrived to 
Santos’ campaign I organized it, as Roman Generals organized their Legions.” What he 
meant was that, contrary to the Mockus campaign which was powered by the force of a 
                                                
35 J.J Rendón is considered an expert stirrer of negative publicity. When he arrived to the country to work 
in Santos’ campaigns, different political circles criticized his arrival since they saw it as “dirty play.”  
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mob of enthusiasts and followers with little strategic directive, Santos’ campaigned 
aligned in a disciplined fashion media and political forces in order to stir and work within 
the established networks of power. Rendón made sure that the political forces in place, 
“the political machine,” the army of voters mobilized by particular political figures, was 
disciplined and synchronized, as he also made sure that the message they were spreading 
across different media was organized and “disciplined.”  
For this purpose, his first action as chief political strategist was to change the 
colors of the campaign, from the initial orange and white to the colors of the Partido de la 
U, the political party of President Alvaro Uribe, which was supporting Santos’ candidacy. 
Although changing the campaign colors may seem like an innocent move at first glance, 
in fact it was a master move, a calculated strategy aimed to stir public recognition. The 
goal was to link Santos to Uribe and profit on the latter’s high rates of public approval. 
The mission was achieved. Although, previous to this shift in the campaign Santos was 
known to be Uribe’s candidate, the straightforward visual association in the new publicity 
pieces boosted his public recognition and his popularity. As Rendón explained in our 
meeting, people could relate to the new colors and the new forms the campaign took. He 
disciplined the message by tying different elements of the campaign that in the beginning 
were loose. Rendón provided a direct linkage of Santos to Uribe’s nationalist project, but 
making sure that Santos kept his own identity as a diplomat who welcomed any political 
opinion. For this purpose, the Colombian flag colors were widely used, and the Partido de 
la U was highlighted to be the Partido de Unidad Nacional (Party of National Unity) 
where everyone, independent of political ideology, had a place as long as they were 
working for the prosperity of the nation.  
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Santos’ campaign before J.J Rendón 
Santos’ campaign after J.J Rendón  
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Tying up the elements of the campaign was paired up with the vertical 
organization and fine-tuning of the campaign mechanics itself. Half jokingly, half 
seriously J.J Rendón portrayed his arrival to the campaign: “I asserted my position of 
leadership, I would tell people what to do in the middle of a meeting regardless their 
position within the campaign.” He made sure that everyone in the campaign knew that he 
was in charge. And for this purpose, he established a vertical organization where the only 
one who had all the information about his campaign and about the strategy was Rendón 
himself.36 This way any information leak would be avoided and the message of the 
campaign would be more easily managed and controlled. The different teams working 
within the campaign followed this vertical and centralized organizational scheme, and 
accordingly all the information coming from the campaign was managed this way.  
The use of social media, the Internet and news outlets from the point of view of 
the Santos campaign looked dramatically different from the “cyber-utopianism” rehashed 
by the enthusiastic Mockus followers, but keeping the sense of media being the world of 
the voto de opinión at its core. Instead of a libertarian tool that would unleash the full 
realization of freedom, the Internet in this highly managed environment was another site 
that needed special managerial skills in order to use this technological platform to the 
best advantage of the campaign and to advance freedom. Felipe, a young lawyer working 
in the social media team of the campaign, recalls his experience working with Ravi 
Singh, social media and Internet campaigning “guru” hired37 to counteract the increasing 
                                                
36 This is a common practice among political consultants and political strategists. Campaign strategies are 
often considered “campaign secrets” and they remain secret even after elections have passed.  
37 According to an investigative report that circulated months after the election (León 2011), Ravi Singh 
misrepresented himself as a campaign guru who had won the Obama election. Campaigns worldwide hired 
his services believing his credentials.   
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popularity of Antanas Mockus: “He [Ravi Singh] called his closest team of collaborators 
his lieutenants. We were nine people with very specific tasks [and specific skills].”  No 
one in the team knew what the strategy was, and as lieutenants they followed directions. 
The Santos campaign’s use of social media followed this highly managed and vertical 
form of political practice. Alejandro, another member of Santos’ social media team, 
described his involvement: “when you spot a sentiment on the Internet, you only need to 
light a match and it starts spreading like a wild fire.” The trick is to control the fire. He 
was in charge of lighting the fire and keeping it burning. In Santos’ campaign, web 
developers replicated pyramidal campaign structures of administration that resorted to 
(human) gatekeepers of information in order to guarantee the efficacy of social media. 
The web administration team combined administrators and trustworthy members who 
spread information among their networks. Their task was to keep the campaign message 
“disciplined,” in line with the rest of the campaign, and to regulate web-based 
participation to avoid any attacks from hackers.  
This approach also follows the premises of the industry of public relations as 
outlined by Bernays in the mid-20th century, and a conception of freedom enrooted in 
access to knowledge and freedom of speech. Bernays (2004: 59) writes that the public 
relations industry should strive for the ‘Engineering of Consent,’ “action based only on 
thorough knowledge of the situation and on the application of scientific principles and 
tried practices in the task of getting people to support ideas and programs.” In his view, 
the engineering of consent advances the freedom to persuade and suggest, a central 
feature in any democracy. He argues that citizens often do not have the information to 
make a decision on the urgent issues that government faces and that require public 
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consent, and therefore citizens need to be convinced by their leaders on how to act best. 
Although Bernays does not cite John Dewey (Dewey 1954), his preoccupation is in 
debate with Dewey’s pragmatic concern with citizens needing to be experts and have an 
informed opinion on every public issue, an impossible requirement.  For Dewey, this was 
a problematic feature of American democracy that was fostering an increasingly apathetic 
public culture; for Bernays it was a condition of democracy that required the dexterous 
aid of the industry of Public Relations in order to advance democratic principles38.  
With the export of the American political consulting industry to reforming 
democracies, it is no surprise that these ideas still linger on in other parts of the world 
where local political consultants organize the political game, even with new technologies 
like social media and the Internet. In fact, political consultants and political managers in 
Colombia generally conceive of the Internet and other media as the home, or the world, 
of the voto de opinión. They conceive them as part of a network that needs to be 
integrated in order to manage public perception and be able to persuade free, rational 
individuals through rational and also emotional arguments. Very similar to Bernays’ 
notion, these consultants conceive of different media as a platform to reach an 
anonymous collectivity with a brain of its own, a brain that can be measured, known, 
studied and guided through the standardization of different techniques (some of which 
were explored in chapter 3). As Alejandro, a member of Santos’ web campaign, put it:  
 
In social networks people are not fooled easily and they have a way of 
collective thinking that’s superior to the collective way of thinking that 
people can have watching TV where they do not have other referents to 
                                                
38 John Dewey was a strong critic of Edward Bernays. In Dewey’s review of Walter Lippman’s book “The 
Phantom Public”  he wrote against public relations as a new form of falsification of the deliberative 
rationality that he so much defended (Fairfield 2010).   
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compare what is being said. If you post a dubious message on the Internet, 
people will start commenting immediately, they will defend it or attack it, 
and people will always find ways to get better information. The most 
important thing in a social media strategy is to [manage] perception, more 
than merely broadcasting a message. The message has to be the same 
[consistent] so people believe it (…) the most important thing is to 
persuade people, to win people over.  
 
Alejandro’s view is biased by his own social media expertise. But his view is not 
distant at all from the views of political strategists who work within the political 
management industry and who work as well with other media. Camilo Rojas, one of the 
political strategists with whom I worked during fieldwork, collected and analyzed 
campaigns worldwide. He often highlighted the techniques for moving emotions that 
these spots appealed to. “If you have a candidate that is not charismatic, you can show 
him surrounded by children, that will soften his image. If the candidate is not considered 
executive enough, highlight the technocrats that advise him rather than focusing on the 
candidate himself.” For every situation, he provided a set of techniques and visual forms 
that appealed to shifting perception. In several occasions I heard him say, “I always think 
how an event will look on TV.” But what he meant was not just TV. His comment 
revealed a concern with how visual images and emotional messages molded perception, 
and how these messages could be spread consistently in different media, to make 
everyone talk about the same issue in the same way and at the same time.   
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PART!2!!
 
Strategic politics 
 
In the days previous to the first round Presidential Election Day in 2010, 
Colombia’s public scene saw the spectacular popularity of the Green Party’s presidential 
candidate Antanas Mockus skyrocket. All of the major public media, and web-based 
social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, were awash with the images of this 
collective enthusiasm. However, on May 30th after the first round presidential election,39 
the polling results showed that the enthusiasm for the “Green Wave” was not as 
collective as the media portrayed it. Juan Manuel Santos won the election by a 25% 
margin. A public joke circulating the next day in the same social media that glorified 
Mockus sardonically described his defeat: “Mockus won in Putumayo [the one territory 
he actually won], Twitter and Facebook.” Political pundits and political consultants all 
around explained this defeat by raising arguments concerning the voting behaviors of 
consumers of web-social media: they are not disciplined enough and they don’t go to the 
voting polls, they can change their minds last minute, and there is no way to make them 
accountable for their actions. Others, including J.J Rendón, Santos’ own strategist in 
chief, blamed the defeat on the unmanaged and unsystematic nature of Mockus’ 
campaign. As Rendón remembers, Mockus may have had the multitude and the publicity 
on his side, but Santos had politics on his.  
                                                
39 The Colombian presidential electoral system has the possibility of Ballotage. If on the first electoral 
round none of the candidates have an absolute majority, a second round is carried out where the two 
candidates who obtained the highest results on the first round face each other.  
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This explanation, however, told only half of the story, and as an observer of the 
electoral process in Colombia, I could not quite figure out why Mockus’ popularity and 
ample publicity did not translate into votes. If Santos and Mockus were campaigning on 
basically the same media, why did Santos’ followers go to the polls and Mockus’ 
followers not go? I asked this question to one of Santos’ campaign members. He simply 
answered: “Voters were not on the Internet, they were in la maquinaria [the political 
machine].”  
The production of a media-based national discourse contrasts with the 
micromanaged world of electoral politics on the streets. The architecture of media-
oriented worlds harvests the rapid exchange of information among a large number of 
anonymous individuals, while face-to-face electoral spaces foster the word-of–mouth, 
intimacy and relatedness. In Colombia, the latter world is conceived of as the space for 
the voto amarrado, the tied vote. As its name suggests, it is represented as the antinomy 
of the freedom of will, individuality and anonymity that the voto de opinión is supposed 
to stand for. On the contrary, the voto amarrado is associated with rural and urban 
contexts of marginality, with spaces of need and necessity, with ties of solidarity and 
closeness, in short to political pre-modernity as so many times conceptualized by social 
scientists and policy makers (Auyero 2000; Roudakova 2008; Schiller 2011). These 
spaces contrary to the voto de opinión do not promote anonymity but rather promote 
closeness and loyalty.  
 In our late liberal moment in which rationalization, standardization and 
anonymity are valued as paragons of progress, these spaces are taken to be 
uncomfortable, a malaise of politics that hinders open participation, accountability and 
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transparency. However, face-to-face politics are real, and as scholars in subaltern studies 
have pointed out, this form of politics is politics at large in most of the world (Chatterjee 
2006). The fantasy of a national space attuned to seemingly universal liberal principles 
evinces symbolic power at work: “The nation fills the void left in the uprooting of 
communities and kin, and turns that loss into the language of metaphor. Metaphor, as the 
etymology of the word suggests, transfers the meaning of home and belonging, across the 
‘middle passage,’ or the central European steppes, across those distances, and cultural 
differences, that span the imagined community of the nation-people” (Bhabha 1994: 139-
140). As the instauration of the nation-state in the colonial world that Bhaba critiques, the 
democratization wave in the late and post cold war period followed similar logics, as 
Chatterjee (2006) argues. Rather than establishing a worldwide “homogeneous, empty 
time,” the same linear time frame, the same political ideals and therefore the same 
political experiences for the entire world, the experience of political and economic 
reformation that broad parts of the world underwent in the 1980s and 1990s revealed the 
“heterogenous time of modernity.” Political experience is rooted in plural and fragmented 
global and local political processes, and taking democratic politics as a unity replicated 
globally is a misconstruction of political experience. And as Chatterjee continues to 
argue, this misconstruction is tainted by colonial legacies that reproduce everywhere 
hierarchical structures of power.  
 Although the experience of Colombia is distant from the experience of India 
where Chatterjee centers his analysis, Chatterjee’s argument offers an entry point to 
conceptualize the fragmentation and segmentation of political logics and political spaces 
within a national legal and political framework.  In countries with a strong colonial 
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legacy where race/class/caste operate as a segmenting social function, politics and 
political spaces are fragmented too, and the power dynamics at work in social 
segmentation inform how both the political field and political action are structured. In 
politics, and more evidently in electoral politics, elites and “subalterns” meet in 
complicated ways. Chatterjee coins the term “political society” to account for the 
dynamics that these social structures sponsor.  In a biopolitical fashion, elites articulated 
in NGOs, state agencies and expert institutions diagnose, intervene and seek to transform 
the underprivileged’s livelihoods without altering the structure of ownership or power. In 
return, in these settings of poverty, these groups “have to pick their way through this 
uncertain terrain by making a large array of connections outside the group—with other 
groups in similar situations, with more privileged and influential groups, with 
government functionaries, perhaps with political parties and leaders. They often make 
instrumental use of the fact that they can vote in elections (…) the instrumental use of the 
vote is only possible within a field of strategic politics” (Chatterjee 2006: 40-41) [Italics 
are mine].  
 Chaterjee’s characterization of Indian political dynamics in squatters’ 
neighborhoods can also be taken out of context to describe the Colombian maquinaria 
[political machine] that mobilizes electoral processes. As in India, the Colombian 
electoral competition is configured within a “field of strategic politics,” where demands 
are mobilized and social and political positions are negotiated. For many Colombians, the 
experience of electoral politics means taking part in the political game to get something 
in exchange that cannot be obtained otherwise, or to fulfill sociopolitical demands that 
are not regularly fulfilled by the state. As Westbrook (2004) diagnoses, this version of 
 140 
liberal politics is most prevalent in our current world where the “grammar of property” 
and where economic capital guide any form of political logics, what he terms “the City of 
Gold.” In this sense, strategic politics is not limited to the dispossessed, the 
disenfranchised and the marginal, but is a condition of politics in itself. In Westbrook’s 
point of view, any social mobilization seeking to guarantee resources for itself in the 
framework of a blurred state falls within the field of strategic politics. Westbrook’s 
interpretation offers an analytical entry to understand political competition in a world of 
uncertainty and instability, where public and private functions are easily interchangeable, 
and where production and labor have become increasingly flexible and deterritorialized. 
Strategic politics as a condition of late-liberal polities explains its prevalence in different 
contexts, from the management of public media, to the backrooms of country clubs, to 
the darkest corners of any third-world slum.  
 This sense that the managing of political behaviors and any form of political 
participation informs political managers works, especially when it comes to directing the 
electoral bases of candidates. Nicolás, a seasoned political manager who unabashedly 
shared his view about politics, understood it as a field guided by the fulfillment of 
personal interests and personal needs, a place to strategically allocate resources: 
“Everyone works within the CVY40 logic. Politicians deliver what you want and you’re 
not voting for an ideal but for the CVY [an interest]. In a way, everyone is looking for 
their own personal CVY [personal interest]; I’m interested in education, that my school 
gets fixed or that I can land a scholarship.” And therefore, as he added half jokingly, half 
seriously, the job of any political manager, of any political strategist is to effectively 
                                                
40 CVY stands for “Como voy Yo” [What’s in for me] a common expression used in politics to exchange 
favors for money, other favors, commodities, etc.  
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manage personal interests in order to align potential voters. However, this management is 
segmented according to a class bias, as Nicolás noted:  
 
The politician knows that there are some proposals that are populacheras 
[vulgar and populist] that are targeted to certain sectors that are very 
difficult to convince because those people [sic] are incredulous. What 
those people [sic] like is getting the ready tiles41 and not the long-range 
technical proposal. They are used to being tricked. You cannot trick the 
wealthy, you cannot promise them to lower taxes and not do it. If you 
don’t deliver they’ll go to the media, they will withdraw their economic 
support for the campaign.  
 
Nicolás’ sense of strategic politics and how interests work is very attuned to the idea that 
the people who run politics are within the political machine, they are the ones who elect, 
the ones with the ability to coordinate actions that will effectively affect decision-making 
in the political realm and therefore affect the contours of political power. Politics is a well 
-oiled machine where different interests come together and are negotiated in very 
complex ways. And these logics often make the machine unfold in places that formally 
look as open and transparent, as the spaces where the voto de opinión is supposed to 
dwell, but that appeal to privatized networks to mobilize action and affect political 
outcomes.  
 
Machine politics  
 Mr. H, a local Bogotanean politician, runs an organization that articulates 
neighborhoods, public offices, national politicians and local leaders. After congress 
elections, Mr. H met with his community leaders and with the representative that he 
                                                
41 During elections it is fairly common to see politicians campaigning in poor neighborhoods and rural 
areas giving away construction materials and tiles in exchange for votes.   
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sponsored, who won a seat in the House of Representatives. It was a time for what looked 
like a political family to celebrate together, a time to thank everyone, and a time to also 
honor those who had mobilized the votes for this political dream to happen. People from 
all strata were there, and the environment was one of familiarity and camaraderie. 
Everyone knew each other, in spite the different places where they lived and worked; 
after all they all belonged to the same political family under the protection of Mr. H. I 
arrived and people stared at me. Although it was a “public” gathering, the masking 
anonymity public spaces offer was not in place here. Strangers stood out in an awkward 
way, like most American anthropologists when doing their fieldwork. Although I was a 
native anthropologist, I clearly didn’t belong. I wasn’t native to that “family,” nor to that 
world.  
I had been invited to the meeting by my friend’s aunt, Mrs. M, who was one of 
the local leaders in a middle-class neighborhood in Bogotá. I had been able to access this 
organization through proximity and referrals, through bonds of trust and familiarity. Mrs. 
M was there with her son, Carlos, who also belonged to the organization. Once there I 
explained that I was doing research on electoral politics and I wanted to learn more about 
the role of the leaders and how these political organizations worked. Contrary to all 
expectations of secrecy that I had, they were eager to show me around, share stories with 
me, introduce me to other members of the organization and point out who the most 
relevant and powerful people were within the organization. Being a person who had been 
referred by a close person to Mrs. M, I became another familiar face to whom she could 
provide some help.  
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Carlos, Mrs. M’s son, was eager to share with me the inner workings of the 
organization and the motivations to be in it. “My mom joined the organization and was 
happy to help out mobilizing voters in our neighborhood under one condition: in 
exchange Mr. H would find me a job in one of Bogotá’s public offices.” And so he did. 
Carlos worked in a local office with other people who also belonged to the organization. 
They were all Mr. H’s people and they recognized themselves as such. Carlos continued 
to explain how having a job in a public office and belonging to an electoral machine 
worked: “In the office, we prioritize to solve those problems that will mobilize the most 
votes.” And accordingly, mobilizing voters is often the way in which citizens find a way 
to bargain with city officials, a way to have the State be delivered to their door, as so 
many times described by the scholarly work that has explored patronage and clientelism 
as an objective sociopolitical organizational function (Strickon and Greenfield 1972; 
Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008).  
The literature on patronage and clientelism often highlights the ties of loyalty and 
personal closeness of these political arrangements as a feature that evinces its political 
pre-modernity. Patronage and clientelism have been mainly placed as a political mode of 
feudal systems or systems that participate in a market economy in limited ways (i.e. 
provincial rural systems with isolated economies). As Gellner points out (Gellner and 
Waterbury 1977: 4), “It is the incompletely centralized state, the defective market or the 
defective bureaucracy which would seem to favor it [patronage].” In this view, patronage 
and clientelism emerges from an objective fracture between local practices and broader 
rationally organized structures. However, this framework falls short when explaining the 
resilience of clientelism in an ideologically constructed technochratic world. Still, even if 
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there are in place exams of qualification, academic titles, transparency advocates 
operating in how state institutions are organized, these political organizations are highly 
effective in directing and delivering the face of the state. The question to ask then is how 
the intertwining of public and private worlds in political management has permeated 
certain arrangements to endure macroeconomic and macropolitical shifts.  
The intertwinement of personal and public worlds that political communication 
industries sponsor is also a constitutive feature of political machines. Although political 
machines as an analytical category seem distant and antithetical to the ideas of post-
industrial, late modern societies, they share this blurring between what we have 
constructed as public and private subjectivities. As explored in this dissertation, affect is 
an instrumental category that political managers crafting public messages use to appeal to 
voters. In the political machine, affect, personal relations and loyalty are capitalized as 
the meat and bones of any political association. The difference between these blurring 
nevertheless lies in its source for legitimacy and at an organizational level. In the world 
of political communication the intertwinement of public and private is the platform on 
which to mobilize anonymous individuals, and these individuals are publicly visible, and 
legitimate as aggregates in anonymous statistics, demonstrations, in tweets and crowds. 
In the world of the electoral machine, on the other hand, faces count. And the 
coordination of political action unfolds as intimacy, loyalty, recognition and legitimacy 
within the political organization provide a solid ground to achieve effective political 
action.  
“People in the organization are very natural and unaffected, no one is 
pretentious,” Mrs. M pointed out to highlight how fortunate she was to belong to this 
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organization. Carlos jumped in to add that he was “treated like a professional” and no one 
looked down on him. Another woman jumped into the conversation to signal, however, 
that they knew their people, and that they knew who was bringing in good work and who 
was not. They know who is a “lagarto,” [lizard] meaning who is in just to obtain personal 
benefit without contributing to the organization as a whole. And the group of people who 
were talking highlighted how important it is for everyone to get a benefit; this sense of 
cooperation and solidarity is a very powerful social glue, especially in a moment where 
the state, its functions, and the ways of belonging to the state are not clear or 
straightforward. Another woman taking part in the conversation in an ironic manner, and 
as an intended pun, started to sing one of the Green Party’s signature political chants used 
to highlight their freedom and the individuality of their political consciousness: “Yo vine 
porque quise, a mí no me pagaron [I came because I wanted to. Nobody paid me to 
come].” Everyone around burst into laughter after the joke. The ironic and subversive 
undertones of the pun was a wink among the people there who knew that in the world of 
the political machine those ideas of transparency, anonymity and disinterested politics are 
simply absurd.  
 
Private networks in public spaces 
 
 Anyone, an anonymous citizen, can step into any of the public gatherings, 
campaign headquarters, political local meetings and activities that politicians hold to 
connect with their electoral base. But being able to be there does not mean accessing the 
political networks that sponsor these spaces. Rather, these spaces are some sort of 
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publicly private spaces open to anybody, but where face-to-face politics, loyalty, 
solidarity ties and relatedness are central to the operability of the space in itself.  
Therefore, the question arises about how to understand these places. The public/private 
divide that liberal politics has delimited to classify and understand collective and 
productive activities as opposed to intimate and more individual activities falls short 
when situated in these spaces where public affairs are discussed among private networks. 
Such social theorists as Erving Goffman (1959) have described these intimate political 
dwellings as “a backstage” of public life, in an attempt to understand the private (privacy) 
within an activity that is eminently public: politics – polis (city). This definition of the 
backstage of public life suggests what is hidden, inaccessible and out of public sight, 
while also defining how public life unfolds. However, these spaces are often open and 
inserted in public life itself, although the networks assembling in these places may not be 
public by definition.   
 Susan Gal (2002) signals this problematic definition of the public and private 
divide, and elaborates on feminist approaches that have questioned this divide as a 
western, male-centered, ideological construct. Gal points to the widespread forms of 
liberal politics that make the public and private divide a real, tangible form of 
categorizing life for people around the world. But, in this author’s view, this is not a 
rigid, binary opposition between public and private, but rather a permanent negotiation. 
Gal understands the public and private divide as operating in a fractal logic; in every 
space of life, people negotiate what is public and what is private, and the divide is 
replicated at different scales. In Gal’s view, “indexical gestures” and “semiotic markers” 
that people enact in different speech acts and practices delimit what is constituted as 
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private and as public. This analysis is fruitful in understanding how political spaces 
where strategic politics is deployed can both be public and private at the same time. The 
spaces are conceived to be public, to deal with public affairs, but the networks that 
inhabit these spaces promote loyalty, intimacy and proximity in order to coordinate 
actions that will affect public life, and therefore through these practices reenact privacy 
while being in the limelight.  
 Political strategists and political managers are well aware of these hybrid forms of 
public and private as a format in which politics is successfully and strategically 
mobilized. Therefore, they also pay close attention to “informal,” non-mediatized forms 
of campaigning, or mediatized forms of campaigning that promote private networks. As 
Gonzalo de Francisco put it when I asked about the mechanisms that political managers 
use to know if a campaign is going well:  
 
There are three ways we know: the focus groups, the polls, and the contact 
with people in the development of the campaign. If you want to see if a 
campaign is doing well, just go to the campaign headquarters and see the 
level of activity (…) if there’s people, if there’s activity and things are 
getting stolen (sic) chances are the campaign is going well. There’s always 
a guy that no one knows standing there (…) When the candidate comes to 
the headquarters he pulls a lot of people as well, and there are some 
systems of information that people know when he (or she) is going to be 
there. People go there to ask him for jobs, and as elections get closer, it 
can get unmanageable and the candidate has to stop going there unless it is 
for concrete things. People won’t go to a losing campaign, there are some 
other people who go to several campaign headquaters, but the campaign 
that gets most people is the one that’s winning.  
 
Bringing attention to the campaign not only from a media perspective but working from 
more lateral forms of communication, such as the spread of gossip and rumors, is central 
to management. Nicolás always reminded me that those candidates elected through the 
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opinion vote and who did not build an electoral base, meaning a stable group of voters 
who would vote for the candidate, would not be incumbents if they did not build that base 
when in office. He used the example of many congresspeople who are unknown in the 
public arena, who rarely are on the covers of any newspaper or on billboards on the 
streets, but who have served several terms as congress people. Usually these candidates 
masterfully handle the negotiation of personal and collective interests in exchange for 
support and votes. Therefore, political managers play close attention to the work that 
political teams put into building and keeping contact with the base. Handling these 
effective forms of political exchange and the political communication strategies that 
come with these exchanges is crucial for making any campaign successful.  
 In a visit I paid to the Chief Assistant to a recently elected representative from Mr. 
H’s organization at the Congress offices in Bogotá, he explained how this intertwinement 
between public affairs and private networks was handled. He started by saying that their 
work was mainly centered in a poor area in the south side of Bogotá, and they mainly 
worked with senior citizens, although they handled “many of the community’s 
problems.” He continued to explain:   
  
The contact with people is very important to us after elections and during 
elections. We as a political organization, or mainly our Representative, is 
not known by public opinion so we have to reach the neighborhoods, go 
there with [development] proposals for the community. If you walk down 
the alleys here in Congress, you’ll see that many of the offices are empty 
(…) we instead have our doors open to listen to people, we are their voice 
and help them mobilize community projects. Our organization has a 
leader, Mr. H, who is a councilman in Bogotá, and we also have 23 town 
councilors working for us, who help us place people’s concerns in local 
and national government offices’ agendas. As a political organization our 
duty is not just political representation but helping start community 
projects at every level.  
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After I left his office, I stood outside with the community leaders who were part of the 
organization and helped mobilize voters for the representative. They were there for a 
variety of reasons, voicing concerns, asking for help, or asking for personal favors. 
Standing in this alley, the strategic mobilization of politics in order to secure certain 
resources became evident, and with it I could see how public affairs and private networks 
intertwined. Not everybody could access the office of the Representative; the people 
there were the people who belonged to the organization and who had different stakes in 
it. Just coming to the Congress offices and the security checkpoints that they have implies 
knowing somebody who can grant you access. As we chatted, the community leaders 
bragged about how many votes they managed to get for the candidate. A woman referred 
to the manager of community leaders for a senator, whom I happened to meet during my 
fieldwork: “I don’t understand how now he has a job in Congress when he didn’t get as 
many votes as other people did.” Her sullen remark encapsulated the dense interplay of 
personal stakes, public affairs and networked forms of organization that come together in 
the mobilization of strategic politics.  
 In a technochratic world of screens and transparency, this dense interplay has 
moved to the TV screen, as it will be explored in the next section.   
 
The Architecture of Loyalty in the era of screens  
 
 The spaces in which affairs get mobilized by private networks entail such 
privatized forms of political communication as gossips and rumors. Political consultants 
in Colombia know that these privatized forms of sharing information are highly effective 
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in affecting the public reputation of candidates. Putting a face to a message, tying the 
message to a person who delivers it, makes the message more credible, especially when 
politics mobilizes in close-knit networks rather than in mass messages. Rather than 
having the vertical reception of a broadcast message, or a message gone viral, word-of-
mouth is tremendously powerful in reinforcing intimacy and “truthiness.” This notion of 
rumors and gossip is very close to the anthropological perspectives on how they operate. 
Rumors and gossip stand as a form of communication defined by function and its relation 
to social and politics contexts (Besnier 2009). Trying to define it as a standalone social 
form can be futile since depending on where it is situated it takes different forms. For 
instance, rumors and gossip have been characterized as a grassroot form of resistance in 
highly repressive environments (Perice 1997; Scott 1990); as solidarity forming 
(Gluckman 1963; Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider 2008); as a way to start conflict 
and push a personal agenda (Stewart and Andrew Strathern 2004); or as a way in which 
elites manage “privileged” information as they reinforce their elite position (Paine 1967). 
Rumors and gossip can be all of the above, and political strategists and consultants are 
well aware of the strategic potential that rumors and gossip have; the key is to manage 
them properly.    
 Nicolás often referred to certain campaign strategies that were very effective in 
stirring a candidate’s reputation. These strategies entailed privatized forms of 
communication in public settings. Nicolás and his firm would hire “actors” to have 
candid and casual conversations about certain candidates in settings such as public 
transportation, parents association meetings in schools, or in line at the voting polls. The 
actors would “share” anecdotes or experiences they had with certain candidates 
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(fabricated but with a degree of “truthiness,” of course), so that other people could 
overhear. These conversations either highlighted positive aspects of the candidate Nicolás 
was managing, or highlighted negative aspects of the opposing candidate. Nicolás 
believed that sometimes these forms of communication were even more effective and 
affected people’s vote more than any spot or political campaign ad, even the most 
brilliant of them all.  
 This strategic mobilization of messages that entails a blurring between private and 
public forms of communication can be analyzed as the traveling of “metapragmatic 
discourse.” As Debra Spitulnik (1996) analyzes in Zimbabwe, media information and 
media talk (public) gets appropriated in daily talk (private) and reworked in different 
ways. She sees a process of decontextualization and recontextualization where 
“audiences” appropriate and also participate in shaping media messages and meanings.  
In the work of political consultants in Colombia, there is a similar process at work where 
messages are crafted objects that travel and get “used” in different contexts.  The 
different “uses” and the different media through which these messages travel create a 
very fluid dynamic between messages that are intended to be all encompassing, to reach a 
national audience, and messages that are appropriated and mobilized among privatized 
networks of communication. However, in recent years and with the broad use of 
television and other media in politics in Colombia, the connection and fluidity between 
mass communication and private networks in the mobilization of politics has become 
more intertwined than ever, and distinguishing them as separate analytical categories is 
futile.    
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 The most striking example of the interplay of these fluid forms of political 
communication was President Uribe’s highly successful media-centered government 
strategy. During Alvaro Uribe’s government his popularity was built on the skillful 
management of public relations, which appealed to facelessness, technocracy and 
impersonality, while also appealing to the intimacy and relatedness that mobilizes politics 
effectively. Many political managers praised his style of government, not for its ethical 
contents, but rather for how accurately he understood the formats of power and used them 
in savvy ways. During his eight years of government, he established the “Community 
Councils,” a style of government that has been typified as “neo-populist”--characterized 
by a very strong nationalist discourse, neoliberal economic measures, instead of the 
protectionist economics characteristic of populist regimes, and a heavy reliance on media 
to manage public affairs (Barczak 2001; Torre 2005; Weyland 2003). Every Saturday 
president Uribe and his cabinet would go to a remote town in Colombia and hold a town 
hall meeting that was televised on public television. Usually these meetings lasted for 
nine hours or more, and although nobody watched them, everyone knew about them. In 
these meetings, people would line up to ask the president himself to solve their most local 
problems, from the pavement of a street, to the protection of their lives.42 Often, the 
president himself handed the checks of public subsidies to people who came to the 
councils, as if it was he and not the state that was doing a favor to the people who needed 
it most.  
                                                
42 In 2003, Tito Díaz Salgado, the mayor of El Roble, Sucre, a small town in an area where the 
paramilitaries had a very strong influence, used the community council to ask for Uribe’s protection: “Mr. 
President, they are going to kill me,” referring to the politicians and paramilitaries who were after him. He 
was murdered days after this public intervention.  
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 In 2007, I came to one of these community councils in Santa Marta, Colombia, 
where my uncle was an elected public official.  I was in the city visiting my family and I 
heard the rumor that in a week’s time they would have a community council meeting. As 
a naïve outsider, it seemed funny to me that the information about the council traveled as 
a rumor instead of as a public announcement about a scheduled event. Two days before 
the council the rumor was confirmed to be true --the council was taking place. My uncle 
told me that he could get me in as long as he could register my name in “the system.” The 
only requirement to be registered was my ID and my full name. He called me late the 
night before the community council to inform me that I was one of the last names that 
had been able to be registered. At that point I really could not figure out what were the 
criteria to participate in these spaces. Everything seemed highly technochratic and 
impersonal, but when looking closer it was not quite. Apparently if you knew someone 
who had access to “the system,” access was granted.  
 Once there, after three checkpoints in which they asked my name, and the 
organization I represented (I said I was accompanying my uncle and they let me through), 
we got into the building disposed for the meeting. It was a conference room constructed 
in a “tropical style.” Once in the room the intense heat from the studio lights, the cables 
scattered all over the room, the huge TV screens and the TV cameras, gave the 
appearance one was entering a TV studio. There was chaos and movement all over the 
place. People were arriving, greeting each other, chatting, just like as in a meeting among 
friends. Journalists were chasing the local mayors, the governor of the region, and of 
course the high official that had come from Bogotá.  I could feel the piercing glances of 
those habitués of the councils. It felt as if they were regular characters in a TV series and 
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we the “new ones,” just unknown stuntmen. As I learnt later through my uncle, most of 
the people there knew each other; as he described them, “They are part of a portion of the 
population in Colombia who make a living out of politics.” And they belong to very tight 
networks that meet in different public arenas.  
The room came to a climatic frenzy when the main character of the show arrived, 
the president. He stepped into the room surrounded by his bodyguards and followed by 
his cabinet. Journalists were hurling themselves over one another frantically. They were 
pushed away by the bodyguards. Everyone in the room rose either to salute the president 
or take a glance at him. When he came to the area of the auditorium were I was, people 
stood up and stretched their hands eagerly to greet him. He responded with a frozen smile 
and a “an affectionate greeting to all of you.”  I was sitting in the second floor of the 
auditorium so I could not quite reach Uribe’s hand. I was not even going to try to shake 
his hand, but the people around me encouraged me to get up and try to shake the 
president’s hand. They even gave me, literally, an extra push. I stretched as far as I could 
encouraged by these people (and afraid that they would take my negative as an anti-
patriotic gesture). I felt someone pushing me, I turned around and the lady sitting next to 
me was grabbing my rear, pushing me so I could reach. It was a grotesque scene: The 
lady with her hands on my rear, me trying to be the elastic woman and the president 
bending over, all in the midst of a yelling crowd and the TV cameras. I came back to my 
seat after my failed attempt and the lady sitting next to me, who had just grabbed my rear, 
just gave me this disappointed face and remarked that it was a pity I had not shaken the 
president’s hand.  
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Once the meeting started, for every topic discussed the responsible minister, and 
even vice-minister, was there to answer mainly the president’s questions. He dropped 
questions on statistics and the status of public constructions. The ministers rushed to their 
notes, opened their laptops, made phone calls in order to answer promptly and correctly. I 
was able to see some nervousness as they answered the inquiries. Efficiency seemed to be 
the act they were displaying. The president either congratulated, asking the audience to 
applaud, or publicly dismissed the ministers’ interventions with further questions about 
the explanations of the delays in their work. Furthermore, efficiency was displayed at its 
fullest when the president asked to sign a public contract onsite instead of waiting to do it 
through the appropriate office; he even suggested names to name the public works that 
would be done.  
The mismatch between technochratic styles and their contents was more 
noticeable when the conversation shifted to micro-credits. As the president started talking 
about the topic, the people sitting in front of me stood up. They did not look like public 
officials but rather like common farmers of the region. They all wore the same t-shirt 
with institutional propaganda on micro-credits. At this point, I thought I had found civil 
society, the “communities” that these councils were advertised for but that up until that 
point I had not seen. However, they were also part of the “political” community that my 
uncle had described earlier. The president introduced them as beneficiaries of the mobile 
credits of the Banco Agrario [Agrarian bank]. These people had applied for credits and 
had been successful at getting them. As the president explained to the auditorium –
mastering his knowledge of the region – usury was one of the main problems that people 
lived in their day-to-day lives. Therefore the government was relieving their grievances 
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with these easy-to-access credits.  Rather than being spontaneous participants in the 
meeting, the people in the t-shirts were brought in to illustrate a government policy.  
The president began to ask each one his or her particular story. Each answered 
and took advantage of the air-time to bring up other concerns about their personal credits. 
For every inquiry the president programmed a meeting with either the appropriate 
minister or vice-minister. He even asked the police chief of the region to accompany 
these people to pay the usurer. I thought it was a joke but after a few repetitions of the 
same line, I could tell the president meant it as a command. Before giving away the 
credits, the president asked for a priest. One came to the center stage and blessed the 
credits. People prayed for the money they had just received from the government, 
thanking God, and of course, the president. After the blessings a protocol picture was 
taken showing the beneficiaries of the credits receiving the checks from government 
authorities.   
During my fieldwork during 2010, a joke circulated to ironically describe this 
style of government which combined technochratic formalities and clientelistic forms of 
doing politics: This was the M.I.T government, a government that combined ‘manzanilla 
y técnica’ [clientelism and technique]. However, every observer of politics noticed how 
effective the skillful management of public spaces and private networks was in 
mobilizing the political. Both forms played on a deep desire for transparency that in 
contemporary discourses is the standard for ethical politics (Marilyn Strathern 2000) and 
on the effective and reliable power of coordination of action that privatized networks 
managing resources have. Political strategists and political managers took note.  
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Chapter*5*
Unrelenting*Hope:*Invoking*Democracy*in*a*“Failed”*State*
*
 In 1991, the student movement transformed Colombia’s institutions by achieving 
the unthinkable: calling for the reformation of the political constitution of 1886. A new 
political constitution was drafted that granted more citizen participation in a system that 
had been highly exclusionary. The hope was that these reforms would deliver peace and 
institutional stability therefore ending years of non-declared civil war. As years passed, 
peace seemed further away. War continued to be the daily bread for the next generation. 
The leaders of the student movement grew up seeing their youthful dreams never coming 
to concretion, but nevertheless, never losing the hope for a democracy that would 
eventually arrive.  
 In this chapter, I focus on the work of the Misión de Observación Electoral 
(MOE), a civil society NGO that works on electoral monitoring and whose executive and 
research directors were leaders of the student movement. Alejandra Barrios and Claudia 
López have never stopped fighting, and they continue to believe that another democracy 
is possible; despite it has not yet arrived. They work in partnership with international 
European and American NGOs and funding agencies, as well as with international civil 
society volunteers who come to Colombia to guarantee the fairness of the electoral 
process. During my fieldwork, I participated as the coordinator for the International 
Observation Missions and I was puzzled by the unrelenting hope that keeps burning in 
spite of a sense of living in a context of stagnant and ossified political institutions. 
Moreover, international actors joined in the fierce defense of Colombian political 
institutions also driven by a sense of shared hope for a country that is not theirs.  
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 For all the people who participate in MOE election after election, local and 
international, hope materializes in the use of statistics and objective, observable data that 
surpass a widespread feeling that politics will never, ever change. As many people say to 
convey this feeling, politics is politics after all. I argue that by standardizing electoral 
processes and performing those standards in the unfolding of the electoral observation, 
NGOs set the plausible grounds for, and partially recreate, a democracy that will 
eventually come. This sense of future is constructed by negotiating a sense of agency 
where present and future intermingle, and that reframes individual and collective 
grassroots power in the midst of overarching power structures.  
This chapter is organized around three themes. I first look at the double-edged 
legitimating work that NGOs do for themselves and for local governments by using 
statistical language. In doing so, NGOs carve a space for civil society to exist and lay the 
foundations for strong institutions that will eventually come, and also anticipate and 
prefigure the democratic practices that these institutions are supposed to support. I then 
move to understand statistics as a language of hope that allows imagining plausible 
realities and shaping present contexts different from historical trends. Last, I look at hope 
as the location of horizontal internationalism that complicates notions of late liberal 
imperialism and unidirectional understandings of geopolitical power.  
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Broken promises, hopeful dreams, again 
 
Todo ciudadano tiene derecho a participar en la conformación, ejercicio y control del 
poder político. 
Artículo 40 – Constitución Política de Colombia43  
 
 
Alejandra Barrios, former leader of the student movement that pushed for the 
reform of the constitution in 1991, was a leading figure in the foundation of MOE in 
Colombia in 2006. During this year, Claudia López, journalist, researcher at MOE, and a 
life-long friend of Alejandra who also was involved in the leadership of the student 
movement in the early 1990s, had publicly denounced in her column in El Tiempo the 
ties between paramilitaries and elected congresspeople. The political constitution and the 
country that both Alejandra and Claudia had envisioned as young university students, and 
that had materialized, at least on paper (Lemaitre 2009), were under imminent threat. The 
very organ of democracy, congress, had been dramatically co-opted by the dark forces of 
death, the paramilitaries; the same forces that cruelly murdered villages under the strident 
sound of chainsaws and loud popular music played at full blast to harmonize their 
spectacle of horror44. 
In 1991 they pushed for the reformation of the constitution asking for a more 
participant and transparent democracy, motivated by the strong indignation that the 
rampant institutional corruption and violence caused in this youth, as was explored in 
                                                
43 “Every Citizen has the right to participate in the conformation, exercise and control of political power. ” 
Political Constitution of Colombia (1991)  
44 This image alludes to El Salado massacre were paramilitaries terrorized the population for days. 
Surviving victims tell that as the paramilitaries tortured the civilians, they played loud music and consumed 
alcohol to the point of oblivion.  
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chapter two. The social movement successfully attained its goal by articulating and 
translating a global language of open markets, individual responsibility and civic 
participation to localized sentiments, by bridging political “universals” of democracy and 
transparency constructed internationally with the realities at home (Delazay and Garth 
2002). In 2006, Alejandra and Claudia felt that call again, and technification, 
transparency and participation once again provided the language to reclaim politics.  
 The idea of organizing a mission for the elections in 2006, as Alejandra 
remembers, seemed like a crazy one due to the lack of resources and the short time they 
had to organize it. At first, the idea was to bring the electoral monitors that the 
Organization of American States (OAS) sends when member countries require them. 
Alejandra and other NGOs working in human rights and governance sent several formal 
requests to Alvaro Uribe’s government asking for international monitors. After months of 
sending many letters, and of arguing that Colombia could request electoral monitors 
given that the electoral legislation included a clause allowing the government to request 
so, there was no answer. Frustrated by the government’s silence, but motivated by a 
strong will to reclaim Colombia from the forces that had installed narco-regimes of 
horror, Alejandra and a network of collaborators decided to organize an observation 
mission as Colombian civil society. Their legal framework was Article 40 of the Political 
Constitution that grants the right to political participation to any citizen. For Alejandra, 
that fundamental civil right allowed her to organize observation missions as a citizen: 
“We as citizens can do whatever is not forbidden by the law; [electoral observation] 
wasn’t forbidden.”   
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Alejandra knocked on every door possible, and her allies became the international 
community working in governance in Colombia, such as USAID and Swedish 
International Cooperation, and local catholic pastoral organizations and human rights 
NGOs. Based on the documents on electoral monitoring that the Carter Center and the 
OAS had developed as standard observation practices, Alejandra put together a document 
for Colombia. Her international partners referred her to the director of CAPEL45, José 
Thompson, who provided the technical expertise to put the observation exercise in 
motion. For the legislative elections in 2006, 776 Colombian observers authorized by the 
Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)46 observed the elections in six major cities, and eight 
towns in areas controlled by illegal militias.  Since then MOE has become a legitimate 
voice in monitoring elections in Colombia, a reliable source for political information and 
for exercising political control, in spite of the adverse conditions of corruption and 
violence that year after year threaten elections.  
In fact, the members of MOE, the national directory and the regional directions, 
continue to work for the dream of a democracy not yet realized, a dream always under 
threat.  Colombia lives in a perpetual state of emergency, amidst tacit, but still tangible, 
civil war (Tate 2007). Periods of relative peace are interspersed in between massacres, 
kidnappings, and corruption scandals. For many workers of peaceful governance, what is 
achieved in one day is shattered by a macabre event the next day. There is an acute sense 
that politics will never change, and the NGOs that work directly in monitoring political 
power work within this framework of stagnation and repetition, eternally negotiating their 
                                                
45 The Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion is a branch of the Inter-American Institute of Human 
Rights based in Costa Rica, an authority in the defense and promotion of human rights in Latin America.  
46 The CNE is the central organ that regulates elections.  
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sense of frustration and helplessness and a hopeful outlook. As Alejandra clearly 
conveys,  
In the congressional elections, we observed the same old practices. We 
didn’t see anything different. The same clientelism, although before 
wasn’t as evident as in this election. Still we have the same families [in 
power]. (…) 
That’s why [NGOs] end up working in human rights issues, in education 
for democracy, in [promoting] participation mechanisms but there’s little 
work in exercising political control, when in the regions you would have a 
great capability of doing so. But going out to fight is very verraco 
[extremely difficult and requiring courage]. The factor of who is who, of 
who is giving out public contracts weighs a lot, especially if you’re 
depending on the state to have social access, or to have education or 
healthcare. You’ll be facing a few families that have the power. You can 
maybe exercise political control in Bogotá, Cali, Medellín and 
Barranquilla [the big cities] but not in the smaller ones where you face the 
monster of the state being the main employer. This is tragic for NGOs. In 
Bogotá we work with funding from international cooperation, but 
sometimes, regional NGOs depend on public contracts. That’s why the 
umbrella of MOE is relatively effective. From the direction we can say 
things that cannot be said locally, or even that haven’t been thought 
locally, but that we can say because it does not really affect us if a mayor 
or a congressperson stops talking to us.  
 
In this bleak political landscape of powerlessness, for MOE and its collaborators hope is 
the last thing to lose. In spite of the adverse conditions that many MOE workers face, 
every election they go out to observe, making the democracy for which they long 
somewhat tangible, somewhat real. Stories of heroism and technique animate this sense 
of hope. As I was meeting the local coordinators, I came across Padre Eliécer Soto, a 
very well respected activist in Barrancabermeja, one of the most violent regions in 
Colombia. As Alejandra later told me, Padre Eliécer embodies courage and respect, and 
in his actions he makes democracy happen. The first time that Padre Eliécer organized an 
observation mission, he walked in front of the observers to act as a human shield since 
“those people [paramilitaries] believe that killing priests is bad luck.” Election after 
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election he goes out and judiciously collects statistics, even if it means risking his own 
life.  
In anthropological literature, the intrusion of both international NGOs in local 
governance and standardized political epistemologies (Pandolfi 2003; Paley 2001), 
particularly in third-world countries, has been many times critiqued as a late-liberal form 
of colonialism (Elyachar 2006) in which power differentials and territorial and economic 
scales (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) are assembled in complicated ways. Although these 
analyses illuminate convoluted realities in many parts of the world, this framework 
overshadows how international partnerships and standardized languages materialize 
hopeful outlooks.  
 In the months that I worked for MOE I had to learn a new language. I had to make 
a radical break from the cynical outlooks that often are associated with politics. The 
practitioners of politics I worked with rehashed a very particular form of pragmatism, 
closer to cynical reason (Sloterdijk 1987) --“We know what we’re doing and we’re still 
doing it”—a pragmatism anchored in the pressures of winning elections, of navigating 
local powers and therefore reproducing them.47 But, MOE’s work cannot be classified as 
the public and complicit scripts of the powerless that reproduce structures of power, 
while unavailingly defying these in private (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Scott 1990) -- another 
brand of cynicism often explored in contexts of explicit individual powerlessness and 
ossified political representation (Yurchak 2006).  
Despite working in a context where the news features a scandal every day but 
                                                
47 My dissertation project analyzes the intertwinement of free-market ideologies, classism and politics in 
post-reform Colombia. I carried out fieldwork among political consultants, political managers and 
politicians, and observed the particular technologies they deployed during elections that reconcile a class-
segmented polity with participatory democracy.  
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where political structures remain rigid and immovable, MOE’s work is unapologetically 
hopeful. I borrow elements from both Miyasaki’s (2006) and Crapanzano’s (2003) work 
on hope to frame the work of electoral observation in Colombia as an epistemic, 
experiential and affective operation that materializes a yearned democracy in the present. 
As Miyazaki (2006:130) reminds us, inspired by Ernest Bloch, “[t]he method of hope 
therefore revolves around radical temporal reorientation of knowledge and its replication 
of past hope in the present.” But it is not just knowledge. Hope dwells at the interstice of 
experience and analysis (Crapanzano 2003), as a reflexive encounter that connects lived 
experiences and reflexive forms of self-fashioning, of being in and feeling the world 
(Faubion 2011). This operation results in the production of particular senses of agency 
that invert seemingly immovable power structures. Hope recursively gives shape to and is 
maintained by forms of expertise that translate ambiguous affective worlds into particular 
technologies that materialize desires for the future in the present (Boyer 2008). But, these 
materializations are not just translations and cultural codings of a subliminal, trans-
cultural form of hope. Nor are these statistics the shape “the field of desire in waiting” 
takes in this particular context (Crapanzano 2003:19). Hope is a performative, an 
utterance of future, that does things in the present, to paraphrase Austin (1975). Hope 
constructs contexts by invoking the future in the present, grants meaning and is in 
dialogue with ways of being in the world.  
MOE’s work is not anchored in the past, it looks to the future and this gaze has 
particular materializations in the present. It is grounded in laying the foundations for a 
democracy that will eventually come, a democracy that was designed with the 
constitution of 1991 but that never came to fruition. The youthful dreams of the students 
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who envisioned a different political reality matured into a struggle to lay the concrete 
foundations for that dream to come true. And here there is no cynicism, nihilism or 
paralyzing doubts about the work they are doing. Anchored in another kind of 
temporality, MOE tiptoes around the heavy burden that a long-standing legacy of 
violence and usurpation has left behind: an incredulous public culture condemned to 
eternally repeat the self-fulfilling prophecy of a failed state (Bushnell 1993)48.  
 
Legitimacy, the sturdiest foundation of them all 
 
 Electoral monitoring is deployed in contexts of political instability and weak 
democratic institutions. The point of these exercises of observation is to pose the eyes of 
the international community on a particular election to make sure it is legitimate. This 
international exercise has many times being critiqued as masked neo-colonial forms of 
tourism (Soremekun 1999), or as evidence of very complicated macro political power 
plays that bring into question western definitions of sovereignty (Coles 2007).  
 However, the internationalism at stake in electoral observation in Colombia is 
also anchored in the hope to bring democracy to a place that offers the chance to make 
things right, to design a democracy from scratch, and therefore oversee that it effectively 
acts in the best interest of the majority. As Santa-Cruz (2005) describes, among the first 
observation missions in the Western Hemisphere were conceived at the intersection of an 
urgency to protect republican life and human rights on one side, and the Wilsonian 
internationalist principle of national self-determination, on the other. In the 1960s, the 
                                                
48 In Colombia, the idea that we live in a failed state that is not able to guarantee basic rights and citizen 
security is a widespread public sentiment as well as a very well-formed idea enrooted in academic thought.  
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first exercises of electoral monitoring sponsored by the nascent OAS were justified under 
a broader framework of the protection of human rights and democracy. The hope was that 
if these tenets were assured, this would guarantee the success of nations and therefore the 
harmonious orchestration of internationalism. A healthy world depended on healthy, 
successful individual nations. For this to happen, rocky political contexts could use an 
extra hand from fellow nations.  
 In Colombia, the birth of MOE, as Alejandra recalls, is justified under the broader 
umbrella of civil rights, of the right to participation. Calling for electoral observation as a 
basic civil right gave the legitimate justification for international observers to participate, 
at some capacity, in the sovereign ritual of national elections. In spite of the reservations 
and critiques (sometimes very well justified) to which these kinds of international 
exercises give rise, the presence of international electoral observers in Colombia does not 
undermine sovereignty. Rather, the presence of international observers strengthens 
governance by rendering state institutions legitimate.  
This process of legitimating of the Colombian state occurs twofold: it is a matter 
of legitimating the state through international presence and through the use of solid 
statistical methods. First, the presence of an international contingent of observers means 
that the elections that the government calls for are legitimate to some extent, but they are 
at risk of being co-opted by obscure forces. If elections were plainly illegitimate, 
electoral observers would not even make the effort to travel great distances to engage in 
this very physically and emotionally demanding exercise. Second, observers have to 
adjust to the statistical language of the state in order to participate in a legitimate regime 
of representation.  
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Ted Lewis, the director of Global Exchange, an American-based human rights 
NGO, in partnership with MOE organized a pre-electoral observation mission that 
assembled several members from American NGOs. In the intense week they worked in 
Colombia, they traveled to “hot” regions to observe the pre-elections period. Before 
departing, they received training about elections in Bogotá, and visited the major political 
parties’ headquarters and the central offices of electoral regulating entities. To guarantee 
their security, MOE contacted the police. MOE’s regional coordinators saw this initiative 
as a move that relieved them of the burden of being in charge of the security of the 
American delegation. When the American mission came back to Bogotá after working in 
the regions, they complained about having the police by their side. As Ted Lewis 
expressed, “Colombia is nerve-wracking, we don’t feel safe.” This image was partially 
fueled by the desire for adventure, but also grounded in the very real horror stories of 
state officials working along side illegal groups. To respond to these complaints, MOE 
incessantly explained that the government was not our enemy, and that we worked within 
the legality of the state. Therefore, we trusted and supported the police forces.  
This first friction was further irritated when the missions denounced the use of a 
government subsidy program (Familias en Acción) for electoral purposes. The American 
mission found that local politicians threatened poor populations to withdraw the subsidy 
if they did not vote for pro-government candidates. The American missions denounced 
the fact by making overarching claims about the government in general, suggesting this 
was a practice orchestrated from the highest levels of government. The negative reactions 
from government officials to these accusations threatened the legitimacy of MOE as a 
neutral NGO. The impasse was hashed out between the two organizations and the 
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government when the American observation mission adjusted their framework to the 
language and methodology that MOE used. They offered statistical evidence and concrete 
proof of how the subsidy program was being used specifically by certain politicians. The 
results were presented to government authorities with a very positive response.  
These two vignettes show the careful work that MOE does in balancing their 
claims within the available and recognized vehicles of the state. In this way, observation 
missions are double-edged swords that seek to prevent fraud, but at the same time give 
legitimacy to the governments sponsoring the elections. As Ted framed his work as a 
seasoned international observer,  “If there’s a system that doesn’t provide basic levels of 
fairness, to observe that election is to give credibility to something that at its base is not 
credible.” Therefore, their presence in Colombia stood in grey areas, of fighting illegal 
electoral practices for the sake of the common good while giving legitimacy to the 
government.  
The balance between denunciation and legitimacy is central to design a 
methodology oriented to reproduce a hopeful political future in Colombia. Careful 
statistical work is crafted to provide a legitimate voice for MOE to be in dialogue with 
the government, international actors and civil society. The Mapas de Riesgo (Risk maps) 
are among the strongest tools that have consolidated MOE’s voice as a truthful source of 
electoral knowledge. By collecting statistics that government agencies and independent 
academic research groups gather regarding terrorist attacks during elections, MOE 
predicts which municipalities are at greater risk and therefore need more state security as 
well as closer electoral monitoring. MOE combines this work with the information that 
electoral observers collect in highly technical forms, where different forms of fraud and 
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illegal activities are typified as easily observable categories. Working within the systems 
of information that the government has set up gives MOE a halo of impartiality, 
regardless of the political leanings that the officers in the organization may have. At the 
same time, by working within the government’s system of information, and by pairing up 
with international organizations, MOE gives legitimacy and credibility to government 
institutions.  
 Mario Mitre, a representative of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in 
Colombia, frames this legitimating function of statistical information for elections:  
 
I believe that the technification of the observation was very important. I 
don’t know if you remember this email that said that there was fraud [in 
the presidential elections] because the records did not match; the Green 
party people said that the records of a table didn’t match the ones that we 
had in Registraduría49.  And the work that MOE did of taking a random 
sample and we saw that there wasn’t a systematic difference, therefore 
there was no fraud. This [exercise] puts everything into context. We can 
evaluate what the system did well, how it complied with the law, and also 
point fingers when needed. This is positive.  
 
Statistics clean the “political” from electoral discourse, so to speak. Any political tinge, 
any bias, is swept away by the standardizing power of statistics and its claims to 
objectivity (Urla 1993). States express forms of biopolitical control, a form of control that 
is not anchored in partisan political discourse but in concerns of preserving life, through 
the framing power of statistics (Foucault 2007; Mitchell 2006). This is the language that 
MOE has adopted to be a legitimate state interlocutor, a legitimate voice of civil society. 
                                                
49 Registraduría is another of central regulating organ for elections and citizen information. They are in 
charge of counting the votes and gathering, processing and centralizing all of the electoral information. 
During the elections of 2010, Green Party members approached MOE after Mockus’ dramatic defeat. They 
were concerned that Santos had won due to electoral fraud. For a week, all of us at MOE compared the 
records submitted by the electoral authorities at the voting polls with the centralized information in 
Registraduría.  
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MOE is a guardian of democratic life, and in a country with high incidences of political 
violence, preserving democracy is an attempt to preserve life itself.   
This strategic process of self-legitimating via statistical representation has 
unexpectedly resulted as well in a process of legitimating government institutions. MOE 
has learned to see and talk like a state, to speak the same language, and to participate in 
the same regimes of representation (Scott 1999). In this move legitimacy occurs twofold: 
the recognition of the government, an authoritative voice, of the work of MOE grants 
them the recognition of being an organization that works within the legitimate regimes of 
truth, therefore speaks the truth. But also, MOE, conceived as being part of civil society, 
that entity that in liberal democracy is conceived both to regulate and be regulated by the 
state, grants legitimacy to a government that is supposed to represent the best interests of 
their people.  
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Talking hope through statistics 
The temporality and particular regime of representation articulated in statistical 
language is commensurable and compatible with the language of hope. As Miyazaki 
explains, hope is the experience of the “abeyance of agency,” the suspension of taking 
action in one’s own hand, and therefore a suspension of a sense of self. This suspension 
entails letting go of one’s ownership of one’s past, present and future, and is thus rooted 
in a temporality that lives the present as open. Hope dwells in the “now-time,” a time that 
is not marked or determined, a time that is shaped by its own unfolding. In his own work 
among Fijians claiming their territorial rights, Miyazaki observed how ritual repetition 
produced a seriality where the suspension of agency was followed by the return of 
agency, in a seriality that fulfilled expectations of hope, and maintained that flame alive. 
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This ritual seriality worked by first posing a problem without solution, a long-standing 
problem that dragged a sense of historical depth along, followed by giving a solution, 
often coded as a form of divine intervention. This ritual seriality rendered past, present 
and future as an embodied experience, constitutive of subjectivity, rather than just being a 
mere timeline to frame events that unfold. The idea of being determined by the past, 
trapped in events coming from the past, then suspending one’s own sense of agency in 
the present since one cannot really change the conditions inherited from the past, and 
looking towards a plausible change in the future as the present unfolds, marks a hopeful 
approach to the experience of being. In this sense, hopeful discursive practices are very 
similar to performatives, those utterances that shape reality as they are being uttered:  
“performatives get their presentness by being interpreted with reference to the context 
they create. They get their temporality by a process of elimination since they have no 
explicit tense marking – they can be neither past nor future. Instead they are interpreted 
as being indexically linked to the context of utterance, since they create what they index” 
(Lee 1997: 265-266 ). As Lee signals following the work of John Austin (1975), 
performatives connect indexicality and meta-indexicality, a second-order, reflexive 
interpretative context that creates context in itself. Hope arises from and grants meaning 
to hopeful environments that are sketched with the utterances of hope. In this play, 
agency is constantly negotiated in relation to broader structures that overburden 
individual action.   
Statistical representation follows a very similar logic, and in the work of MOE, 
statistics provided the logical building blocks for a narrative of hope about Colombian 
political reality, in spite of the sense of living in a world of permanent violence and 
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stagnant, ever-lasting structures of power. Statistical representation is the language of 
modernity and progress, and it encompasses a modernist form of representation 
embedded in a temporality oriented to the future (Asad 2002; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 
1994). The variable correlations that statistics provide connect past, present and future by 
framing tendencies in retrospective view; by ordering the present in categories of 
normalcy and outliers and by drafting plausible outcomes through probabilistic 
operations. Therefore, statistics is the main tool for imbuing the present with future, with 
“our modern hopes and fears” (Asad 2002: 75). Baselines, interventions, plans and 
measures are reflections of our complex “ethical plateaux” (Fischer 2003), our hopes to 
change the present and stir the future, but with a sense that we cannot really change the 
past, only measure it and represent it.  
The day of the congressional elections of 2010, observers were deployed in 
different voting polls across Colombia. Some international observers supported local 
observation missions in different towns and cities; many others stayed in Bogotá to carry 
out an itinerant observation route that would provide additional information to enrich the 
observation results. As the coordinator for the international missions, and resorting to 
ethnographic knowledge, I explained to our international observers the importance of 
their job: with unfamiliar eyes, they would see patterns and behaviors that we the 
Colombian observers were unable to observe due to the familiarity we had with the 
voting practices. I designed a route of observation that would take us to different voting 
sites across socio-economic contexts. We started by going to the wealthiest parts of town 
and slowly moved to the most peripheral areas of the city, the feared neighborhood of 
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Altos de Cazucá50; and ended in Corferias, the largest voting facility in Colombia, to 
observe the closure of the voting tables and the process of counting of votes.  
Previous to Election Day, MOE offered a workshop to explain the use of the 
observation forms, as well as basic training in electoral legislation and electoral fraud. In 
the training, MOE staff reenacted different electoral frauds while the trainees acted as 
election officers and observers. This playful activity that often provoked chuckles and 
laughter was meant to highlight the role of electoral observers at the voting poll: stoicism 
and technique. Observers are not there to confront, directly denounce or stop illegal 
voting practices. Rather, they are a “symbolic presence”—as we so many times 
explained—recording facts in technical forms to later be used by the heads of MOE to 
make appropriate recommendations backed up by statistical facts. In this sense, the 
organization of MOE is built upon a combination of trust and discipline. As Alejandra 
explained, “the process of construction of all this [the instruments for electoral 
observation] is totally democratic, but on Election Day this works militarily (…) since we 
deal with politics, it can easily get out of hand.” If an observer who is not authorized 
makes inappropriate remarks to the media, or interferes with the electoral process in any 
way, it can jeopardize the whole mission. Therefore, MOE observers are just eyes and 
ears, but not mouths. The mouths are statistics, the directors of MOE and some of the 
coordinators.  
                                                
50 Displaced populations fleeing war in other areas of the country have mainly populated this 
neighborhood. Urban militias of FARC, Paramilitaries and violent gangs operate in this area.  
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Electoral Observation Training Workshop  
 
For many of the international observers this non-intervention policy was difficult 
to understand. The question arose if we actually had any impact or were of any 
consequence as guardians of democracy. The doubts were heightened by the extended 
observation exercise. We started our day at 7:00 am in order to be at the first observation 
site for the setting of the voting polls. The excitement of this moment, seeing the judges51 
set up the tables was soon worn off by the repetition and slowness of Election Day. This 
initial moment where things are happening is followed by many hours of repetition and 
tedium. The judges check IDs, hand out ballots, and ask for signatures, over and over 
again. The itinerant observation, moving around the city, added another component of 
exhaustion. A Polish observer kept the spirits up by translating jokes from Polish to 
                                                
51 Common citizens are required as part of civil duty to perform the role of judges at the voting polls. They 
hand out the ballot, write down the citizens’ IDs and at the end of the day count the votes and record the 
results in the official forms.   
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Spanish while we were in the van, but the fierce Andean sun, and the long time in the 
van, took its toll. By the time we arrived to Corferias to observe the closure of elections 
at 4pm, we were sunburnt and exhausted.  
 
 
Election Day – International Observers  
 
Another brief period of excitement was followed by frustration. When arriving at 
Corferias the police did not want to let us in. My explanations in my Colombian accent 
were not getting us anywhere. A French observer who had long lived in Colombia 
resorted to a fake broken Spanish to prove how “international” we were. The police 
escorted us inside. We were hyped, there was some action going on. Once there, we had 
been assigned certain tables to observe, from the 840 tables that had been set up in this 
facility where over 600.000 citizens where registered to vote. The hope was to reinforce 
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the local observers already there by having a bigger spread to cover the tables chosen to 
be part of a random statistical sample for MOE to monitor. The closing of the tables 
started, followed by the vote counting. I had estimated we would be there for one hour. 
An hour turned into three, and we had not seen the whole process. The voting ballot had 
recently changed and the judges did not have the tools to properly count the votes. At the 
tables I was observing, the judges took two hours to count 40 votes and record the 
information in the institutional forms. This was a common episode at all the tables 
observed. The judges did not know how to navigate the system. This chaos was enhanced 
by the presence of “electoral witnesses,” hired by the political parties, whose duty is to 
observe that the votes for their parties are properly counted. Arguments, exasperation and 
frustration invaded everyone at Corferias. As observers we could not say anything. And 
this sense of helplessness, of this surmounting lack of agency, brought the spirits down. 
As we joked with many of the observers, we reached a point where we wanted to just 
jump in and count the votes ourselves.  
We finally decided to leave. Some tables took six hours to close. And it was not 
electoral fraud that we saw but the bewildering encounter that citizens have with the 
technical language of the state, a Kafkaesque nightmare come true. Once back at MOE 
headquarters we wrote a report to frame the observations we made. All of the observers 
conveyed how frustrating it was to see that the most salient threat to the sacred ritual of 
democracy was not even an evil plot but sheer negligence and misinformation. As we 
reported the facts to the directors, and tossed in some funny anecdotes that built a 
narrative of adventure, the initial sense of helplessness and frustration quickly 
transformed in a hopeful outlook that our efforts would pay off. We were writing a 
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report, and we would also resort to the statistics collected in the forms, to make 
recommendations to Registraduría of how the electoral process could be improved. In the 
electoral observation ritual, a second-order ritual of observing the ritual of elections, we 
had experienced the “abeyance of our own agency,” enacted in the stoic role that as 
observers we had to take, serially followed by reclaiming our own agency by putting 
together a narrative of intervention backed up by statistical knowledge and direct 
observation. The presentness of the observation practice, which entails being there 
without talking or resolving problematic situations, turned into a gaze into a plausible 
future with a stronger electoral system, a gaze that was materialized through certain 
recommendations for intervention we as MOE had made. Despite the long-standing 
structures of power, we were taking action to change them, therefore constructing a 
narrative of hope. 
 
Close encounters in hope  
 
The negotiation of a sense of agency in a context of asymmetrical power 
structures that fuels hope also enables horizontal partnerships in macro-political contexts 
that invert geopolitical power differentials. In the observation missions, civilians from 
around the world, national and international organizations, and funding agencies come 
together with a same purpose but for different reasons, thus sharing a sense of hope that 
looks very different depending on where it is situated. Hope taken as an object of cultural 
significance, as an affective experience that invokes sheer humanity but at the same time 
is culturally placed (Crapanzano 2003; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990), is also strategically 
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mobilized (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001b). And this does not mean that it is less 
real, or cynical. Rather, the desires for the future articulated in hopeful outlooks reveal 
the confluence of scales and power differentials in the making and unfolding of local 
dynamics, what Sassen (2007) has termed “the strategic geography of globalization.” 
Hope and the actions that deliver it, as well as the intended and unintended consequences 
these actions bring, are placed in a web of states, institutions, actors and scales. Hope is 
strategically placed in the most unsuspected places, often to bring hope somewhere else.  
This is particularly the case of MOE and the U.S.-based institutions, agencies and 
NGOs that funded and supported their work. The array of U.S organizations often had a 
conversation about the U.S. rather than a conversation about Colombia. But Colombia 
was the place that offered food for thought to think about different, plausible futures not 
just for Colombia, but also for the U.S. and for the world. MOE was caught up in the 
middle of these conversations, receiving funding or dealing with the consequences of 
changes in U.S. international policy, either by reframing electoral monitoring tools, or 
highlighting parts of their work more aligned with the funders’ goals. MOE receives 
funds from USAID, technical help from NDI, support from IRI52 and has strong 
partnerships with Global Exchange, an NGO that has done important electoral work in 
Latin America.  
For the elections of 2010, USAID provided major funds for MOE to mobilize the 
observation missions across the country. USAID also works in partnership and partially 
channels funds through NDI and IRI. Both of these organizations work with the same 
purpose: to strengthen political parties around the world and give assistance in the design 
                                                
52 The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI).   
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and consolidation of best practices for transparency and participation. As Mario Mitre, 
NDI consultant, explains:  
[NDI and IRI] are complementary. We are not contractors of USAID, we 
have a contractual agreement [with USAID] for smaller amounts of 
money. USAID gives us the directives that a program should have but we 
are independent, and they ask us to propose actions based on our 
experience. NDI is in charge to propose and handle one part and then IRI 
proposes and handles another part.  
 
NDI has worked with MOE in providing technical expertise to standardize the 
observation forms and to systematize the electoral observation information. IRI for its 
part, during the election of 2010 sent an observation mission to an area of Colombia that 
MOE had no capacity to cover, but where IRI had established a working base.   
The involvement of U.S.-based development agencies in developing countries 
around the world has often been characterized as a late liberal form of imperialism 
(Arturo Escobar 1995; Williams 1962). “Imperialism means the practice, the theory, and 
the attitude of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory (…) In our time, 
direct colonialism has largely ended; imperialism, as we shall see, lingers where it has 
always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, 
ideological, economic, and social practices” (Said 1994: 9). Although this analytical 
umbrella articulates certain elements that frame U.S. - Colombian relations, it also 
overshadows the more complex power dynamics that unfold in contexts where different 
institutional actors are advancing their political agendas, even when these institutions all 
come from the metropole. “Americanists,” scholars of U.S. international policy and post-
colonial theorists have identified U.S. international power as a contradictory mix of 
economic and military expansionism, and a redemptory innocence rooted in religious 
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ideas of “manifest destiny,” justified through ideologies of exceptionalism that posit the 
U.S. as the true bearer of freedom and democracy (Hardt and Negri 2000; Kaplan and 
Pease 1994).  
But, as Lutz (2008) warns, “empire is in the details.” And it is very difficult to 
diagnose a monolithic, unidirectional and direct form of imperial power in a world where 
economic dependencies are not state-centered, where transnational corporations have 
overtaken some of the functions of states, and where military intervention and 
international humanitarian solidarity often come in pairs. Lutz calls for an ethnographic 
research program that focuses on the specific practices, networks and forms of exchange 
where empire appears, sometimes intertwined with other forms of internationalism that 
do not imply unilateral forms of dominance.  
At the level of the work of USAID, NDI and IRI with MOE it is possible to 
observe certain dependencies rooted in asymmetrical power. On one hand, at a macro 
level, one observes the alignment of moral frameworks, a nuanced and culturally rooted 
form of domination. The synchronicity of goals of MOE and USAID do not come as an 
imposition but as organically linked. Such paring up is what scholars of empire have seen 
as the ideological work of the U.S during the twentieth century, a “soft” imposition of a 
single possible and desired version of political organization (Hardt and Negri 2000).  
On the other hand, looking at more specific practices, these asymmetries can be 
observed in how priorities are delineated.  The reliance on funding to operate, and the 
ideological implications that accepting this kind of funding has, bring uneven forms of 
power. USAID determines regions of assistance according to its own priorities informed 
by the debates developing in Washington, D.C. Colombian NGOs and government 
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agencies apply to grants that require specific work in certain regions or on specific topics. 
For instance, since President Obama has been in office, U.S. agencies have focused their 
work in those regions with a high concentration of Afro-colombian populations, which 
are also the poorest regions in the country. Accordingly, MOE makes sure that these 
populations are a priority in order to access the resources that USAID provides. MOE 
therefore participates in a debate about structural racism and governability that is not just 
bound to Colombia but that is unfolding directly in the United States. Colombia is a 
drawing board where these debates get extrapolated, sometimes having echoes and 
consequences in altering and shifting asymmetrical relations of power, both here and 
there.  
But, when looking at other forms of internationalism like civic solidarity, 
unidirectional forms of power become less obvious. The work of Global Exchange and 
MOE shows how hope abroad brings hope back home, established through horizontal 
relations. The drive for Ted Lewis, director of Global Exchange, his motivation to go 
abroad and sometimes be in dangerous situations, is a problem of human solidarity, and 
an expectation to realize democracy, no matter where. For him “elections provide a way 
for people to resolve conflicts,” and fighting for more transparent elections means a more 
peaceful world. His involvement in Colombia has to do with a debate he and his group 
hold with the U.S government. Countries abroad provide the space to oversee the U.S. 
government, that government that, back in the U.S, is very difficult to access. Ted Lewis 
highlighted his meetings with the U.S ambassador to Colombia and the director of 
USAID in making his voice heard, meetings that were possible thanks to the partnerships 
that MOE had with representatives of the U.S. government in Colombia. Back in the 
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U.S., this level of access is granted to those close to Washington, D.C, but groups with 
less notoriety seldom have a chance to encounter policy makers.  
The work of U.S.-based civil society NGOs abroad unveils how in this world of 
contemporary empire, the center-periphery relations are visible in these encounters in the 
“hinterlands,” where anything coming from the center is lumped into the same networks, 
made easily accessible, regardless of the disparities in the metropole. And this lumping 
effect holds the possibility of inverting asymmetrical relations, at the expense of empire 
itself. For Ted, a true believer in “democratic solidarity,” traveling to other countries is a 
problem of overseeing government and defending democracy in the face of interests that 
are contrary to it. He works within the networks and logics of empire to invert them. For 
him this means contesting power back home when the conversation is happening abroad. 
This unexpected placement show how multiple and disperse state power is in a world 
where internationalism complicates state apparatuses (Fraser 2007), and therefore how 
hopeful solidarities can happen in the most unexpected places. By traveling abroad he 
keeps his hope alive to change things back home, to bring democracy to the U.S and also 
to change those places with long histories of violence and death like Colombia.  
In 2004, Ted was part of one of the early experiments of observation within the 
U.S. The group observed elections in five states:  
 
Part of the reason why we did that, besides the intrinsic value of what we 
were doing, we learned a great deal about our country and the weaknesses 
in our democracy by doing that.  It was a big learning curve for us because 
we had not put our own elections under that lens. But also we wanted to 
make it clear that international electoral observation wasn’t just one thing 
that people from the U.S did in other countries, it was an active 
democratic solidarity, in fact we wanted people to use the same techniques 
and push democracy forward in the U.S. Until the election in 2000, which 
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was a complete fiasco, the U.S. people were very complacent with the 
electoral mechanisms in our democracy. And in fact the United States has 
one of the most backwards electoral practices in the hemisphere because 
they are very old practices, they are extremely regionalized; in the U.S 
there are 3000 different election districts (…) we have all kinds of crazy 
different elections laws which don’t mesh. Even places like the Carter 
Center would not observe elections in the U.S. because the kind of 
standardization that they insist on as a basic bottom line for possible 
observation does not exist in the United States.  
 
By bringing back home the practices exported abroad, Ted Lewis reclaimed the hope for 
democracy for the U.S and for the world. MOE and Ted, in spite of the geopolitical 
differences, shared an earnest and hopeful belief in a democracy that will eventually 
come, if citizens take action. For both of them, hope is therefore the point of confluence 
to negotiate a sense of agency in the face of long-standing, and historically deep, 
structuring power structures, both here and there. By opening the present to the future, 
the languages of hope recreate the possibility of a different future, in the present.  
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Conclusion*
 
On September 2012 President Juan Manuel Santos announced the beginning of a 
peace process with the FARC guerrilla, the oldest guerrilla in the world. After 50 years of 
war justified by the uneven and unjust distribution of wealth, Colombia and its other, 
those territories ruled by the guerrillas and not the state, are laying the grounds to become 
one. The peace process has spurred many reactions among the Colombian public. Most 
noticeable are the opinions expressed by former president Álvaro Uribe, who strongly 
rejects Santos’ approach to end the war. Through his twitter account, Uribe voices every 
day his opposition to Santos’ government and expresses his feeling of betrayal. Santos 
was elected on Uribe’s platform and since he has been in power, he has distanced himself 
from this platform. Constantly quoting the ‘third way,’ reconciliation and unity, Santos’ 
government has been characterized for its diplomacy, both domestically and 
internationally. Uribe disagrees with what he considers a “soft” approach that threatens 
the security achieved during his government through military control. Twitter is Uribe’s 
forum, and in this virtual realm he throws darts at the government and galvanizes a 
conservative political base. Is Uribe constructing a political project on Twitter? Are 
social media and media in general the channels through which politics is mobilized?   
Twitter has become one of the most used tools by politicians in Colombia. 
Antanas Mockus heavily relied on social media for his campaign in 2010, as this 
dissertation has explained throughout. Gustavo Petro, mayor of Bogotá since 2011, has 
been accused of governing on Twitter rather than governing the city, and Álvaro Uribe 
exercises his opposition to the government through Twitter. This tool allows politicians 
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to hold permanent “focus groups” and take the temperature of the Colombian public. 
Since the introduction of political marketing to Colombian politics in the mid-80s, social 
research tools have become politicians’ best ally, to the point that, as it was explored in 
chapter four, focus groups and now social media are increasingly becoming government 
itself.  
 But, the big questions still remain, and are worth posing: has political marketing 
dramatically change the face of politics in Colombia? Are we before a new kind of 
democracy? Are personhood and citizenship being redefined? The rise of marketing 
within politics, and the use of new technologies for governments and political leaders to 
communicate with citizens has brought to the fore these questions every time society has 
faced major technological innovations. The rise of mass broadcasting media, such as 
cinema, radio and later television, led social observers to diagnose the “eclipse of the 
public sphere,” to borrow John Dewey’s words in 1927, or the death of liberalism and the 
“refeudalization of the public” as Jurgen Habermas sullenly diagnosed in 1961 in the 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. To others, like Edward Bernays (1951) 
or Water Lippman (1927), this realignment of society presented hopeful opportunities for 
knowledgeable elites to stir the future of uneducated masses in the best interest of the 
common good. In this new era, Bernays (1951) wrote, democracy is “the freedom to 
persuade.”   
With the popularization and democratization of television in the last decades of 
the twentieth century, and with the expansion of Internet coverage and social media in the 
first decades of the twenty-first century, social observers have again stepped in to 
diagnose a radical redefinition of democracy. Some see the emergence of sophisticated 
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political marketing technologies fashioned to read the public mind and tailor political 
debate according to those readings as the true realization of people’s will.53 Some others 
believe the Internet materializes true democracy (Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 
2007), while yet others have diagnosed the demise of public life and the triumph of 
individualism (Sloterdijk 2011). The introduction of these technologies to Colombia has 
opened as well this line of questioning, and political practitioners in Colombia stand as 
well in different camps. As explored throughout the dissertation, clientelistic 
arrangements continue to be an important channel through which politics is mobilized. 
Therefore, some political practitioners see the introduction of new technologies as a 
radical shift away from this “traditional” form of politics, while others see new 
technologies just as new public fora that do not really compete with the actual means 
where politics is produced, that of the face-to-face negotiation of interest.    
Working among these expert elites, and exploring their informed outlook on 
Colombian and world politics, I was very tempted to work within the framework of their 
questions and preoccupations. Worried about new ways to lure the Colombian public, or 
to deeply stir political behavior among Colombians, political practitioners are interested 
in the causes and effects of certain technologies, or if x, y or z conditions are dramatically 
affecting the way politics is being shaped. By “going native,” and participating in the 
dialogues that these question arise, I got lost. With the introduction of political marketing 
and new technologies, Colombian politics has radically changed, and at the same time 
has also remained the same. New forms of coordinating political action have emerged, as 
                                                
53 The Century of the Self (Curtis 2002), a documentary of the BBC interviews several political strategists 
in the U.S who share this view. Dick Morrison, a prominent political consultant who has also worked in 
Colombia, states in the documentary that marketing tools are a way to shape government according to 
people’s will, and therefore realize democracy.  
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well as novel ways to administrate political behavior. However, the small circles where 
political interest is negotiated, and that determine the institutional directions of the 
country, remain integral to Colombia’s political life.  
As it has been explored throughout the dissertation, the introduction of political 
marketing intersected with historically deep class structures, to reproduce social 
segmentation within the political system, despite the country’s institutional commitment 
to political inclusion, participatory politics and multiculturalism, which are consecrated in 
the political constitution of 1991. This intertwinement has produced a strategic form of 
politics that combines the kind of politics that political marketing manages, and that 
travels through the channels of media, and the politics of close-knit networks of 
allegiance where political interest is negotiated. In this sense, politics has both changed 
and stayed the same: certain segments of the population experience politics through 
(new) media, and therefore experience politics through the novelty of those media; while 
certain others experience them through old-fashion face-to-face politics.  
Beyond this descriptive observation, the question about the “newness” of political 
marketing has injected to the Colombian political system does not lead much further. 
However, it does bring attention to “technological innovation” in politics, and what using 
different technologies for political purposes entail. Looking at politics from the 
technologies and communication practices that mobilize it, offers a more nuanced picture 
of what political practice looks like in relation to macro-institutional shifts. This is 
precisely the contribution that a technological understanding of politics brings to the 
table: seeing politics as a practice that is interconnected to the world, and to an extent 
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producing the world, and not just as a manufactured ideological construction that 
overshadows “real” economic and social processes.  
In this sense, a technological approach to politics that focuses on the “logics of 
design” (Handelman 1998), the materials, practices and techniques through which 
political competition is produced resonates with the preoccupations that Bruno Latour has 
put to the fore in his explorations of laboratory studies to frame the ecological 
connections that produce scientific facts. As Latour (1983:159) observes about 
laboratories, “I claim that, on the contrary, laboratories are among the few places where 
the differences of scales are made irrelevant and where the very content of the trials made 
within the walls of the laboratory can alter the composition of society.” Electoral politics 
behave similarly. The techniques and negotiations of electoral politics are left to a few 
expert groups and networks of allegiance, what has been identified as the “political field” 
that contains its own inner distinct logics. However, this field is not disconnected from 
society as a whole, and it is in dialogue with, and sometimes stirs, macro-logics and 
macro-structures. Within the political field society is changed, and this change ranges 
from the different forms of liberal political subjectivity, to how liberalism solves or 
reproduces its inner contradictions. Paraphrasing Foucault, liberalism is a practice that 
can be observed in the circles where politics is practiced.  
In this way, contrary to Latour, I do not see scales as being irrelevant. I actually 
call for the attentive observation of the intertwinement of economic logics and political 
logics in how political transactions occur, and the scales at which these intertwinements 
are operating. This route of analysis steps away from normative understandings of 
political behavior that have been produced in specific political contexts and that have 
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been reproduced in scholarly work. Rather, this approach that privileges technologies and 
practices in the political arena invites the researcher to thoroughly observe how these 
normative horizons, these forms of order, are produced in the first place. Also, this 
methodological approach presents a clearer picture of how macro-systems shift in 
formats that from the surface look as the same good ol’ politics. 
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